application of the general rule in Indiana

2019The doctrine was developed by the courts to recognize that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate action is not expected to exercise the judgment of one acting under normal circumstances. . . .[U]nlike the sudden emergency doctrine, the issue with sudden medical emergency is not whether the defendant responded reasonably to an emergency situation, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have altered his conduct before the medical emergency occurred based on knowledge of peril. 116 N.E.3d at 540 n.2.

2014“In a negligence cause of action, the sudden emergency doctrine is an application of the general requirement that one’s conduct conform to the standard of a reasonable person.” Id. at 1184 .

2012“This is an application of the general rule that ‘the sentencer may not refuse to consider . . . any relevant mitigation evidence.’” Id. (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)). 11 In this case, Weems presented as a mitigating circumstance his participation in a substance abuse program while incarcerated for the instant offense.

2009More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the sen-tencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 232 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285-87 , 124 S.Ct. 2562 , 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (discussing Skipper with approval).

2009More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the sen-tencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 232 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285-87 , 124 S.Ct. 2562 , 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (discussing Skipper with approval).

2009As the Court noted, this is an application of the general rule that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider ... any relevant mitigation evidence." Id. at 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 (quotation omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)).

2009As the Court noted, this is an application of the general rule that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider ... any relevant mitigation evidence." Id. at 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 (quotation omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)).

2009As the Court noted, this is an application of the general rule that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider ... any relevant mitigation evidence." Id. at 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 (quotation omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)).

2009As the Court noted, this is an application of the general rule that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider ... any relevant mitigation evidence." Id. at 4 , 106 S.Ct. 1669 (quotation omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)).

1988Matter of Pubs, Inc. of Champaign (7th Cir.1980) 618 F.2d 432 .

1951In Flick v. State (1935), 207 Ind. 473, 477 , 193 N. E. 603 , this court said: “An erroneous instruction is not corrected by giving a correct one, unless the improper one is withdrawn.

1951In Flick v. State (1935), 207 Ind. 473, 477 , 193 N. E. 603 , this court said: “An erroneous instruction is not corrected by giving a correct one, unless the improper one is withdrawn.

1918Board, etc. v. State, ex rel. (1913), 179 Ind. 644, 647 , 102 N. E. 97 ; Adams Express Co. v. Welborn (1915), 59 Ind. App. 330, 332 , 108 N. E. 163 , 109 N. E. 420 . 2. 3.

1918Board, etc. v. State, ex rel. (1913), 179 Ind. 644, 647 , 102 N. E. 97 ; Adams Express Co. v. Welborn (1915), 59 Ind. App. 330, 332 , 108 N. E. 163 , 109 N. E. 420 . 2. 3.

1918Board, etc. v. State, ex rel. (1913), 179 Ind. 644, 647 , 102 N. E. 97 ; Adams Express Co. v. Welborn (1915), 59 Ind. App. 330, 332 , 108 N. E. 163 , 109 N. E. 420 . 2. 3.

1918Board, etc. v. State, ex rel. (1913), 179 Ind. 644, 647 , 102 N. E. 97 ; Adams Express Co. v. Welborn (1915), 59 Ind. App. 330, 332 , 108 N. E. 163 , 109 N. E. 420 . 2. 3.

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1915Pugh v. Pugh (1886), 105 Ind. 552 , 5 N. E. 673 ; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432 ; Downie v. Buennagel (1 884), 94 Ind. 228 ; Hinds v. Hinds (1882), 85 Ind. 312 ; Lofton v. Moore (1882), 83 Ind. 112 ; Heilman v. Heilman, supra; Fowler v. Duhme, supra. 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) §316, makes use of the following language: “Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustee should take a fee or not; hence, in other cases, it has been said that if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take anything beyond what was necessary for the

1906The ease is in all respects controlled by the principles of law announced in the case of Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co. (1906), 37 Ind. App. 351 , and upon the authority of that case the judgment is' affirmed.

1898Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129, 136, 137 , and authorities there cited on this point; Fitch v. Byall, 149 Ind. 554-558; Denton v. Arnold, 151 Ind. 188 .

1898Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129, 136, 137 , and authorities there cited on this point; Fitch v. Byall, 149 Ind. 554-558; Denton v. Arnold, 151 Ind. 188 .

1896It is said in the latter section that: “The rule that a party cannot successfully assail a decision given upon his express or implied invitation is really nothing more than an application of the general principle that parties will be held to the theories they present and upon which they secure action by the court.” The rule as stated in Pence v. Waugh, 135 Ind. 143 , at page 150,is: “Tf a party opens the door for the admission of incompetent evidence he is in no plight to complain that his adversary followed through the door thus opened.’ ” Perkins v. Hayward, 124 Ind. 445 .

1896It is said in the latter section that: “The rule that a party cannot successfully assail a decision given upon his express or implied invitation is really nothing more than an application of the general principle that parties will be held to the theories they present and upon which they secure action by the court.” The rule as stated in Pence v. Waugh, 135 Ind. 143 , at page 150,is: “Tf a party opens the door for the admission of incompetent evidence he is in no plight to complain that his adversary followed through the door thus opened.’ ” Perkins v. Hayward, 124 Ind. 445 .

1878As an enunciation, and an example of the application of the general doctrine of the law on this subject, we present the facts and opinion of the court in the leading case of The United States v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28 : “ It appeared, that for a considerable time before the fatal act” (killing of Clark), “Drew had been in the habit of indulging himself in very gross and almost continual drunkenness; that about five days before it took place, he ordered all the liquor on board, which was accordingly done.