application of the general rule in California

2025We conclude that the Harvey-Madden claim has no merit.5 Marques testified that when he contacted Duff he already knew about the “three 5 The Attorney General makes a strong argument that Pamela’s evidentiary claim is forfeited because he did not make a timely and specific objection under Harvey-Madden, citing People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548 (“bar against raising a Harvey-Madden issue for the first time on appeal is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely

2013(People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 918 ; see People v. Eckstrom (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 323, 332 [failure to object to evidence on the same ground as urged on 8 appeal precludes appellate review of the issue].) This bar "is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal." (People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 (Rogers).) The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a "contrar

2023Jury instructions that relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process (Carella v. California, supra, at p. 265; accord, People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 491 ), but CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant’s guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances” (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 , overruled on another ground by People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 257 ; accord, Pe

2010(People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 577 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation at Trial, § 142, p. 202.) The instructions “clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant’s guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ].) Defendant claims that the circumstantial evidence instructions undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as appl

2025An ancillary injunction should not issue as a concomitant to a declaratory judgment unless the pleading and proof demonstrate that the traditional requisites of injunctive relief have been met. 19 When the plaintiff has failed to prove any facts which would entitle him to any affirmative relief beyond a declaration of his rights, the issuance of an injunction is error.” (California Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 32 (California Water), italics added.) This is an application of the general rule that in declaratory relief actions, parties seeking injuncti

2025An ancillary injunction should not issue as a concomitant to a declaratory judgment unless the pleading and proof demonstrate that the traditional requisites of injunctive relief have been met. 19 When the plaintiff has failed to prove any facts which would entitle him to any affirmative relief beyond a declaration of his rights, the issuance of an injunction is error.” (California Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 32 (California Water), italics added.) This is an application of the general rule that in declaratory relief actions, parties seeking injuncti

2025(See City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co. (1930) 209 Cal. 105, 151 (City of San Diego) [“This . . . is an action purely declaratory in character and is one wherein the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor attempted to prove any facts which would entitle it to any other or affirmative relief beyond [declaratory relief].

2025(See City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co. (1930) 209 Cal. 105, 151 (City of San Diego) [“This . . . is an action purely declaratory in character and is one wherein the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor attempted to prove any facts which would entitle it to any other or affirmative relief beyond [declaratory relief].

2022Code, § 353; see generally People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [“a defendant forfeits an argument on appeal where he fails to object” at trial]; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301 [“We have long held that a party who does not object to a ruling generally forfeits the right to complain of that ruling on appeal”; “[t]his bar ‘is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal’”].) 6 2.

2007This claim is not cognizable on appeal because defendant failed to object at trial to Jesse Smith’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right. “[A] defendant who fails to object to a court’s permitting a witness to assert the privilege against self-incrimination may not challenge the ruling on appeal.” (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493 , 114 P.3d *520 742]; see also People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 34-35.) This bar “is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the abse

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1981Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; People v. Pacific Guano Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [ 132 P.2d 254 ]; see 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943) § 4701 et seq., p. 333 et seq.) The application of the general rule to the pension exemption was recognized in In re Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 534 [ 106 P.2d 873 , 131 A.L.R. 222 ], where this court said: ‘There is no exception in the exemption laws which would authorize the satisfaction of an alimony judgment out of exempt property belonging to the husband and it is not the province of the courts to read such an exception into

1960(See People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [ 150 P.2d 812 ]; People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [ 146 P.2d 469 ].) They deal with proof of “each fact which is essential to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant’s guilt,” the use of evidence “susceptible of two constructions or interpretations,” and the relationship required between “the proved circumstances” and possible hypotheses.

1960(See People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [ 150 P.2d 812 ]; People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [ 146 P.2d 469 ].) They deal with proof of “each fact which is essential to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant’s guilt,” the use of evidence “susceptible of two constructions or interpretations,” and the relationship required between “the proved circumstances” and possible hypotheses.

1960(See People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [ 150 P.2d 812 ]; People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [ 146 P.2d 469 ].) They deal with proof of “each fact which is essential to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant’s guilt,” the use of evidence “susceptible of two constructions or interpretations,” and the relationship required between “the proved circumstances” and possible hypotheses.

1960(See People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [ 150 P.2d 812 ]; People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 154-155 [ 146 P.2d 469 ].) They deal with proof of “each fact which is essential to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant’s guilt,” the use of evidence “susceptible of two constructions or interpretations,” and the relationship required between “the proved circumstances” and possible hypotheses.

2024(Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 30 .) “This rule is an application of the general principle of contract law articulated in Civil Code section 1657, to the effect that, ‘[i]f no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hat constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending upon the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the facts of the particular case.’” ( Wagner, supra, at p. 30 .) Although there is no uniform or single test for determini

2024(Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 30 .) “This rule is an application of the general principle of contract law articulated in Civil Code section 1657, to the effect that, ‘[i]f no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hat constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending upon the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the facts of the particular case.’” ( Wagner, supra, at p. 30 .) Although there is no uniform or single test for determini

2018(See, e.g., *46 Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 [there can be more than one final judgment " ' "when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party" ' "].) When viewed from the perspective of Burkhalter's alter ego claim against Hamilton, it is apparent that Hamilton is a prevailing party on the contract.

2018(See, e.g., *46 Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1 , 9, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 [there can be more than one final judgment " ' "when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party" ' "].) When viewed from the perspective of Burkhalter's alter ego claim against Hamilton, it is apparent that Hamilton is a prevailing party on the contract.

1963In the first cited Sears case it is said: ‘The Corporate Securities Act clearly prohibits a foreign corporation from soliciting in California a sale of stock of its own issue without first securing a permit, even though in good faith the issuance of the stock and transfer of title are to take place in a foreign state. ’ (People v. Sears, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 773, 791 [ 292 P.2d 663 ].) *747 “The contention that the status of Meng and Shrader as corporate directors and officers precludes the application of the general rule cannot prevail.

1963In the first cited Sears case it is said: ‘The Corporate Securities Act clearly prohibits a foreign corporation from soliciting in California a sale of stock of its own issue without first securing a permit, even though in good faith the issuance of the stock and transfer of title are to take place in a foreign state. ’ (People v. Sears, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 773, 791 [ 292 P.2d 663 ].) *747 “The contention that the status of Meng and Shrader as corporate directors and officers precludes the application of the general rule cannot prevail.

2025If proximate causation is established, the defendant’s level of culpability for the homicide in turn will vary in accordance with his criminal intent.” (Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 872, fn. 15 .) In other words, the label “provocative act murder” is “merely shorthand used ‘for that category of intervening-act causation cases in which, during commission of a crime, the intermediary (i.e., a police officer or crime victim) is provoked by the defendant’s conduct into [a response that results] in someone’s death.’ ” (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 663 ; see Mejia, at p. 612 [provocative ac

2023Jury instructions that relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process (Carella v. California, supra, at p. 265; accord, People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 491 ), but CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant’s guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances” (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 , overruled on another ground by People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 257 ; accord, Pe

2023The California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “reduce or weaken the prosecution’s constitutionally mandated burden of proof or amount to an improper mandatory presumption of guilt.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375 [CALJIC Nos. 2.01 & 2.02]; accord, People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 , 792–794; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 286 .) Given this settled law, defendant fails to explain how the mirror-image instruction, merely modified to address circumstantial evidence of intent or mental state as it concerned the defenses, c

2023Jury instructions that relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process (Carella v. California, supra, at p. 265; accord, People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 491 ), but CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant’s guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances” (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 , overruled on another ground by People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 257 ; accord, Pe

2023The California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “reduce or weaken the prosecution’s constitutionally mandated burden of proof or amount to an improper mandatory presumption of guilt.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375 [CALJIC Nos. 2.01 & 2.02]; accord, People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 , 792–794; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 286 .) Given this settled law, defendant fails to explain how the mirror-image instruction, merely modified to address circumstantial evidence of intent or mental state as it concerned the defenses, c

2023Jury instructions that relieve the state of its burden of proving every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process (Carella v. California, supra, at p. 265; accord, People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 491 ), but CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant’s guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances” (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 , overruled on another ground by People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 257 ; accord, Pe

2022Code, § 353; see generally People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [“a defendant forfeits an argument on appeal where he fails to object” at trial]; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301 [“We have long held that a party who does not object to a ruling generally forfeits the right to complain of that ruling on appeal”; “[t]his bar ‘is but an application of the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal’”].) 6 2.

2021Bill No. 1511 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 22, 2018, Aug. 24, 2018, p. 1.)” (Medeiros, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155.) 12 prospectively (Stats. 2007, ch. 420, § 2), we conclude Navea is not entitled to the application of the general rule as there is not “some doubt” regarding the Legislature’s intent in enacting the sunset provision.