application of the general rule in Georgia

1975The application of the general rule in the specific factual situation where the employee was going to or from work at the time of the collision is controlled in Georgia by Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880 ( 114 SE2d 138 ), where the rule is stated as follows: "As a general rule, a servant in going to and from his work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, and consequently the employer is not to be held liable for an injury occasioned while the servant is en route to or from his work.” Further, in the same opinion, the court also sta

1975The application of the general rule in the specific factual situation where the employee was going to or from work at the time of the collision is controlled in Georgia by Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880 ( 114 SE2d 138 ), where the rule is stated as follows: "As a general rule, a servant in going to and from his work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, and consequently the employer is not to be held liable for an injury occasioned while the servant is en route to or from his work.” Further, in the same opinion, the court also sta

1975This case can be distinguished from Pest Masters v. Callaway, 133 Ga. App. 123 ( 210 SE2d 243 ), which reiterates the general principle governing these cases.

1975This case can be distinguished from Pest Masters v. Callaway, 133 Ga. App. 123 ( 210 SE2d 243 ), which reiterates the general principle governing these cases.

1983Co., 248 Ga. 350 , supra, is an application of the general rule that lack of notice to the insurer provides no defense where the insurance is compulsory.

1938As applied to the facts of the present case, the charge of the court was not error for any reason assigned. (c) Although the plaintiff may have informed the agent that he had had some ribs broken when a boy, the principal is not bound by any constructive knowledge as to “infirmity” or “ deformity.” Wiley v. Rome Insurance Co., 12 Ga. App. 186 ( 76 S. E. 1067 ); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193 ( 140 S. E. 496 ).

1938As applied to the facts of the present case, the charge of the court was not error for any reason assigned. (c) Although the plaintiff may have informed the agent that he had had some ribs broken when a boy, the principal is not bound by any constructive knowledge as to “infirmity” or “ deformity.” Wiley v. Rome Insurance Co., 12 Ga. App. 186 ( 76 S. E. 1067 ); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193 ( 140 S. E. 496 ).

1938As applied to the facts of the present case, the charge of the court was not error for any reason assigned. (c) Although the plaintiff may have informed the agent that he had had some ribs broken when a boy, the principal is not bound by any constructive knowledge as to “infirmity” or “ deformity.” Wiley v. Rome Insurance Co., 12 Ga. App. 186 ( 76 S. E. 1067 ); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193 ( 140 S. E. 496 ).

1938As applied to the facts of the present case, the charge of the court was not error for any reason assigned. (c) Although the plaintiff may have informed the agent that he had had some ribs broken when a boy, the principal is not bound by any constructive knowledge as to “infirmity” or “ deformity.” Wiley v. Rome Insurance Co., 12 Ga. App. 186 ( 76 S. E. 1067 ); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193 ( 140 S. E. 496 ).

1937McFadden v. Dale, supra, after quoting the general principle as stated in § 113-819, immediately follows it with the language above quoted from Miller v. Cotten, supra, recognizing the rules codified in §§ 37-501 and 37-502 as conditions necessary for an application of the general doctrine.

1937The McFadden case concludes that the principle was not there applicable, since “the will does not designate any particular property, but only purports to devise and bequeath such property as might belong to the testator in his own right.” In McGinnis v. McGinnis, supra, the testator had bequeathed property actually belonging to one of his sons, which put that son to an election between his own right and the legacy to him.

1936Seeburger v. Cohen, 215 Iowa, 1088 ( 247 N. W. 292 , 89 A. L.

1936Seeburger v. Cohen, 215 Iowa, 1088 ( 247 N. W. 292 , 89 A. L.

1921Johnson v. Ætna Insurance Co., 123 Ga. 404 ( 51 S. E. 337 , 107 Am.

1921Johnson v. Ætna Insurance Co., 123 Ga. 404 ( 51 S. E. 337 , 107 Am.

1919And while, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, delivery of freight to a common carrier is regarded as delivery to the consignee, and any loss or damage to the goods while in transit would fall on the purchaser, this rule may be varied by agreement (McCook v. Halliburton-Myers Co., 14 Ga. App. 381 ) ( 80 S. E. 863 ); and if at the time the contract of purchase in the instant case was made there existed a custom, such as that alleged by the defendant, which was of such universal practice as that it became by implication a part of the contract, this would amount to such an agreement a

1919And while, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, delivery of freight to a common carrier is regarded as delivery to the consignee, and any loss or damage to the goods while in transit would fall on the purchaser, this rule may be varied by agreement (McCook v. Halliburton-Myers Co., 14 Ga. App. 381 ) ( 80 S. E. 863 ); and if at the time the contract of purchase in the instant case was made there existed a custom, such as that alleged by the defendant, which was of such universal practice as that it became by implication a part of the contract, this would amount to such an agreement a

1909The exception alluded to is practically recognized in Mayor etc. v. Wood, 114 Ga. 370 ( 40 S. E. 239 ), where it is said: “The opinion of a witness is not admissible in evidence when all the facts and circumstances are capable of being clearly detailed and described so that the jurors may be able readily to form correct conclusions therefrom.” It will be observed that the application of the general rule made in the case cited was predicated .on the non-existence of circumstances sufficient to bring the case under the exception.

1909The exception alluded to is practically recognized in Mayor etc. v. Wood, 114 Ga. 370 ( 40 S. E. 239 ), where it is said: “The opinion of a witness is not admissible in evidence when all the facts and circumstances are capable of being clearly detailed and described so that the jurors may be able readily to form correct conclusions therefrom.” It will be observed that the application of the general rule made in the case cited was predicated .on the non-existence of circumstances sufficient to bring the case under the exception.

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).

1909To the same effect are rulings in the cases of Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 115 Ga. 638 ( 43 S. E. 60 ); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Goodwin, 130 Ga. 83 ( 47 S. E. 641); Thomas v. State, 133 Ga. 151 ( 50 S. E. 64 ); O'Neill Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 137 Ga. 643 ( 56 S. E. 739 ); Moore v. Dozier, 138 Ga. 95 ( 57 S. E. 110 ); Robinson v. State, 138 Ga. 355 ( 57 S. E. 315 ).