application of the general rule in Pennsylvania

1973See Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272 , 122 A. 2d 705 (1956).” Under the evidence in this case the jury could have found that Denise’s conduct would not in and of itself have caused the accident.

1973See Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272 , 122 A. 2d 705 (1956).” Under the evidence in this case the jury could have found that Denise’s conduct would not in and of itself have caused the accident.

1973It ‘is only an application of the general principle that the fact that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the defendant in producing an injury does not relieve the defendant from liability unless he can show that such other cause would have produced the injury independently of his negligence,’ Carlson v. A. & P. Corrugated Box Corporation, 364 Pa. 216, 223 , 72 A. 2d 290, 293 (1950).

1973It ‘is only an application of the general principle that the fact that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the defendant in producing an injury does not relieve the defendant from liability unless he can show that such other cause would have produced the injury independently of his negligence,’ Carlson v. A. & P. Corrugated Box Corporation, 364 Pa. 216, 223 , 72 A. 2d 290, 293 (1950).

2018The ownership of the surface carries with it, if there be no obstacle to the application of the general rule, title downward to the center of the earth and upward indefinitely.” See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v, Hughes, 183 Pa. 66 , 691 38 A. 568,569 (1897) (emphasis added).

2018The ownership of the surface carries with it, if there be no obstacle to the application of the general rule, title downward to the center of the earth and upward indefinitely.” See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v, Hughes, 183 Pa. 66 , 691 38 A. 568,569 (1897) (emphasis added).

2002Promissory estoppel has historically been utilized in instances where one of these essential elements is not present. “[T]he phrase ‘promissory estoppel’ and this nomenclature is well chosen as indicating that the basis of the doctrine is not so much one of contract, with a substitute for consideration, as an application of the general principle of estoppel to certain situations.” Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 501 , 196 A. 39, 41 (1938); see Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 398 , 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000).

2002Promissory estoppel has historically been utilized in instances where one of these essential elements is not present. “[T]he phrase ‘promissory estoppel’ and this nomenclature is well chosen as indicating that the basis of the doctrine is not so much one of contract, with a substitute for consideration, as an application of the general principle of estoppel to certain situations.” Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 501 , 196 A. 39, 41 (1938); see Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 398 , 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000).

2008Luke’s Hosp., 755 A.2d 20, 23-24 (Pa.Super.2000).

2002Promissory estoppel has historically been utilized in instances where one of these essential elements is not present. “[T]he phrase ‘promissory estoppel’ and this nomenclature is well chosen as indicating that the basis of the doctrine is not so much one of contract, with a substitute for consideration, as an application of the general principle of estoppel to certain situations.” Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 501 , 196 A. 39, 41 (1938); see Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 398 , 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000).

2002Promissory estoppel has historically been utilized in instances where one of these essential elements is not present. “[T]he phrase ‘promissory estoppel’ and this nomenclature is well chosen as indicating that the basis of the doctrine is not so much one of contract, with a substitute for consideration, as an application of the general principle of estoppel to certain situations.” Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 501 , 196 A. 39, 41 (1938); see Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 398 , 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000).

2002In an effort to remedy the injustice caused by a promise that is reasonably relied upon and then broken the courts have awarded “damages where justice requires.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90; Travers v. Cameron County School District, 117 Pa. Commw. 606, 613 , 544 A.2d 547, 551 (1988).

2002In an effort to remedy the injustice caused by a promise that is reasonably relied upon and then broken the courts have awarded “damages where justice requires.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90; Travers v. Cameron County School District, 117 Pa. Commw. 606, 613 , 544 A.2d 547, 551 (1988).

2001See generally Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that “[i]f subsequent safety improvements to a product could be used as evidence that prior models were defec lively designed, this would discourage manufacturers from continuing to update and improve upon the safety features of their products after initial manufacture”).

2001See generally Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that "[i]f subsequent safety improvements to a product could be used as evidence that prior models were defectively designed, this would discourage manufacturers from continuing to update and improve upon the safety features of their products after initial manufacture").

1989In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), the Supreme Court discussed the Fourth Amendment and exceptions to its warrant requirements: These [exceptions to the warrant requirement] have been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search.

1989In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), the Supreme Court discussed the Fourth Amendment and exceptions to its warrant requirements: These [exceptions to the warrant requirement] have been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search.

1987Here we are concerned with a specific application of the rule which holds that “ ‘where descriptions in a deed refer to a driveway as a boundary, which is not a highway or dedicated to public use, the grantee does not take title in fee to the center of it but by implication acquires an easement or right of way over the lands.’ ” McAndrews v. Spencer, 447 Pa. 268, 270-271 , 290 A.2d 258, 259 (1972), quoting Taylor v. Gross, supra 195 Pa.Super. at 231 , 171 A.2d at 617 .

1987Here we are concerned with a specific application of the rule which holds that “ ‘where descriptions in a deed refer to a driveway as a boundary, which is not a highway or dedicated to public use, the grantee does not take title in fee to the center of it but by implication acquires an easement or right of way over the lands.’ ” McAndrews v. Spencer, 447 Pa. 268, 270-271 , 290 A.2d 258, 259 (1972), quoting Taylor v. Gross, supra 195 Pa.Super. at 231 , 171 A.2d at 617 .

1986In Commonwealth v. Cooper, 319 Pa.Super. 351 , 466 A.2d 195 (1983), we analyzed the case law in other jurisdictions and determined that "restitution is permissible only as to losses flowing from the conduct for which the defendant has been held criminally accountable." 319 Pa.Super. at 356 , 466 A.2d at 197 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

1986In Commonwealth v. Cooper, 319 Pa.Super. 351 , 466 A.2d 195 (1983), we analyzed the case law in other jurisdictions and determined that "restitution is permissible only as to losses flowing from the conduct for which the defendant has been held criminally accountable." 319 Pa.Super. at 356 , 466 A.2d at 197 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

1981“It thus involves nothing more than an application of the general standard of reasonable care to a specific situation,” Lewis v. Mellor, supra, 259 Pa.Super. at 526 , 393 A.2d 941 , and “the standard of care is the same in every negligence case, only the circumstances differ.” Eichman v. Dennis, 225 F.Supp. 531, 533 (E.D.Pa.1963) (applying Pennsylvania law).

1981"It thus involves nothing more than an application of the general standard of reasonable care to a specific situation," Lewis v. Mellor, supra, 259 Pa.Super. at 526 , 393 A.2d 941 , and "the standard of care is the same in every negligence case, only the circumstances differ." Eichman v. Dennis, 225 F.Supp. 531, 533 (E.D.Pa. 1963) (applying Pennsylvania *27 law).

1981See also Westerman v. Stout, 232 Pa.Super. 195, 200 , 335 A.2d 741, 744 (1975) where we held that the jury must determine “that the party confronted with the emergency acted in a reasonable manner in light of the circumstances.” It would seem the appropriate charge, therefore, is still one of reasonable care under the circumstances and the fact that one is involved in an emergency situation not of his own creation simply presents additional circumstances which the jury must consider in determining whether or not the actor acted reasonably. 1 The term, “honest exercise of judgment,” introduced

1981See also Westerman v. Stout, 232 Pa.Super. 195, 200 , 335 A.2d 741, 744 (1975) where we held that the jury must determine “that the party confronted with the emergency acted in a reasonable manner in light of the circumstances.” It would seem the appropriate charge, therefore, is still one of reasonable care under the circumstances and the fact that one is involved in an emergency situation not of his own creation simply presents additional circumstances which the jury must consider in determining whether or not the actor acted reasonably. 1 The term, “honest exercise of judgment,” introduced

1981See also Westerman v. Stout, 232 Pa.Super. 195, 200 , 335 A.2d 741, 744 (1975) where we held that the jury must determine “that the party confronted with the emergency acted in a reasonable manner in light of the circumstances.” It would seem the appropriate charge, therefore, is still one of reasonable care under the circumstances and the fact that one is involved in an emergency situation not of his own creation simply presents additional circumstances which the jury must consider in determining whether or not the actor acted reasonably. 1 The term, “honest exercise of judgment,” introduced

1981See also Westerman v. Stout, 232 Pa.Super. 195, 200 , 335 A.2d 741, 744 (1975) where we held that the jury must determine “that the party confronted with the emergency acted in a reasonable manner in light of the circumstances.” It would seem the appropriate charge, therefore, is still one of reasonable care under the circumstances and the fact that one is involved in an emergency situation not of his own creation simply presents additional circumstances which the jury must consider in determining whether or not the actor acted reasonably. 1 The term, “honest exercise of judgment,” introduced

1977And see Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 377 F.2d 328, 330 (8th Cir. 1967); Krebsbach v. Miller, 22 Wis.2d 171, 175 , 125 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1963). -B- Most courts, however, have chosen to soften what has been characterized as “the initial appearance of harshness and rigidity of this general rule.” Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra. Their technique has been to examine “the initial grant of permission [in order to determine whether it] was broad enough to include an implied grant to the permittee [Samuel Melanovich] to give another [Craig Calabria] use of the automobile and thus render the latte

1977And see Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 377 F.2d 328, 330 (8th Cir. 1967); Krebsbach v. Miller, 22 Wis.2d 171, 175 , 125 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1963). -B- Most courts, however, have chosen to soften what has been characterized as “the initial appearance of harshness and rigidity of this general rule.” Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra. Their technique has been to examine “the initial grant of permission [in order to determine whether it] was broad enough to include an implied grant to the permittee [Samuel Melanovich] to give another [Craig Calabria] use of the automobile and thus render the latte

1977And see Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 377 F.2d 328, 330 (8th Cir. 1967); Krebsbach v. Miller, 22 Wis.2d 171, 175 , 125 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1963). -B- Most courts, however, have chosen to soften what has been characterized as “the initial appearance of harshness and rigidity of this general rule.” Gillen v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra. Their technique has been to examine “the initial grant of permission [in order to determine whether it] was broad enough to include an implied grant to the permittee [Samuel Melanovich] to give another [Craig Calabria] use of the automobile and thus render the latte