87 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1974–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beck-Nichols v. Biancogreen2 sentences2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko 2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko | 5 | 6 |
MATTER OF HOSLEY v. Currygreen2 sentences2010“For a change to a new domicile to be effected, there must be a union of residence in fact and an ‘absolute and fixed intention’ to abandon the former and make the new locality a fixed and permanent home” (Matter of Hosley v Curry, 85 NY2d 447, 451 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995]; see Newcomb, 192 NY at 250-251 ). 2008Here, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Powers’s letters to the Board and his concomitant submission of an out-of-state driver’s license and lease agreement conclusively establish his intention to establish residency outside of this state (see Election Law § 1-104 [22]; Matter of Hosley v Curry, 85 NY2d 447, 451-452 [1995]; Matter of Justice v Gamache, 45 AD3d at 510 ; Matter of Gresser, 136 NYS2d 468 , 470 [1954]; cf. Matter of Larkin v Herbert, 185 AD2d 607, 608 [1992]) and, therefore, his disqualification for the office in question (see Matter of Justice v Gamache, 45 AD3d at 510 | 3 | 3 |
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences2008It is equally well established that “[o]ne such basis may be that the candidate will not satisfy the residency requirement at the time of the general election” (id.; see Election Law § 6-122; Public Officers Law § 3 [1]; Matter of Keith v King, 220 AD2d 471, 472 [1995]; Matter of Clark v McCoy, 196 AD2d 607, 607 [1993]). 2007One such basis may be that the candidate will not satisfy the residency requirement at the time of the general election (see Public Officers Law § 3 [1]; Matter of Keith v King, 220 AD2d 471, 471-472 [1995]; Matter of Clark v McCoy, 196 AD2d 607 [1993]). | 3 | 3 |
Galbraith v. New York Conservative Partygreen2 sentences2011That is, the mere fact that a state election law “creates barriers . . . tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny” (id.; see Galbraith v New York Conservative Party, 155 AD2d 183, 185-186 [3d Dept 1990] [the right to run for elective office is not fundamental]). 2 Ross cannot point to a residency requirement case that supports his position. 2009The statute must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if the residency requirement is rationally related to a legitimate State interest {see Matter of Rosenstock v Scaringe, 40 NY2d 563, 564 [1976]; Galbraith v New York Conservative Party, 155 AD2d 183, 185 [1990]; Matter of Roth v Cuevas, 158 Misc 2d 238, 252-253 [1993], affd 197 AD2d 369 [1993]; see also Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618 [1990]). | 2 | 3 |
Naliboff v. Davisgreen2 sentences2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of 2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of | 2 | 2 |
People v. Garsongreen2 sentences2020Of course, we must “‘interpret . . . statute[s] so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law’” (Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A., 34 NY3d 250 , 255 [2019], quoting People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 614 [2006]). 2020Of course, we must “‘interpret . . . statute[s] so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law’” (Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A., 34 NY3d 250 , 255 [2019], quoting People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 614 [2006]). | 2 | 2 |
In re the Claim of Tischmanngreen2 sentences2015Moreover, we reject the City’s assertion that the Board heavily relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in making its determination; a fair reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the Board made its own factual findings regarding whether claimant violated the residency requirement, and substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant did not engage in disqualifying misconduct or voluntarily separate from her employment (see Matter of Tischmann [ITT Sheraton Corp. — Commissioner of Labor], 256 AD2d 949, 950-951 [1998]; cf. Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. 2015Moreover, we reject the City’s assertion that the Board heavily relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in making its determination; a fair reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the Board made its own factual findings regarding whether claimant violated the residency requirement, and substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant did not engage in disqualifying misconduct or voluntarily separate from her employment (see Matter of Tischmann [ITT Sheraton Corp. — Commissioner of Labor], 256 AD2d 949, 950-951 [1998]; cf. Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. | 2 | 2 |
In re the Claim of Guimaralesgreen2 sentences2015Moreover, we reject the City’s assertion that the Board heavily relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in making its determination; a fair reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the Board made its own factual findings regarding whether claimant violated the residency requirement, and substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant did not engage in disqualifying misconduct or voluntarily separate from her employment (see Matter of Tischmann [ITT Sheraton Corp. — Commissioner of Labor], 256 AD2d 949, 950-951 [1998]; cf. Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. 2015Moreover, we reject the City’s assertion that the Board heavily relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in making its determination; a fair reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the Board made its own factual findings regarding whether claimant violated the residency requirement, and substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant did not engage in disqualifying misconduct or voluntarily separate from her employment (see Matter of Tischmann [ITT Sheraton Corp. — Commissioner of Labor], 256 AD2d 949, 950-951 [1998]; cf. Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ. | 2 | 2 |
Fisher v. Finnegan-Curtisgreen2 sentences2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). 2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Ruiz v. Lazalagreen2 sentences2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). 2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Butts v. Marseillegreen2 sentences2013In opposition, and after a residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of the commencement of the action (see Forbes v Rubinovich, 94 AD3d at 810 ; Doe v Hall, 36 AD3d 651 [2007]; Harley v Miller, 295 AD2d 401 [2002]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797, 798 [1999]). 2013In opposition, and after a residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of the commencement of the action (see Forbes v Rubinovich, 94 AD3d at 810 ; Doe v Hall, 36 AD3d 651 [2007]; Harley v Miller, 295 AD2d 401 [2002]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797, 798 [1999]). | 2 | 2 |
Dalton v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). 2013By improperly commencing the action in Kings County, the plaintiff forfeited the right to select venue (see Ruiz v Lazala, 26 AD3d 366, 367 [2006]; Fisher v Finnegan-Curtis, 8 AD3d 527, 528 [2004]; Dalton v Barrett, 275 AD2d 297, 298 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State Department of Taxation & Financegreen2 sentences2013In particular, Shapiro challenges § 112 (3) of the Charter, which grants incumbents one year to move into a newly drawn district following a “readjustment or alteration of the county legislative district.” Shapiro argues that the Charter, in requiring nonincumbents to reside in the legislative district at the time of their nomination, does not afford nonincumbents the same opportunity. “ ‘Legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality . . . [and] parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reason 2013In particular, Shapiro challenges § 112 (3) of the Charter, which grants incumbents one year to move into a newly drawn district following a “readjustment or alteration of the county legislative district.” Shapiro argues that the Charter, in requiring nonincumbents to reside in the legislative district at the time of their nomination, does not afford nonincumbents the same opportunity. “ ‘Legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality . . . [and] parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reason | 2 | 2 |
| Schneeberg v. New York State Board of Electionsgreen | 2 | 2 |
Montano v. Riveragreen2 sentences2015Further, the fact that the legislative districts were redrawn in 2015 does not exempt petitioner from the residency requirement (see Matter of Adamczyk v Mohr, 87 AD3d at 834-835; Matter of Reid v Richards, 89 AD2d 939, 939 [1982]). 2011The fact “[t]hat the [common] council districts have been reapportioned this year provides no exemption from the residence requirement” (Matter of Reid v Richards, 89 AD2d 939 [1982]). | 1 | 4 |
Clark v. McCoygreen2 sentences2008It is equally well established that “[o]ne such basis may be that the candidate will not satisfy the residency requirement at the time of the general election” (id.; see Election Law § 6-122; Public Officers Law § 3 [1]; Matter of Keith v King, 220 AD2d 471, 472 [1995]; Matter of Clark v McCoy, 196 AD2d 607, 607 [1993]). 2007One such basis may be that the candidate will not satisfy the residency requirement at the time of the general election (see Public Officers Law § 3 [1]; Matter of Keith v King, 220 AD2d 471, 471-472 [1995]; Matter of Clark v McCoy, 196 AD2d 607 [1993]). | 1 | 3 |
Ayres v. Dunhill Interiors, Ltd.green2 sentences2024Rather, the residency requirement pertains to "tenants" of the property: a tenant who enters into an agreement with a contractor for the performance of a home improvement is entitled to the protections of the home improvement contractor's licensing requirement if the "work is to be performed in, to or upon the residence or dwelling unit of such tenant" (Administrative Code § 20-386[6]; see Ayres v Dunhill Interiors , 138 AD2d 303 [1st Dept 1988] [applying residency requirement to tenant]). 2009Plaintiff refers to the case Ayres v Dunhill Interiors ( 138 AD2d 303 [1st Dept 1988]) in arguing that defendant does not meet the residency requirement of Administrative Code § 20-386. | 1 | 2 |
| Goldstein v. Carlsengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Matter of Wicksel v. Cohengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lucariello v. Commissioners of Chautauqua County Board of Electionsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Collins v. Heffernangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Mansfield v. Epsteingreen | 1 | 2 |
| Schwartz v. Heffernangreen | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Revocation of Ancillary Letters Testamentary of the Estate of Newcombgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Weidman v. Starkweathergreen | 1 | 2 |
| August v. Bronsteingreen | 1 | 2 |
| Urbanski v. City of Rochestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Aklog v. Town of Harrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holton v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leahygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Burr v. . Voorhisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matilda Construction Inc. v. 420 East 72nd Street Tenants Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Partners v. Superior Well Services, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Troxel v. Granvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenblum v. Conflicts of Interest Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Claim of Ballgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. City of Albanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leavy v. Merriamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adamczyk v. Mohrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York State Office of Children v. Lantermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Felix v. New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services
green
2 sentences2023Servs. ( 3 NY3d 498 [2004]), in which the petitioner, a plant tender formerly employed by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, was terminated for failing to comply with a residency requirement that had been enacted by the City Council in 1986, seven years before he was hired in 1993 ( see id. at 501-502 ). 2023Servs. ( 3 NY3d 498 [2004]), in which the petitioner, a plant tender formerly employed by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, was terminated for failing to comply with a residency requirement that had been enacted by the City Council in 1986, seven years before he was hired in 1993 ( see id. at 501-502 ). | 4 | 2008–2023 |
Patten v. HAMBURG OB/GYN GROUP, PC
green
2 sentences2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko 2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko | 3 | 2013–2023 |
O'Connor v. Board of Education of City School District
green
2 sentences2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko 2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko | 3 | 2013–2023 |
Forbes v. Rubinovich
green
2 sentences2021In opposition, and after the residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of commencement of the action ( see Forbes v Rubinovich , 94 AD3d 809, 810 ; Doe v Hall , 36 AD3d 651 ; Ellis v Wirshba , 18 AD3d 805 ). 2013In opposition, and after a residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of the commencement of the action (see Forbes v Rubinovich, 94 AD3d at 810 ; Doe v Hall, 36 AD3d 651 [2007]; Harley v Miller, 295 AD2d 401 [2002]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797, 798 [1999]). | 3 | 2013–2021 |
Doe v. Hall
green
2 sentences2021In opposition, and after the residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of commencement of the action ( see Forbes v Rubinovich , 94 AD3d 809, 810 ; Doe v Hall , 36 AD3d 651 ; Ellis v Wirshba , 18 AD3d 805 ). 2013In opposition, and after a residency hearing, the plaintiff failed to establish through documentary evidence that he resided in Kings County with any degree of permanency at the time of the commencement of the action (see Forbes v Rubinovich, 94 AD3d at 810 ; Doe v Hall, 36 AD3d 651 [2007]; Harley v Miller, 295 AD2d 401 [2002]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797, 798 [1999]). | 3 | 2013–2021 |
Lerman v. Board Of Elections In The City Of New York
green
2 sentences2005Although Supreme Court found 136 of the 224 signatures valid 1 thus raising the signature count to 3,045, it nevertheless ruled that the subscribing witnesses must reside in the City of Albany and therefore excluded all 316 signatures on those pages of the petition that were signed by subscribing witnesses not meeting this residency requirement 2 In doing so, the court distinguished Lerman v Board of Elections in City of N.Y. ( 232 F3d 135 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 533 US 915 [2001]), relied upon by petitioner, wherein the Second Circuit found unconstitutional the requirement in Election Law 2001Petitioners assert that the designating petitions are defective because numerous signatures were witnessed by subscribing witnesses who resided outside the Second and Sixth Council Districts in violation of Election Law § 6-132 (2), which provides that the subscribing witness to a designating petition must be, inter alia, “a resident of the political subdivision in which the office or position is to be voted for.” Respondents do not dispute the facts as they relate to the designating petitions; rather, they assert that the residency requirement for subscribing witnesses contained in Election L | 3 | 2001–2005 |
People v. Dunbar
green
2 sentences1998As Dunbar (supra) and Haggerty hold, and Carter suggests, Sleight’s failure to satisfy the residency requirement of Public Officers Law § 3 is not a jurisdictional defect, but a mere irregularity that may be waived, and is waived, by failure to object or raise the issue prior to the conclusion of a criminal proceeding. 1995Additionally, respondents argue that the residency requirement is riddled with exceptions (although respondents point to no exception for Assistant District Attorneys in Cattaraugus County), and that violation of the residency requirement is not a ground for reversal on appeal from a judgment of conviction, let alone for issuance of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition (see, People v Dunbar, 53 NY2d 868, 870-871 ; Matter of Brindisi v Donalty, supra, at 1040). | 3 | 1990–1998 |
Dempster v. OVERVIEW EQUITIES, INC.
green
2 sentences2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of 2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Mathew v. Coler Goldwater Specialty Hospital & Nursing Facility
green
2 sentences2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of 2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Moogan v. New York State Department of Health
green
2 sentences2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of 2023Similarly distinguishable are Matter of Mathew v Coler Goldwater Specialty Hosp. & Nursing Facility ( 103 AD3d 567 [1st Dept 2013] [upholding the petitioner's termination as a respiratory therapist for failure to hold a "valid active license . . . , which was a minimum job requirement"]), Matter of Moogan v New York State Dept. of Health ( 8 AD3d 68 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 612 [2004] [upholding the petitioner's termination as an EMT based on the suspension of his EMT certification, such certification having been "a requirement for employment with the Fire Department"]), and Matter of | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Koutros v. Department of Education
neutral
2 sentences2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko 2023In each of the state cases cited by the majority in which termination of a tenured teacher for failure to satisfy a qualification for employment was held to be a nondisciplinary matter not subject to the procedural requirements of Education Law § 3020-a, the qualification or condition at issue had existed at the inception of the teacher's employment ( see Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco , 20 NY3d 540, 549, 552, 555 [2013] [the three petitioners were terminated for failing to satisfy a residency requirement that had become effective on March 1, 1994, before any of them were hired]; Matter of Ko | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Gruenwald v. Polatseck
neutral
2 sentences2021The plaintiff failed to adequately support his assertion that he maintained a second residence at his mother's home in Kings County ( see Gruenwald v Polatseck , 114 AD3d at 905 ; Doe v Hall , 36 AD3d at 651-652 ). 2019Defendants established that the county designated by plaintiff was improper by submitting, inter alia, plaintiff's Department of Motor Vehicle records, hospital records, tax returns for 2007 through 2011, the accident report, plaintiff's 2009 employment records and his 2009 W-4 and W-2 forms, all of which indicated that he resided in Westchester County at the time he commenced the action ( see Gruenwald v Polatseck , 114 AD3d 904 [2d Dept 2014]). | 2 | 2019–2021 |
In re the Claim of Samuels
green
2 sentences2015Auth. — Commis sioner of Labor], 118 AD3d 1206 , 1206-1207 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 905 [2014]). 2015Auth. — Commis sioner of Labor], 118 AD3d 1206 , 1206-1207 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 905 [2014]). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Ricket v. Mahan
green
2 sentences2013In April 2011, petitioners were terminated from their long-term employment with respondent Town of Colonie as fire protection specialist and civil engineer on the ground that they were public officers who were required to but did not meet the residency requirement of the Public Officers Law, relying upon our decision in Matter of Ricket v Mahan ( 82 AD3d 1565 [2011]). 2013In April 2011, petitioners were terminated from their long-term employment with respondent Town of Colonie as fire protection specialist and civil engineer on the ground that they were public officers who were required to but did not meet the residency requirement of the Public Officers Law, relying upon our decision in Matter of Ricket v Mahan ( 82 AD3d 1565 [2011]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Becker v. Shapiro neutral | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Harley v. Miller green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Rivera v. Erie County Board of Elections neutral | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Goldstein v. Carlsen neutral | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Haggerty v. Himelein green | 2 | 1998–2010 |
| Kahn v. Dean & Fulkerson, P. C. green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| La Brake v. Dukes green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Carmack v. Buckner green | 2 | 1980–1989 |
| Mesivta of Forest Hills Institute, Inc. v. City of New York green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. . Molineux green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dean v. Tower Insurance green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ellis v. Wirshba green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| The Matter of Steven Glickman v. Zackary Laffin green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Colon green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Black v. Black green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Venizelos v. Venizelos green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Walsh v. Katz neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Reynolds v. Sims green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cuba Village v. Town of New Hudson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Mileto v. Sleight neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.