10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Flakegreen2 sentences2025Notably, in an opinion decided after the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, our Supreme Court reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim a petition for quo warranto, even though the petitioner’s crucial allegation that a judge did not satisfy a residency requirement for holding office was made “on information and belief.” Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 500 ( 480 SE2d 10 ) (1997). 2025Notably, in an opinion decided after the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, our Supreme Court reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim a petition for quo warranto, even though the petitioner’s crucial allegation that a judge did not satisfy a residency requirement for holding office was made “on information and belief.” Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 500 ( 480 SE2d 10 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Blackgreen2 sentences2022Under OCGA § 19-5-2, “[n]o court shall grant a divorce to any person who has not been a bona fide resident of this state for six months before the filing of the petition for divorce[.]” The party filing for divorce bears the burden of establishing compliance with the residency requirement, and he may do so by showing that “he maintained actual residence in Georgia during the relevant time and that he had an intent at that time to remain in Georgia indefinitely.” Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 692 (1) ( 740 SE2d 613 ) (2013). 2022Under OCGA § 19-5-2, “[n]o court shall grant a divorce to any person who has not been a bona fide resident of this state for six months before the filing of the petition for divorce[.]” The party filing for divorce bears the burden of establishing compliance with the residency requirement, and he may do so by showing that “he maintained actual residence in Georgia during the relevant time and that he had an intent at that time to remain in Georgia indefinitely.” Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 692 (1) ( 740 SE2d 613 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Liberty County Board of Electionsgreen2 sentences2017Burgess v. Liberty County Bd. of Elections, 291 Ga. 802, 802-803 (1) ( 733 SE2d 774 ) (2012).1 1 Pursuant to the Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the denial of a nomination petition in which the notice of appeal or application to appeal was filed on or after Here, Morgan seeks review of the local superintendent’s decision that he is disqualified from the City Council position because he does not satisfy the residency requirements. 2017Burgess v. Liberty County Bd. of Elections, 291 Ga. 802, 802-803 (1) ( 733 SE2d 774 ) (2012).1 1 Pursuant to the Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the denial of a nomination petition in which the notice of appeal or application to appeal was filed on or after Here, Morgan seeks review of the local superintendent’s decision that he is disqualified from the City Council position because he does not satisfy the residency requirements. | 1 | 1 |
Avery v. Bowergreen2 sentences2008While “domicile” and “residence” have different meanings, with “domicile” denoting a permanent place of abode and “residence” not necessarily being permanent (Avery v. Bower, 170 Ga. 202 (2) ( 152 SE 239 ) (1930) (“ ‘There must be a concurrence of actual residence and the intention to remain, to acquire a domicile’ ”)), the residency requirement for a candidate for, or holder of, public office refers to domicile. 2008While “domicile” and “residence” have different meanings, with “domicile” denoting a permanent place of abode and “residence” not necessarily being permanent (Avery v. Bower, 170 Ga. 202 (2) ( 152 SE 239 ) (1930) (“ ‘There must be a concurrence of actual residence and the intention to remain, to acquire a domicile’ ”)), the residency requirement for a candidate for, or holder of, public office refers to domicile. | 1 | 1 |
Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Committee v. City of Atlantagreen1 sentence2006Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Committee v. City of Atlanta, 584 F.Supp. 961, 964 (1) (N.D.Ga.1983) (upholding the City's residency requirement for taxi drivers as against an equal protection challenge). | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commissiongreen2 sentences2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w 2006The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association's Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association "must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . . [Cit.]." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong "associational standing" test it set forth in Hunt and w | 1 | 1 |
Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'ngreen2 sentences2006Whether the Association has standing to raise this issue was addressed below, and the trial court determined that the Association has "associational standing" in accordance with Aldridge v. Ga. Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 236 (1), 304 S.E.2d 708 (1983): "(A)n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual me 2006Whether the Association has standing to raise this issue was addressed below, and the trial court determined that the Association has "associational standing" in accordance with Aldridge v. Ga. Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 236 (1), 304 S.E.2d 708 (1983): "(A)n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual me | 1 | 1 |
McCaskill v. McCaskillgreen1 sentence1991Under Texas law the residency requirement is not jurisdictional, McCaskill v. McCaskill, 761 SW2d 470, 472 (5) (Tex. App., Corpus Christi 1988); Svensen v. Svensen, 629 SW2d 97, 98 (1) (Tex. App., Dallas 1981), and the trial court therefore erred in concluding the Texas judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit on the ground Mr. Hildebrant had not met the residency requirement. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Whitakergreen2 sentences1991Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillis, 196 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 396 SE2d 54 ) (1990); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 897-898 ( 230 SE2d 486 ) (1976). 1991Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillis, 196 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 396 SE2d 54 ) (1990); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 897-898 ( 230 SE2d 486 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Svensen v. Svensengreen1 sentence1991Under Texas law the residency requirement is not jurisdictional, McCaskill v. McCaskill, 761 SW2d 470, 472 (5) (Tex. App., Corpus Christi 1988); Svensen v. Svensen, 629 SW2d 97, 98 (1) (Tex. App., Dallas 1981), and the trial court therefore erred in concluding the Texas judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit on the ground Mr. Hildebrant had not met the residency requirement. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillisgreen2 sentences1991Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillis, 196 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 396 SE2d 54 ) (1990); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 897-898 ( 230 SE2d 486 ) (1976). 1991Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tillis, 196 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 396 SE2d 54 ) (1990); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895, 897-898 ( 230 SE2d 486 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Hardison v. Haslamgreen2 sentences1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). 1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Hammock
green
2 sentences2008Clark v. Hammock, 228 Ga. 157 (2) (a) ( 184 SE2d 581 ) (1971). 2008Clark v. Hammock, 228 Ga. 157 (2) (a) ( 184 SE2d 581 ) (1971). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ward v. Village of Monroeville
green
1 sentence1992The appellant argues that such a residency requirement exists by virtue of the following language contained in OCGA § 36-32-2 (a): “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any general or local Act, the governing authority of each municipal corporation within this state having a municipal court, as provided by the Act incorporating the municipal corporation or any amendments thereto, is authorized to appoint a judge of such court who shall be a resident of the same judicial circuit as that in which the court, is located and who shall serve in lieu of the mayor or other members of | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Thornton v. State
green
2 sentences1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). 1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Alexander v. State
green
2 sentences1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). 1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Tant v. State
green
2 sentences1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). 1985Tant v. State, 226 Ga. 761 ( 177 SE2d 484 ) (1970).” Thornton v. State, 234 Ga. 480 ( 216 SE2d 330 ) (1975).’ [Emphasis in original.] Alexander v. State, 239 Ga. 810 ( 239 SE2d 18 ) (1977).” Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) ( 295 SE2d 830 ) (1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Lucas v. Woodward
green
2 sentences1980We do note that it is established by Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770 ( 243 SE2d 28 ) (1978), that the General Assembly cannot by statute impose a residency requirement as a conditiqn of eligibility to hold county office which is more stringent than the requirement fixed by the State Constitution. 1980We do note that it is established by Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770 ( 243 SE2d 28 ) (1978), that the General Assembly cannot by statute impose a residency requirement as a conditiqn of eligibility to hold county office which is more stringent than the requirement fixed by the State Constitution. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Dyke v. Georgia
green
1 sentence1978This residency requirement is not a violation of the constitutional rights to privacy and to free association (Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 F2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U. S. 952 (1975); Poynter v. Drevdahl, 359 FSupp. 1137 (W.D. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.