residency requirement in Illinois

2004App. 3d 364 , 788 N.E.2d 286 (2003), quoting Cicero Municipal Code § 2 — 123(a) (amended March 29, 1988), the Town of Cicero (Town) imposed a residency ordinance which required that its employees must reside in the Town “ ‘no later than six months after commencing their employment and keep such domicile during the term of the appointment or employment.’ ” The ordinance further stated that the failure to comply with the residency requirement “ ‘will be sufficient cause for termination of employment or removal from service.’ ” Town of Cicero, 338 Ill.

2004App. 3d 364 , 788 N.E.2d 286 (2003), quoting Cicero Municipal Code § 2 — 123(a) (amended March 29, 1988), the Town of Cicero (Town) imposed a residency ordinance which required that its employees must reside in the Town “ ‘no later than six months after commencing their employment and keep such domicile during the term of the appointment or employment.’ ” The ordinance further stated that the failure to comply with the residency requirement “ ‘will be sufficient cause for termination of employment or removal from service.’ ” Town of Cicero, 338 Ill.

2001Miller, 98 Ill. 2d at 485-86 .

2001Miller, 98 Ill. 2d at 486 .

2021Id. -9- No. 1-18-1562 ¶ 31 The residency requirement of the Village’s Municipal Code (Code) provided: “Each and every officer and employee of the village, unless exempted by this chapter, must be a resident of the village as that term has been defined herein.

2020Id. ¶ 16 The residency requirement of the Village’s Municipal Code (Code) provided that: “[e]ach and every officer and employee of the Village, unless exempted by this Chapter, must be a resident of the Village as that term has been defined herein.

2015Id. at 652 .

2015Id. ¶ 56 We found that the evidence against O’Boyle was sufficient to uphold the personnel board’s decision because O’Boyle did not intend to permanently move to the Chicago residence, but rather he merely intended to comply with the residency requirement.

2011In fact, as we discuss below, we view the doctrine, which is actually an outgrowth of the more general rule that courts should consider statutory provisions in light of the *745 entire relevant statutory scheme ( Girard, 356 Ill.App.3d at 17 , 292 Ill.Dec. 376 , 826 N.E.2d 517 ), as support for our conclusion that the requirements of the Election Code and the Municipal Code, although distinguishable, may nevertheless be read in harmony.

2011In fact, as we discuss below, we view the doctrine, which is actually an outgrowth of the more general rule that courts should consider statutory provisions in light of the *745 entire relevant statutory scheme ( Girard, 356 Ill.App.3d at 17 , 292 Ill.Dec. 376 , 826 N.E.2d 517 ), as support for our conclusion that the requirements of the Election Code and the Municipal Code, although distinguishable, may nevertheless be read in harmony.

2010Hooper, 472 U.S. at 618 , 86 L.

2010Hooper, 472 U.S. at 618 , 86 L.

2004In general, we determine whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining by applying the balancing test set forth by the Illinois Supreme court in Central City Education Ass’n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496 , 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), and City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191 , 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).

2004In general, we determine whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining by applying the balancing test set forth by the Illinois Supreme court in Central City Education Ass’n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496 , 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), and City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191 , 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).

2004Specifically, the Local Panel of the ILRB found, inter alia, that: (1) the 1997 amendment to section 14(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2000)), which stated that residency requirements for peace officers are not mandatorily negotiable in “municipalities with populations greater than 1,000,000,” did not include counties with populations over 1 million such as Cook County; and (2) with respect to all of the bargaining units, the residency requirement imposed by the ordinance constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining under the balancing test prescribed in Central City Education Ass’n v.

2004Specifically, the Local Panel of the ILRB found, inter alia, that: (1) the 1997 amendment to section 14(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2000)), which stated that residency requirements for peace officers are not mandatorily negotiable in “municipalities with populations greater than 1,000,000,” did not include counties with populations over 1 million such as Cook County; and (2) with respect to all of the bargaining units, the residency requirement imposed by the ordinance constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining under the balancing test prescribed in Central City Education Ass’n v.

2001Some appellate court cases have followed the supreme court in ignoring the residency requirement (see Ko, 287 Ill.

2001Some appellate court cases have followed the supreme court in ignoring the residency requirement (see Ko, 287 Ill.App.3d at 42 , 222 Ill.Dec. 769 , 678 N.E.2d 641 ; LeBlanc, 178 Ill.App.3d at 237 , 127 Ill.Dec. 423 , 533 N.E.2d 41 ), but at least one case has affirmed the requirement (see Ehlco, 309 Ill.App.3d at 737 , 243 Ill.Dec. 384 , 723 N.E.2d 687 ).

2001Responding to the defendants’ argument that there was no rational basis for denying them, Illinois residents, the protection of the borrowing statute, the court suggested that the legislature, in creating the residency requirement, could have concluded: “(1) Illinois residents who commit torts are more likely to injure other Illinois residents, and (2) refusing to permit Illinois residents to take advantage of a shorter than generally available limitations period (through application of the borrowing statute) would promote the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens by encouraging Illinois

2001Responding to the defendants' argument that there was no rational basis for denying them, Illinois residents, the protection of the borrowing statute, the court suggested that the legislature, in creating the residency requirement, could have concluded: "(1) Illinois residents who commit torts are more likely to injure other Illinois residents, and (2) refusing to permit Illinois residents to take advantage of a shorter than generally available limitations period (through application of the borrowing statute) would promote the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens by encouraging Illinois

2001Some appellate court cases have followed the supreme court in ignoring the residency requirement (see Ko, 287 Ill.App.3d at 42 , 222 Ill.Dec. 769 , 678 N.E.2d 641 ; LeBlanc, 178 Ill.App.3d at 237 , 127 Ill.Dec. 423 , 533 N.E.2d 41 ), but at least one case has affirmed the requirement (see Ehlco, 309 Ill.App.3d at 737 , 243 Ill.Dec. 384 , 723 N.E.2d 687 ).

2001Some appellate court cases have followed the supreme court in ignoring the residency requirement (see Ko, 287 Ill.App.3d at 42 , 222 Ill.Dec. 769 , 678 N.E.2d 641 ; LeBlanc, 178 Ill.App.3d at 237 , 127 Ill.Dec. 423 , 533 N.E.2d 41 ), but at least one case has affirmed the requirement (see Ehlco, 309 Ill.App.3d at 737 , 243 Ill.Dec. 384 , 723 N.E.2d 687 ).

2001After close review of the relevant cases, we conclude that the continuous non-Illinois residency requirement is the product of a misinterpretation of our supreme court’s analysis and holding in Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 , decided in 1876.

2001After close review of the relevant cases, we conclude that the continuous non-Illinois residency requirement is the product of a misinterpretation of our supreme court's analysis and holding in Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 , decided in 1876.

1998Martin , 238 Ill.

1998Martin, 238 Ill.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1996Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) (quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel.

1984JUSTICE WILSON delivered the opinion of the court: Fagiano, Bastían, Byttow and Green (employees), career service employees of the city of Chicago (the city), were discharged from employment following separate hearings before either the city police board (Fagiano) or the city personnel board (Bastían, Byttow and Green) regarding alleged violations of certain departmental rules predicated upon the city’s residency requirement (Chicago Municipal Code (1977), ch. 25, sec. 30), which requires that “[a]ll officers and employees in the classified civil service of the City shall be actual residents o

1983App. 3d 672 , I believe that the residency requirement established in chapter 25, section 30, of the Chicago Municipal Code “is unconstitutional because it lacks definite standards for equitable enforcement.” 108 Ill.