16 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1908–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wyler v. Tripigreen2 sentences2026This is because “ ‘the application of the general rule “would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.” ’ ” Weidman at ¶ 14, quoting O’Stricker at 87 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 (1971). 2025This is because “ ‘the application of the general rule “would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.” ’ ” Weidman at ¶ 14, quoting O’Stricker at 87 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 (1971). | 5 | 8 |
Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Foundationgreen2 sentences2007However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, the discovery rule applies where “ ‘the application of the general rule that a cause of action exists from the time the negligent act was committed would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.’ ” Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d at 113 , 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 , 54 O.O.2d 283 , 267 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 20} Accordingly, we decline to adopt a rule establishing death as a per se cogni 2007However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, the discovery rule applies where “ ‘the application of the general rule that a cause of action exists from the time the negligent act was committed would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.’ ” Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d at 113 , 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 , 54 O.O.2d 283 , 267 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 20} Accordingly, we decline to adopt a rule establishing death as a per se cogni | 3 | 6 |
Weidman v. Hildebrandtgreen2 sentences2026This is because “ ‘the application of the general rule “would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.” ’ ” Weidman at ¶ 14, quoting O’Stricker at 87 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 (1971). 2025This is because “ ‘the application of the general rule “would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.” ’ ” Weidman at ¶ 14, quoting O’Stricker at 87 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 (1971). | 2 | 2 |
O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp.green1 sentence2024We reached that conclusion because “the application of the general rule ‘would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.’” O’Stricker at 87, quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164 , 168 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiongreen2 sentences2010Opportunity Comm. (1983), 462 U.S. 669, 678 , 103 S.Ct. 2622 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 89, fn. 14 (“ ‘The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the application of the general principle to 6 January Term, 2010 women employees’ ”). 2010Opportunity Comm. (1983), 462 U.S. 669, 678 , 103 S.Ct. 2622 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 89, fn. 14 (“ ‘The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the application of the general principle to 6 January Term, 2010 women employees’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.green1 sentence2008See Stivinson v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co . (1997), 80 Ohio St. 3d 498 , 687 N.E.2d 458 . {¶ 24} While it is true that a fight was involved in this case, a mere fight does not automatically invite the application of the general rule that injuries sustained in a fight are not compensable. | 1 | 1 |
Tuck v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998The court reasoned: Although the exigency in the present case involved the protection of animal life rather than human life, we believe that the "public interest" in the preservation of life in general and in the prevention of cruelty to animals in particular "requires some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid search warrant is a prerequisite for a search." Id. at 1120 (citations excluded), quoting Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753 , 759 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 2590 . | 1 | 1 |
Finley v. Duffygreen1 sentence1967See Finley v. Duffy, 88 Ohio App. 159 ; Hennekes v. Maupin, 119 Ohio App. 9 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Liddell v. SCA Services of Ohio, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006However, in situations such as the case at bar, the application of the general rule `would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party's right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.'" Id. at 87 , quoting Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164 , 168 , 54 O.O.2d 283 , 267 N.E.2d 419 , overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111 , 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438 , at syllabus. {¶ 36} The O'Stricker court noted the rationale underlying all statutes of limitations: To ensure fairn | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Arkansas v. Sanders
red
2 sentences1998The court reasoned: Although the exigency in the present case involved the protection of animal life rather than human life, we believe that the "public interest" in the preservation of life in general and in the prevention of cruelty to animals in particular "requires some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid search warrant is a prerequisite for a search." Id. at 1120 (citations excluded), quoting Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753 , 759 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 2590 . 1998The court reasoned: Although the exigency in the present case involved the protection of animal life rather than human life, we believe that the "public interest" in the preservation of life in general and in the prevention of cruelty to animals in particular "requires some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid search warrant is a prerequisite for a search." Id. at 1120 (citations excluded), quoting Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753 , 759 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 2590 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Clark v. Hawkes Hospital
green
1 sentence1985Rather, it is “when a patient actually discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered an injury which is the result of malpractice.” Clark v. Hawkes Hospital (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 182, 183 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hennekes v. Maupin
neutral
1 sentence1967See Finley v. Duffy, 88 Ohio App. 159 ; Hennekes v. Maupin, 119 Ohio App. 9 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Life Ass'n v. Winn
neutral
1 sentence1908The cases of Life Insurance Company v. Winn, 96 Tenn., 224 , where the declarations were offered by the beneficiary himself; Nix v. Donovan, 18 N. Y. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.