7 Arizona opinions name it 3 courts 1959–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Record Club of America, Incorporated, Cross-Appellant v. United Artists Records, Incorporated, Cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2013See Record Club of Am., Inc. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 890 F.2d 1264, 1275 (2d Cir.1989) (requiring the non-breaching party to show ability to perform “is merely an application of the general rule that the complaining party must demonstrate that the breach caused him injury”). | 1 | 1 |
Brousseau v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. 2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. | 1 | 1 |
Forino v. Arizona Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. 2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Neal v. Neal
green
2 sentences1983Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590 , 570 P.2d 758 (1977); Porter, supra; Hueg v. Sunburst Farms (Glendale) Mutual Water and Agricultural Co., 122 Ariz. 284 , 594 P.2d 538 (App. 1979); Ellingson, supra . 1983Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590 , 570 P.2d 758 (1977); Porter, supra; Hueg v. Sunburst Farms (Glendale) Mutual Water and Agricultural Co., 122 Ariz. 284 , 594 P.2d 538 (App. 1979); Ellingson, supra . | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Hueg v. SUNBURST FARMS (GLENDALE) MUT. WATER
green
2 sentences1983Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590 , 570 P.2d 758 (1977); Porter, supra; Hueg v. Sunburst Farms (Glendale) Mutual Water and Agricultural Co., 122 Ariz. 284 , 594 P.2d 538 (App. 1979); Ellingson, supra . 1983Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590 , 570 P.2d 758 (1977); Porter, supra; Hueg v. Sunburst Farms (Glendale) Mutual Water and Agricultural Co., 122 Ariz. 284 , 594 P.2d 538 (App. 1979); Ellingson, supra . | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Porter v. Porter
green
2 sentences1983This is but an application of the general rule that while, absent a request for findings of fact, a trial judge is not required to set forth the underlying *15 factual basis for his ultimate decision, Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273 , 195 P.2d 132 (1948); Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz. App. 456 , 513 P.2d 1339 (1973), nevertheless, the judgment of a trial court must find some reasonable support from the evidence or lack of evidence. 1983This is but an application of the general rule that while, absent a request for findings of fact, a trial judge is not required to set forth the underlying *15 factual basis for his ultimate decision, Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273 , 195 P.2d 132 (1948); Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz. App. 456 , 513 P.2d 1339 (1973), nevertheless, the judgment of a trial court must find some reasonable support from the evidence or lack of evidence. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Ellingson v. Fuller
green
2 sentences1983This is but an application of the general rule that while, absent a request for findings of fact, a trial judge is not required to set forth the underlying *15 factual basis for his ultimate decision, Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273 , 195 P.2d 132 (1948); Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz. App. 456 , 513 P.2d 1339 (1973), nevertheless, the judgment of a trial court must find some reasonable support from the evidence or lack of evidence. 1983This is but an application of the general rule that while, absent a request for findings of fact, a trial judge is not required to set forth the underlying *15 factual basis for his ultimate decision, Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273 , 195 P.2d 132 (1948); Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz. App. 456 , 513 P.2d 1339 (1973), nevertheless, the judgment of a trial court must find some reasonable support from the evidence or lack of evidence. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Traylor v. Thorneycroft
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. 2002Id. at 484 , 657 P.2d at 897 ; accord Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 , 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984)(“ten day requirement for action by the superior court is directory and not mandatory”); Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 , 952 P.2d 315, 319 (App.1997)(failure to conduct hearing within statutory time did not divest agency of jurisdiction). 1 ¶ 9 Having no reason to depart from the application of the general rule in this case, we similarly conclude that the language of A.A.C. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith
green
1 sentence1991Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 2332 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
B. Elmer Moore v. The Home Insurance Company, a Corporation
green
2 sentences1984She acknowledges that Moore v. Home Insurance Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.1979), which in turn relied on Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., supra, would seem to exclude the application of the general rule to the employment-at-will context but then quotes the following passage from Moore : This is not to say that the employer’s contractual duty of fair dealing has no meaning. 601 F.2d at 1074 , to infer that Moore somehow supports her position. 1984She acknowledges that Moore v. Home Insurance Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.1979), which in turn relied on Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., supra, would seem to exclude the application of the general rule to the employment-at-will context but then quotes the following passage from Moore : This is not to say that the employer’s contractual duty of fair dealing has no meaning. 601 F.2d at 1074 , to infer that Moore somehow supports her position. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Southern Surety Co. v. Gilkey-Duff Hardware Co.
green
2 sentences1959The general rule has also been applied in cases where the principal 'was a corporation; indeed, as corporate acts are necessarily, in all cases, performed through the officers or agents of the corporation, there would be in such cases a still stronger reason for the application of the general rule than in the case of transactions between private persons.” * * * See, also Southern Surety Co. v. Gilkey-Duff Hardware Co., 166 Okl. 84 , 26 P.2d 144 , 89 A.L.R. 888 , and Annotation 89 A.L. 1959The general rule has also been applied in cases where the principal 'was a corporation; indeed, as corporate acts are necessarily, in all cases, performed through the officers or agents of the corporation, there would be in such cases a still stronger reason for the application of the general rule than in the case of transactions between private persons.” * * * See, also Southern Surety Co. v. Gilkey-Duff Hardware Co., 166 Okl. 84 , 26 P.2d 144 , 89 A.L.R. 888 , and Annotation 89 A.L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.