application of the general rule in Florida

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2010See, e.g., Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd., 746 So.2d 530 , 534 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Dennis v. City of Tampa, 581 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spadafora v. Carlo, 569 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 1347 , 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2006Co. v. Salter, 717 So.2d 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that insurance company could not pursue a legal malpractice claim under the company's right of subrogation).

2004See Watson v. Buchanan, 344 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that setback requirement could be enforced with respect to added swimming pool enclosure); Daniel v. May, 143 So.2d 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (holding that setback was enforceable with regard to carport addition).

1992To resolve this issue, however, many factual determinations would have to be made, including (1) whether the issue was really ripe for adjudication (in this case whether sufficient discovery had, in fact, taken place); (2) whether the new claim is based on newly discovered evidence; or (3) whether the application of the general rule would result in an injustice. [2] See City of Miami v. Knight, 554 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 567 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1990).

1984The application of the general rule is well illustrated by the case of Cannell v. Arcola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953), which case also describes the first exception.

1983Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company v. Eakins, 337 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)." The Court then noted that the issue in the case is not one of estoppel creating coverage, but one of estoppel to deny the existence of an oral contract creating coverage. [2] Another recent case has considered the issue before us, and has distinguished the application of the general rule in a similar *937 factual situation.

1983In Peninsular Life Insurance Company v. Wade, 425 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) the Court clearly recognized the general rule relative to waiver and estoppel, however cited numerous authorities "in which the insurer was held estopped to deny coverage where the insured was assured of coverage and sustained a loss before learning that the policy actually issued did not provide coverage for the loss in question." The insured in the Peninsular Life case (and the Appellant herein) was affirmatively misled by the agent of the insurance company as to the extent and existence of insurance coverage.

1982Finally, we note that the holding in State Department of Transportation v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1981), was consistent with the application of the general rule, but the court made no mention of it.

1974Another example of an exception to the general rule of requiring an attorney to identify his client is found in Baird v. Koerner, CA 9th, 1960, 279 F.2d 623 .

1967This rule has been applied in Home Insurance Company of New York v. Enloe, Tex.Civ.App. 1956, 287 S.W.2d 235, 238 , where the court stated: "By the application of the rule of `Ejusdem Generis' in construing the meaning of general words following words of particular description, the general words are limited in meaning to the scope of the meaning in light of the preceding particular phrase." I am of the opinion that this general rule also is applicable to the case at bar and operates to cause the words "any person" to be limited in meaning to the scope of the word "passenger".

1920There is no reason why the application of the general principle in a given instance should ever come before a Court of Appeals; to the trial court should be left the determination of the existence of the necessity in a particular case.” 2 Wigmore on Ev. p. 1760 §1406, and notes. ‘‘MITCHELL, J., in Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 130 , 22 Atl. 1048 : ‘The determination of this question in each case as it arises rests largely in the discretion of the court.