residency requirement in Connecticut

1999Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles , 243 Conn. 255 , 257 , 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1838 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1998).

1999Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles , 243 Conn. 255 , 257 , 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1838 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1998).

2000In evaluating the constitutionality of statutes, we are mindful of the principle that [a] party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute’s adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 800. 11 Similarly, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 335 , a case involving an equal protection challenge under the federal co

1985Ill The residency requirement at issue in this case, which is not a prerequisite to municipal employment initially, must be distinguished from the durational residency requirement that was found to impinge upon the fundamental right of travel and thus to violate the equal protection clause of the federal constitution in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 351 , 472 A.2d 328 (1984).

1999Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles , 243 Conn. 255 , 257 , 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1838 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1998).

1999Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255 , 257 , 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ___. 118 S.Ct. 1838 , 140 L.Ed.2d (1998).

2000In evaluating the constitutionality of statutes, we are mindful of the principle that [a] party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute’s adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 800. 11 Similarly, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 335 , a case involving an equal protection challenge under the federal co

2000In evaluating the constitutionality of statutes, we are mindful of the principle that [a] party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute’s adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 800. 11 Similarly, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 192 Conn. 335 , a case involving an equal protection challenge under the federal co

1999Aff., ¶ 4.) As to the residency requirement of the movant, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, it is well settled that if the plaintiff in a suit for a divorce satisfies the residency requirements at the time of commencing proceedings, the court's jurisdiction will survive the plaintiff's change of domicile." Spalding v. Spalding , 171 Conn. 220 , 226 , 368 A.2d 14 (1976).

1999Aff., ¶ 4.) As to the residency requirement of the movant, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, it is well settled that if the plaintiff in a suit for a divorce satisfies the residency requirements at the time of commencing proceedings, the court's jurisdiction will survive the plaintiff's change of domicile." Spalding v. Spalding , 171 Conn. 220 , 226 , 368 A.2d 14 (1976).

1999Id.

1999Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles , 243 Conn. 255 , 257 , 701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1838 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1998).

1996In Jones v. Jones, supra, 199 Conn. 294 , our Supreme Court held that § 46b-46 (b) permits a trial court to modify a dissolution judgment to require a nonresident defendant to pay child support if the nonresident had actual notice of the modification proceedings.

1996The Cashman court held that § 46b-46 (b) not only applies to actions on complaints for dissolution or legal separation, but CT Page 6920 that it also "permits Connecticut courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in matters concerning modification of alimony if the nonresident receives actual notice of the proceeding, the party requesting the modification is a resident of Connecticut and Connecticut was the domicile of both parties immediately prior to their separation." 1 41 Conn. App. 382 , 385 .

1996It does not say that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction if the movant currently meets or did at the time of the complaint or decree meet the residency requirement The appellate court in Cashman stated that § 46b-46 (b) permits Connecticut courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in matters concerning modification . . . if . . . the party requesting modification is a resident of Connecticut 41 Conn. App. 382 , 385 (emphasis added).

1993Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 638-40 , 495 A.2d 1011 (1985) (discussing right to travel).

1993Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 638-40 , 495 A.2d 1011 (1985) (discussing right to travel).

1993Fernandez v. Fernandez, 208 Conn. 329 , 334 ; Babouder v. Abdennur, 41 Conn. Sup. 258 , 265 .

1993Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476 , 488 .

1993Fernandez v. Fernandez, 208 Conn. 329 , 334 ; Babouder v. Abdennur, 41 Conn. Sup. 258 , 265 .

1991The issue in Jones was "the construction to be afforded to 46b-46 (b) which allows a court, in matrimonial matters, to `exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident party as to matters concerning. . .support of children, only if: (1) The nonresident party has received actual notice under subsection (a) of this section.'" Jones, 199 Conn. at 290 , fn. 1, (emphasis supplied).

1985Fraternal Order of Police v. Hunter, supra, 191-93 ; see Lines v. Topeka, supra, 780-81 ; Cross v. Whedon, 93 Mich. App. 13, 19 , 285 N.W.2d 780 (1979).

1985Fraternal Order of Police v. Hunter, supra, 191-93 ; see Lines v. Topeka, supra, 780-81 ; Cross v. Whedon, 93 Mich. App. 13, 19 , 285 N.W.2d 780 (1979).

1979“The use of the phrase ‘conditions of employment’ reflects a judgment that the scope of negotiations should be relatively broad, but sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changing needs of the parties.” West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581-82 .

1979Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44 ; annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 242 , 281-82.