residency requirement in West Virginia

2009Code § 8-5-11 (1969), in pertinent part, Subject to the provisions of the constitution of this State, the provisions of this article, and other applicable provisions of this chapter, any city may by charter provision, and the governing body of any municipality, consistent with the provisions of its charter, if any, may by ordinance, determine and prescribe the ... residency requirements ... of municipal officers and employees[.] In the fairly recent case of Morgan v. City of Wheeling, 205 W.Va. 34 , 516 S.E.2d 48 (1999), this Court upheld the validity of the City of Wheeling’s residency requir

2009Code § 8-5-11 (1969), in pertinent part, Subject to the provisions of the constitution of this State, the provisions of this article, and other applicable provisions of this chapter, any city may by charter provision, and the governing body of any municipality, consistent with the provisions of its charter, if any, may by ordinance, determine and prescribe the ... residency requirements ... of municipal officers and employees[.] In the fairly recent case of Morgan v. City of Wheeling, 205 W.Va. 34 , 516 S.E.2d 48 (1999), this Court upheld the validity of the City of Wheeling’s residency requir

1979The right to become a candidate for public office is a fundamental right; therefore, any classification which restricts that right must serve a compelling governmental interest, Piccirillo, supra; State ex rel.

1979The right to become a candidate for public office is a fundamental right; therefore, any classification which restricts that right must serve a compelling governmental interest, Piccirillo, supra; State ex rel.

2019In Morgan, we held that a city’s residency requirement did not conflict with the express provisions of the Act, and therefore was permissible.9 We reasoned that the Act was primary and exclusive with regard to merit 8 Appalachian Power Co., 195 W.

2019Va. at 588 , 466 S.E.2d at 439 . 9 Syl. pt. 2, Morgan, 205 W.

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In support of this contention, the appellant first looks to the language of Dougherty, supra, that the act is “complete and all-inclusive.” He also points to the language of W.Va.Code § 8-14-6, quoted above, that the selection of police officers shall be made “only” according to the provisions of the act, as well as the language of W.Va.Code § 8-14-23 that the provisions of the act are “complete and exclusive.” The appellant next cites the case of Bays v. Police Civil Service Com’n, 178 W.Va. 756 , 364 S.E.2d 547 (1987).

1999In support of this contention, the appellant first looks to the language of Dougherty, supra, that the act is “complete and all-inclusive.” He also points to the language of W.Va.Code § 8-14-6, quoted above, that the selection of police officers shall be made “only” according to the provisions of the act, as well as the language of W.Va.Code § 8-14-23 that the provisions of the act are “complete and exclusive.” The appellant next cites the case of Bays v. Police Civil Service Com’n, 178 W.Va. 756 , 364 S.E.2d 547 (1987).

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999We quoted in Spradling the United States Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 , 96 S.Ct. 1154 , 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976) in which it stated: We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration.

1999We quoted in Spradling the United States Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 , 96 S.Ct. 1154 , 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976) in which it stated: We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration.

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999In Spradling, 162 W.Va. at 774 , 253 S.E.2d at 375 , we stated that “to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, [most] courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel.” (Footnote omitted), citing Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.1977), [cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 , 98 S.Ct. 727 , 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978) ]; Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1976); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 (19

1999As noted by the appellant, we found this requirement to be unconstitutional in Spradling v. Hutchinson, 162 W.Va. 768 , 253 S.E.2d 371 .(1979), where we concluded in Syllabus Point 2, “there is no rational basis for the restriction it imposes upon the fundamental constitutional right to travel, nor is there any compelling state interest for the requirement.” According to the appellant, the fact .that the police civil service act originally contained a residency requirement means that the residency of police officers is clearly a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the act.

1999As noted by the appellant, we found this requirement to be unconstitutional in Spradling v. Hutchinson, 162 W.Va. 768 , 253 S.E.2d 371 .(1979), where we concluded in Syllabus Point 2, “there is no rational basis for the restriction it imposes upon the fundamental constitutional right to travel, nor is there any compelling state interest for the requirement.” According to the appellant, the fact .that the police civil service act originally contained a residency requirement means that the residency of police officers is clearly a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the act.

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1990We affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and concluded in the Syllabus, in part, of Gray : “A bill in chancery for a divorce under Code, 48-2-8, may be amended to amplify or clarify its allegations, but alterations or additions to its averments which lay a new ground for equitable relief constitute the commencement of a new suit....” 5 See also Goldman v. Goldman, 146 W.Va. 855 , 122 S.E.2d 843 (1961); Grottendick v. Webber, 132 W.Va. 539 , 52 S.E.2d 700 (1949); Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W.Va. 704 , 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947).

1982“We believe that the bar residency requirement is the sort of economic protectionism that the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution was designed to prevent.” 620 P.2d at 646 .

1982As this Court held in syllabus point 6 of West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va. 504 , 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959): The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons who are not admitted to the bar and for limiting and restricting such practice to licensed members of the legal profession is not the protection of the members of the bar from competition or the creation of a monopoly for the members of the legal profession, but is instead the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified and undisciplined persons over whom the judicial

1982As this Court held in syllabus point 6 of West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va. 504 , 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959): The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons who are not admitted to the bar and for limiting and restricting such practice to licensed members of the legal profession is not the protection of the members of the bar from competition or the creation of a monopoly for the members of the legal profession, but is instead the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified and undisciplined persons over whom the judicial