application of the general rule in Oklahoma

1985In Schlender, supra, p. 524 , the Supreme Court stated in the first paragraph of its syllabus: Generally, as a matter of public policy, a builder’s liability to third persons for negligent construction is terminated upon acceptance by the contractee, but where the contractor has wilfully created a condition which he knows, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence *671 should have known, to be immediately and certainly dangerous to persons other than the contractee, who will be necessarily exposed to such danger, considerations of public policy do not require the application of the general rule

1974Generally, as a matter of public policy, a builder’s liability to third persons for negligent construction is terminated upon acceptance by the contractee, but where the contractor has wilfully created a condition which he knows, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known, to be immediately and certainly dangerous to persons other than the contractee, who will necessarily be exposed to such danger, considerations of public policy do not require the application of the general rule.” At the outset, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the exception to the general rule referred

1962“Generally, as a matter of public policy, a builder’s liability to third persons for negligent construction is terminated upon acceptance of the property by his grantee, but where the builder has willfully created a condition which he knows to be immediately and certainly dangerous to persons other than his grantee, who will necessarily be exposed to such danger, considerations of public policy do not require the application of the general rule.” In Leigh v. Wadsworth, supra, in discussing the rule announced in Greenwood v. Lyles & Buckner, Inc., Okl., 329 P.2d 1063 , it is stated: “In the bod

1962“Generally, as a matter of public policy, a builder’s liability to third persons for negligent construction is terminated upon acceptance of the property by his grantee, but where the builder has willfully created a condition which he knows to be immediately and certainly dangerous to persons other than his grantee, who will necessarily be exposed to such danger, considerations of public policy do not require the application of the general rule.” In Leigh v. Wadsworth, supra, in discussing the rule announced in Greenwood v. Lyles & Buckner, Inc., Okl., 329 P.2d 1063 , it is stated: “In the bod

1946It appears from Oil Reclaiming Co. v. Reagin, 169 Okla. 505 , 37 P. 2d 289 , that the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance was not considered erroneous in view of the fact that the testimony to be obtained from the absent witness was corroborative only of evidence already available.

1946It appears from Oil Reclaiming Co. v. Reagin, 169 Okla. 505 , 37 P. 2d 289 , that the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance was not considered erroneous in view of the fact that the testimony to be obtained from the absent witness was corroborative only of evidence already available.

1936The state insists that these circumstances demand the application of the general rule that "a joint assignment of error must affect all jointly and not severally as to all who join in it, or it will be good as to none." Haley v. Wyte, 169 Okla. 406 , 38 P.2d 910 .

1936The state insists that these circumstances demand the application of the general rule that "a joint assignment of error must affect all jointly and not severally as to all who join in it, or it will be good as to none." Haley v. Wyte, 169 Okla. 406 , 38 P.2d 910 .

1926That such rule is applicable in divorce cases has been held in Rariden v. Rariden, 3 Ind. App. 284 , 70 N. E. 398 ; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 ; Stebe v. Stebe (Mich.) 129 N. W. 356 ; Butts v. Butts (Ark.) 238 S. W. 600 ; Branch v. Branch (Colo.) 71 Pac. 632 .

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac

1926That such rule is applicable in divorce cases has been held in Rariden v. Rariden, 3 Ind. App. 284 , 70 N. E. 398 ; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 ; Stebe v. Stebe (Mich.) 129 N. W. 356 ; Butts v. Butts (Ark.) 238 S. W. 600 ; Branch v. Branch (Colo.) 71 Pac. 632 .

1926That such rule is applicable in divorce cases has been held in Rariden v. Rariden, 3 Ind. App. 284 , 70 N. E. 398 ; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 ; Stebe v. Stebe (Mich.) 129 N. W. 356 ; Butts v. Butts (Ark.) 238 S. W. 600 ; Branch v. Branch (Colo.) 71 Pac. 632 .

1926That such rule is applicable in divorce cases has been held in Rariden v. Rariden, 3 Ind. App. 284 , 70 N. E. 398 ; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 542 ; Stebe v. Stebe (Mich.) 129 N. W. 356 ; Butts v. Butts (Ark.) 238 S. W. 600 ; Branch v. Branch (Colo.) 71 Pac. 632 .

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac

1926In Fletcher’s Encyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 5, p. 4940, section 3206. it is said; ‘‘Courts of equity entertain creditors’ bills against a natural person or a. corporation, on the ground that the creditor has no adequate remedy at law, and, as a general rule, therefore, a mere general creditor, who has not obtained a judgment at law or acquired a lien on the property sought to be reached, has no standing in equity to maintain a creditor’s bill.” The rule is again stated in 15 Corpus Juris, page 1388, as follows: “It is a prerequisite to the maintaining of a creditor's bill seeking satisfac