application of the general rule in Louisiana

2007Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc. , 392 So.2d 398 (La. 1980); State ex rel.

2001Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398 (La. 1980); State ex rel.

1961App., 43 So.2d 491 ; O'Connor v. American Automobile Insurance Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .'" And, in Franks v. Department of Highways, 43 So.2d 491 , the Court states at page 492: "We concede the proposition urged by learned counsel for plaintiff to the effect that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to make out his case, but only, as was well stated in Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., La.App., 25 So.2d 104 , 106: `* * * if there is nothing to discredit his (plaintiff's) account of the accident

1960As was stated by this court in Franks v. Department of Highways, La.App. 2d Cir., 1949, 43 So.2d 491 , 492: “We concede the proposition urged by learned counsel for plaintiff to the effect that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to make out his case, but only, as was well stated in Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., La.App., 25 So.2d 104 , 106: ‘ * * * if there is nothing to discredit his (plaintiff’s) account of the accident and resulting disability, and his statements are supported by the surrou

1961App., 43 So.2d 491 ; O'Connor v. American Automobile Insurance Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .'" And, in Franks v. Department of Highways, 43 So.2d 491 , the Court states at page 492: "We concede the proposition urged by learned counsel for plaintiff to the effect that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to make out his case, but only, as was well stated in Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., La.App., 25 So.2d 104 , 106: `* * * if there is nothing to discredit his (plaintiff's) account of the accident

1960Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .” This court also had occasion to rule on a very similar situation in Dunn v. Remington Rand, Inc., La.App. 2d Cir., 1954, 76 So.2d 72 , certiorari denied, wherein we stated: “The testimony of plaintiff himself was so confused, uncertain and unconvincing that it completely failed to support his claims. * * * The testimony of plaintiff’s wife and an elderly neighbor has little, if any, value, inasmuch as the effect of such testimony bears primarily upon plaintiff’s complaints and physical condition and entirely fails to affect the question of causal connection. * * *

1961App., 43 So.2d 491 ; O'Connor v. American Automobile Insurance Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .'" And, in Franks v. Department of Highways, 43 So.2d 491 , the Court states at page 492: "We concede the proposition urged by learned counsel for plaintiff to the effect that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to make out his case, but only, as was well stated in Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., La.App., 25 So.2d 104 , 106: `* * * if there is nothing to discredit his (plaintiff's) account of the accident

1961App., 43 So.2d 491 ; O'Connor v. American Automobile Insurance Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .'" And, in Franks v. Department of Highways, 43 So.2d 491 , the Court states at page 492: "We concede the proposition urged by learned counsel for plaintiff to the effect that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to make out his case, but only, as was well stated in Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., La.App., 25 So.2d 104 , 106: `* * * if there is nothing to discredit his (plaintiff's) account of the accident

2009R.S. 18:1414, which provides: Any procedural matter not specifically provided for in this Code shall be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. |7The appellant also cites Hunter v. Tensas Nursing Home, 32,217 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/99), 743 So.2d 839 , writ denied, 99-3334 (La.2/4/00), 754 So.2d 228 , as authority for the proposition that doubt in the application of prescriptive statutes should be resolved in favor of giving a litigant his day in court.

2009R.S. 18:1414, which provides: Any procedural matter not specifically provided for in this Code shall be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. |7The appellant also cites Hunter v. Tensas Nursing Home, 32,217 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/99), 743 So.2d 839 , writ denied, 99-3334 (La.2/4/00), 754 So.2d 228 , as authority for the proposition that doubt in the application of prescriptive statutes should be resolved in favor of giving a litigant his day in court.

1991Newman v. Department of Fire, 425 So.2d 753 (La.1983) and other cases should be construed merely as the application of the general rule requiring cause to the factual specific situation.

1961The rule was stated by the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Garrett v. Gaylord Container Corp., 71 So.2d 373 , 376: "`In view of the testimony in this record, which I have heretofore sought to fairly analyze, it is impossible for me to reach the conclusion, even if plaintiff is suffering from acute epididymitis, that it was brought about by accidental injury suffered by him in the course and scope of his employment. "`I recognize the proposition that there is precedent in our jurisprudence for the application of the general principle that the testimony of a plaintiff alone is sufficient to mak

1960Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .” This court also had occasion to rule on a very similar situation in Dunn v. Remington Rand, Inc., La.App. 2d Cir., 1954, 76 So.2d 72 , certiorari denied, wherein we stated: “The testimony of plaintiff himself was so confused, uncertain and unconvincing that it completely failed to support his claims. * * * The testimony of plaintiff’s wife and an elderly neighbor has little, if any, value, inasmuch as the effect of such testimony bears primarily upon plaintiff’s complaints and physical condition and entirely fails to affect the question of causal connection. * * *

1960Co., La.App., 32 So.2d 624 .” This court also had occasion to rule on a very similar situation in Dunn v. Remington Rand, Inc., La.App. 2d Cir., 1954, 76 So.2d 72 , certiorari denied, wherein we stated: “The testimony of plaintiff himself was so confused, uncertain and unconvincing that it completely failed to support his claims. * * * The testimony of plaintiff’s wife and an elderly neighbor has little, if any, value, inasmuch as the effect of such testimony bears primarily upon plaintiff’s complaints and physical condition and entirely fails to affect the question of causal connection. * * *

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955No useful purpose would be' served by entering into an analysis of the numerous cases cited by the appellants and -supporting the well settled rule of -law which makes an authentic act full proof as against the contracting parties litigating inter sese, since those cases are clearly inapplicable under the facts here; and the case of Robinson v. Britton, supra, while it contains language which, taken alone, appears to support appellants’ contention, is nevertheless merely an application of the general rule, as is shown by the syllabus, prepared by the Court and declaring that “In the absence of

1955No useful purpose would be' served by entering into an analysis of the numerous cases cited by the appellants and -supporting the well settled rule of -law which makes an authentic act full proof as against the contracting parties litigating inter sese, since those cases are clearly inapplicable under the facts here; and the case of Robinson v. Britton, supra, while it contains language which, taken alone, appears to support appellants’ contention, is nevertheless merely an application of the general rule, as is shown by the syllabus, prepared by the Court and declaring that “In the absence of

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1955There we held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real consideration, i. e., the agreement between the mother and son that $3,-: 000 was fair value for the son’s agreement to support his mother during one-half of each year for her life; and particularly appropriate to the present case is the language that “in the case at bar there was no effort made to prove a different or dissimilar contract in nature; on the contrary, the evidence was intended to maintain the contract and to show the real consideration.” See, also, Jackson v. Miller, 32 La.Ann. 432 ; Dickson v. Ford, 38 La.Ann. 73

1911As was said by Sharswood, J., in 73 Pa. 365 , McHose v. Fulmer, quoted with approval in Sedgwick on Damages, p. 236: “If an article of the same value cannot be procured in the market, its market price cannot be ascertained, and we are without the necessary data for the application of the general rule.