specificity defense (Alabama) · Go Syfert
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specificity defense in Alabama

14 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Terry Ray Uptaingreen
ca5 · 1976 · cited in 9 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1985–1990
2 sentences

1990In Hicks , this court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "`[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 63

1989In Hicks this Court recently enunicated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: “ ‘ “[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony.”

49
Howard L. Dickerson v. State of Alabamagreen
ca11 · 1982 · cited in 7 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1986–1990
2 sentences

1990In Hicks , this court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "`[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 63

1989In Hicks this Court recently enunicated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: “ ‘ “[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony.”

37
Dale v. Stategreen
alacrimapp · 1985 · cited in 5 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1985–1989
2 sentences

1986In Hicks this Court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. " 63

1985These factors are: "[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony." Dale , supra. It is unnecessary for this court to discuss the appellant's case in relation to these factors due to our decision on this matter.

35
Barton v. Stategreen
alacrimapp · 1986 · cited in 4 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1989–1990
2 sentences

1990In Hicks , this court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "`[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 63

1989In Hicks this Court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 633 F

34
Odell Aaron Hicks v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Floridagreen
ca5 · 1981 · cited in 8 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1985–1990
2 sentences

1990In Hicks , this court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "`[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 63

1989In Hicks this Court recently enunicated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: “ ‘ “[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony.”

18
Boyd v. Stategreen
alacrimapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014P., this Court has held: “ ‘Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose the facts relied upon in seeking relief.’ Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364, 406 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

11
McNabb v. Stategreen
alacrimapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See also McNabb v. State, 991 So.2d 313, 335 (Ala.Crim.App.2007)(This court may sua sponte apply the specificity requirement contained in Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim.

11
Reeves v. Stategreen
alacrimapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
1 sentence

1990In Hicks , this court recently enunciated several factors which are to be considered in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to compulsory process by a denial of a motion for continuance: "`[T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which the testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 63

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Firth v. State green
alacrimapp · 1986
2 sentences

1989See also Dale v. State, 466 So.2d 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1985); Firth v. State, 493 So.2d 397 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).” Barton v. State, 494 So.2d 943, 948-949 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).

1987See also Dale v. State , 466 So.2d 196 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); Firth v. State , 493 So.2d 397 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986)." It is clear that the appellant has not made the requisite showing in order to prove that he was deprived of his right to compulsory process as a result of a denial of his motion for continuance.

31986–1989
United States v. Bagley green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

1991I would simply hold that the proper standard is one of reasonable probability. . . ." *Page 1221 Id. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 3385 .

1991I would simply hold that the proper standard is one of reasonable probability. . . ." *Page 1221 Id. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 3385 .

11991–1991
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

1991This interpretation is further supported by Pennsylvania v. Ritchie , 480 U.S. 39 , 57 , 107 S.Ct. 989 , 1001 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), which states: "Although courts have used different terminologies to define 'materiality,' a majority of this court has agreed , '[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

1991This interpretation is further supported by Pennsylvania v. Ritchie , 480 U.S. 39 , 57 , 107 S.Ct. 989 , 1001 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), which states: "Although courts have used different terminologies to define 'materiality,' a majority of this court has agreed , '[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

11991–1991
United States v. James Robert Dorsey, United States of America v. Faye Margaret Crawford A/K/A Faye Margaret Powell green
cadc · 1979
1 sentence

1985"Because no investigation had, nor reasonably should have, apprised the police of the dwelling's multi-residence character, the `entire premises' warrant met the specificity requirement under the Fourth Amendment." Dorsey, 591 F.2d at 930 .

11985–1985
State v. Maulding green
orctapp · 1977
1 sentence

1985Even if "additional investigation might have produced additional facts, ... the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not certainty." Maulding, 564 P.2d at 730 .

11985–1985

Where else courts name it

TX 152 (1974–2025) CA 67 (1969–2024) IL 41 (1966–2026) PA 38 (1975–2026) NY 33 (1975–2026) OH 28 (1976–2025) KY 23 (1998–2026) IN 21 (1977–2020) KS 17 (1974–2024) FL 14 (1963–2026) AL 14 (1985–2014) NC 12 (1972–2025) WY 12 (1979–2022) UT 12 (1992–2025) WI 11 (1988–2023) MA 10 (1981–2007) AZ 9 (1978–2024) NE 9 (2018–2025) NJ 9 (1974–2022) TN 8 (2001–2014) OR 8 (2001–2025) ND 8 (1986–2025) WA 7 (1990–2023) MD 7 (1975–2017) LA 7 (1974–2012) RI 7 (1998–2014) MO 7 (1994–2007) CT 6 (1992–2017) CO 6 (1985–2004) VA 5 (2006–2024) MI 5 (1979–2010) ID 5 (1983–2024) VT 4 (2012–2014) MS 4 (1986–1999) IA 4 (2020–2024) NM 4 (1991–2020) DC 4 (1976–2022) AR 3 (1974–2026) DE 3 (2020–2022) ME 2 (1984–2006) SC 2 (2005–2014) MN 2 (1987–1987) AK 2 (1982–1983) GA 2 (1987–1999) GU 2 (1978–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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