residency requirement in Rhode Island

2023Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1347 .

2013After a careful review of the record, it is our opinion that there was enough evidence in the record from which the trial justice could determine that Lori had met the residency requirement; we are persuaded that his decision in that regard did not “clearly fail[ ] to do justice between the parties” nor was it “clearly erroneous.” See Root, 57 R.I. at 441 , 190 A. at 452 ; see also McCarthy, 45 R.I. at 370-71 , 122 A. at 531 .

2013After a careful review of the record, it is our opinion that there was enough evidence in the record from which the trial justice could determine that Lori had met the residency requirement; we are persuaded that his decision in that regard did not “clearly fail[ ] to do justice between the parties” nor was it “clearly erroneous.” See Root, 57 R.I. at 441 , 190 A. at 452 ; see also McCarthy, 45 R.I. at 370-71 , 122 A. at 531 .

2005Then, two years later, the city council passed a resolution to further amend the charter to reinstitute the residency requirement for all new city workers employed after January 1, 1993. 3 Id.

2004In Loiselle, the Court recognized a number of reasons listed by the California Supreme Court that exist for retaining a residency requirement for government employees, including "`diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal personnel'; the improvement of the quality of employee performance by their greater knowledge of the municipality's conditions and their feeling of having a greater personal stake in the progress of the municipality; the ready availability of trained personnel in emergencies; and the economic benefits flowing from the expenditure within the community of the empl

2004In Loiselle, the Court recognized a number of reasons listed by the California Supreme Court that exist for retaining a residency requirement for government employees, including "`diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal personnel'; the improvement of the quality of employee performance by their greater knowledge of the municipality's conditions and their feeling of having a greater personal stake in the progress of the municipality; the ready availability of trained personnel in emergencies; and the economic benefits flowing from the expenditure within the community of the empl

2004Reynolds, 102 R.I. at 563 , 232 A.2d at 378 .

2004Reynolds, 102 R.I. at 563 , 232 A.2d at 378 .

2003Under LEOBOR, a hearing committee is given the authority to "call witnesses, make findings of fact, and sustain, modify, or reverse the charges of the investigating authority." City of East Providence v. McLaughlin, 593 A.2d 1345 , 1348 (R.I. 1991) (citing Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868 , 870 n. 1, 391 A.2d 117 , 119 n. 1 (R.I. 1978)).

2003Under LEOBOR, a hearing committee is given the authority to "call witnesses, make findings of fact, and sustain, modify, or reverse the charges of the investigating authority." City of East Providence v. McLaughlin, 593 A.2d 1345 , 1348 (R.I. 1991) (citing Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868 , 870 n. 1, 391 A.2d 117 , 119 n. 1 (R.I. 1978)).

2003Under LEOBOR, a hearing committee is given the authority to "call witnesses, make findings of fact, and sustain, modify, or reverse the charges of the investigating authority." City of East Providence v. McLaughlin, 593 A.2d 1345 , 1348 (R.I. 1991) (citing Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868 , 870 n. 1, 391 A.2d 117 , 119 n. 1 (R.I. 1978)).

2001The Plaintiffs, in response to the Defendants' motion regarding standing, argue that "the Providence Teachers' Union, the five individual teachers who are party plaintiffs, and teachers unnamed, past or present, who are similarly situated by stipulation, have standing so that any and all decisions and rulings made in this matter and the judgment hereafter shall be applied to them." The Plaintiffs, in support of their objection, rely on language in the Complaint that states the Union is the "duly certified collective bargaining representative for teachers within the City of Providence," and tha

2001The Plaintiffs, in response to the Defendants' motion regarding standing, argue that "the Providence Teachers' Union, the five individual teachers who are party plaintiffs, and teachers unnamed, past or present, who are similarly situated by stipulation, have standing so that any and all decisions and rulings made in this matter and the judgment hereafter shall be applied to them." The Plaintiffs, in support of their objection, rely on language in the Complaint that states the Union is the "duly certified collective bargaining representative for teachers within the City of Providence," and tha

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a

2001Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that "[e]stoppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority." Ferrelli, 106 R.I. at 592-93 , 261 A.2d at 909 ; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062 ; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93 ; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591 , 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not estopped to enforce a r

1990We recently stated in Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980 (R.I.1990), that a residency clause in an insurance policy — identical to the one in the case before us — should be liberally construed in accordance with the general rule that a person may have more than one residence.

1990In Carrera we acknowledged the possibility of a “constructive” residency while refuting the belief that a person must physically and continuously live in the insured’s household at the time of the accident to qualify as a “resident.” Id. at 983-84 .