15 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINiSTRATION v. KIT WILSON AND JOLE WILSONgreen1 sentence2024A review of the preceding framework highlights an apparent conflict between the relevant statutes, as the Local Option Code does not require paid canvassers for local-option petitions to be Arkansas residents and section 7-9-103(a)(6) states that “[a] person shall not act as a canvasser unless he or she is a resident of this state.” We have made clear that “[w]hen statutes seemingly conflict, it is blackletter law for statutory construction to give effect to the specific statute over the general.” Johnson v. Wright, 2022 Ark. 57, at 10 , 640 S.W.3d 401 , 407; see also Wilson, supra. While the | 1 | 1 |
Forrester v. Danielsgreen1 sentence2020None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012); accord Forrester, supra. By conflating the residency requirement with the qualified-elector requirement, the majority duplicates the former and gives the latter no consequence. | 1 | 1 |
Moorman v. Priestgreen2 sentences2011See Moorman v. Lynch , 310 Ark. 525 , 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992). 3 A.C.A. § 14-43-311 (a)(1)(A). 4 Id. at (c)(1)(A) (B). 5 See n. 1, supra , regarding the residency requirement. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 97-052 . 2011See Moorman v. Lynch , 310 Ark. 525 , 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992). 3 A.C.A. § 14-43-311 (a)(1)(A). 4 Id. at (c)(1)(A) (B). 5 See n. 1, supra , regarding the residency requirement. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 97-052 . | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Guardianship of Vesagreen1 sentence2002Indeed, under a closely analogous provision of state probate law that I am unaware has ever been subjected to constitutional attack, a nonresident of this state cannot serve as domiciliary personal representative in an estate "unless he shall have appointed the clerk of the court in which the proceedings are pending, and the clerk's successors in office, or some person residing in the county of probate and approved by the court, as agent to accept service of process and notice in all actions and proceedings with respect to the estate." A.C.A. § 28-48-101 (b)(6); see also In the Matter of the G | 1 | 1 |
Benton v. Guntergreen2 sentences2001This case is a companion case to Benton v. Gunter, 342 Ark. 543 , 29 S.W.3d 719 (2000) (“Benton I”), where we affirmed a trial court’s ruling that appellant, William Benton, was not a resident of Pine Bluff, and therefore, Benton’s name was removed from the ballot because he did not fulfill the residency requirement for the candidacy of Second Division Pine Bluff Municipal Judge. 2001This case is a companion case to Benton v. Gunter, 342 Ark. 543 , 29 S.W.3d 719 (2000) (“Benton I”), where we affirmed a trial court’s ruling that appellant, William Benton, was not a resident of Pine Bluff, and therefore, Benton’s name was removed from the ballot because he did not fulfill the residency requirement for the candidacy of Second Division Pine Bluff Municipal Judge. | 1 | 1 |
Buford Horton v. Marshall Public Schoolsgreen1 sentence1996See Horton v. Marshall Public Schools, 769 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Holtgreen1 sentence1995Cf. Davis , 304 Ark. at 623 (holding that a statute could not alter the "straightforward residency requirement" of Ark. | 1 | 1 |
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commissiongreen1 sentence1990See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (upholding municipal regulation imposing residency requirement on all civil service employees.) It may be successfully contended that the residency requirement bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental purpose of ensuring the ready availability of trained personnel in emergency situations. | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. New Hampshiregreen1 sentence1984The U.S. Supreme Court in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) held “the Privileges and Immunities Clause, by making noncitizenship or nonresidence an improper basis for locating a special burden, implicates not only the individual’s right to nondiscriminatory treatment but also, perhaps more so, the structural balance essential to the concept of federalism.” Therefore, we find that § 84-2634 (b) and (c) are unconstitutional as to the residency requirement contained therein and violate the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the U.S. Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.green1 sentence1981As the court said in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935), “what is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.” We can find no justification for a residency requirement to tax the sale of Cigarettes, and hold that the statute constitutes an unlawful discrimination against interstate concerns. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tracy Johnson, Gina Rambo, James R. \Rick\" Bright
green
1 sentence2024A review of the preceding framework highlights an apparent conflict between the relevant statutes, as the Local Option Code does not require paid canvassers for local-option petitions to be Arkansas residents and section 7-9-103(a)(6) states that “[a] person shall not act as a canvasser unless he or she is a resident of this state.” We have made clear that “[w]hen statutes seemingly conflict, it is blackletter law for statutory construction to give effect to the specific statute over the general.” Johnson v. Wright, 2022 Ark. 57, at 10 , 640 S.W.3d 401 , 407; see also Wilson, supra. While the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot 2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sherbert v. Verner
green
2 sentences2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot 2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Edelman v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot 2011The United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a government benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (invalidating a law that conditioned receipt of welfare benefits on a residency requirement as an unconstitutional burden on right to interstate travel, and noting that “[t]his constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ ”), overruled in part on ot | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mann v. Lowry
green
1 sentence2008Mann , 227 Ark. 1137 , 303 S.W.2d at 891 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rodgers v. Southland Racing Corp.
green
2 sentences2004Although there is no Arkansas case directly on point, Rodgers v. Southland Racing Corp., 247 Ark. 1115 , 450 S.W.2d 3 (1970) reflects, in my opinion, the court's likely approach to the issue. 2004The court concluded that the residency requirement was a lawful condition upon the operation of a race track, particularly considering "the broad power that the state has over such enterprises, extending even to the point of total prohibition." Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont.
green
2 sentences2004Although a residency requirement that deprives nonresidents of a "protected privilege" can be constitutionally suspect under the "Privileges and Immunities Clause" 1 ( see New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) and cases cited therein), it is my opinion that the bail bond business does not implicate a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" or "privilege." See, e.g., Piper, supra and Baldwin v. Montana Fish Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 2004Although a residency requirement that deprives nonresidents of a "protected privilege" can be constitutionally suspect under the "Privileges and Immunities Clause" 1 ( see New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) and cases cited therein), it is my opinion that the bail bond business does not implicate a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" or "privilege." See, e.g., Piper, supra and Baldwin v. Montana Fish Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Supreme Court of NH v. Piper
green
2 sentences2004Although a residency requirement that deprives nonresidents of a "protected privilege" can be constitutionally suspect under the "Privileges and Immunities Clause" 1 ( see New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) and cases cited therein), it is my opinion that the bail bond business does not implicate a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" or "privilege." See, e.g., Piper, supra and Baldwin v. Montana Fish Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 2004Although a residency requirement that deprives nonresidents of a "protected privilege" can be constitutionally suspect under the "Privileges and Immunities Clause" 1 ( see New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) and cases cited therein), it is my opinion that the bail bond business does not implicate a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" or "privilege." See, e.g., Piper, supra and Baldwin v. Montana Fish Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS v. New Orleans
green
1 sentence1997New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n Local 632 v. New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1172 (La. 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Powell v. McCormack
green
2 sentences1994That Report clearly and specifically determined that the U.S. Constitution reserved no authority in the State legislatures to change, add to, or diminish the qualifications set forth in Article 1. 395 U.S. at 542-543 , 89 S.Ct. at 1974-1975 , citing 17 Annals of Cong. 871-872 (1807). 1994That Report clearly and specifically determined that the U.S. Constitution reserved no authority in the State legislatures to change, add to, or diminish the qualifications set forth in Article 1. 395 U.S. at 542-543 , 89 S.Ct. at 1974-1975 , citing 17 Annals of Cong. 871-872 (1807). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wometco Services, Inc. v. Gaddy
green
2 sentences1984In a letter opinion, Judge Bogard stated: I. . . must find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wometco Services v. Gaddy, 272 Ark. 452 , 616 S.W.2d 466 (1981) control. 1984In a letter opinion, Judge Bogard stated: I. . . must find that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wometco Services v. Gaddy, 272 Ark. 452 , 616 S.W.2d 466 (1981) control. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.