67 California opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2024 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2024Fraud by intentional misrepresentation requires pleading of “ ‘ “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173 (Small).) “ ‘In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.’ ” (Id. at p. 184.) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. 2024Fraud by intentional misrepresentation requires pleading of “ ‘ “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173 (Small).) “ ‘In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.’ ” (Id. at p. 184.) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. | 5 | 9 |
West v. JPMorgan Chase Bankgreen2 sentences2024(Ibid.) “The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they 24 spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793 .) McGill has set forth no specific allegations that Hearthstone negligently gave false information to her in 2023(Ibid.) “The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793 .) McGill has set forth no specific allegations that FPI intentionally or negligently gave false information to W | 4 | 13 |
Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2017Co . (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153 , 158 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ].) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: 'to apprise the defendant of the specific grounds for the charge and enable the court to determine whether there is any basis for the cause of action.' ( Chapman, supra , at p. 231 [ 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ].)" ( Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150 , 1166-1167, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ( Daniels ).) B. 2017Co . (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153 , 158 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 ].) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: 'to apprise the defendant of the specific grounds for the charge and enable the court to determine whether there is any basis for the cause of action.' ( Chapman, supra , at p. 231 [ 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ].)" ( Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150 , 1166-1167, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ( Daniels ).) B. | 3 | 7 |
People v. Husteadgreen2 sentences2014This court has long required that the information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the defendant’s request . . . is limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021 .) The specificity requirement accordingly “excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220 (Jackson) [where defendant alleged that his confession was coerced, trial court properly limited its Pitchess review to comp 2014“A request for information that is irrelevant to the pending charges does not satisfy the specificity requirement.” (People v. Hill, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096, fn. 7 ; Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021 ; People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416 .) Ruddell’s requests for complaints regarding “all acts of aggressive behavior” and “any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude” were not supported by good cause in light of their vagueness and overbreadth. | 3 | 5 |
Warrick v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(Cf. Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1027 ; People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1096, fn. 7 (Hill); see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021 (CHP).) “This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. [Citation.] And it enables the trial court to identify what types of officer misconduct information, among those requested, will support the defense or defenses proposed to the pending charges. 2014“A request for information that is irrelevant to the pending charges does not satisfy the specificity requirement.” (People v. Hill, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096, fn. 7 ; Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021 ; People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416 .) Ruddell’s requests for complaints regarding “all acts of aggressive behavior” and “any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude” were not supported by good cause in light of their vagueness and overbreadth. | 2 | 6 |
Cansino v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2024The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ ” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 .) Second, “the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) “ ‘ “Thus ‘ “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.” ’ [Citation.] 2024The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ ” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 .) Second, “the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) “ ‘ “Thus ‘ “the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.” ’ [Citation.] | 2 | 3 |
Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2020A statement to this effect would have drawn attention to the testimony relating to the efforts of the District’s maintenance crew and the notice to the District of the imminent danger of flood.” (Id. at pp. 698-699, italics added, fn. omitted; see also, e.g., Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 367-369 [examining ways in which defective statement of reasons might have been properly drafted].) By contrast, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing the specificity requirement in this context, Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405 (Lane), upheld a statement of reasons as adequate. 2020A statement to this effect would have drawn attention to the testimony relating to the efforts of the District’s maintenance crew and the notice to the District of the imminent danger of flood.” (Id. at pp. 698-699, italics added, fn. omitted; see also, e.g., Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 367-369 [examining ways in which defective statement of reasons might have been properly drafted].) By contrast, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing the specificity requirement in this context, Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405 (Lane), upheld a statement of reasons as adequate. | 2 | 2 |
Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co.green2 sentences2020A statement to this effect would have drawn attention to the testimony relating to the efforts of the District’s maintenance crew and the notice to the District of the imminent danger of flood.” (Id. at pp. 698-699, italics added, fn. omitted; see also, e.g., Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 367-369 [examining ways in which defective statement of reasons might have been properly drafted].) By contrast, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing the specificity requirement in this context, Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405 (Lane), upheld a statement of reasons as adequate. 2020A statement to this effect would have drawn attention to the testimony relating to the efforts of the District’s maintenance crew and the notice to the District of the imminent danger of flood.” (Id. at pp. 698-699, italics added, fn. omitted; see also, e.g., Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 367-369 [examining ways in which defective statement of reasons might have been properly drafted].) By contrast, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing the specificity requirement in this context, Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405 (Lane), upheld a statement of reasons as adequate. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2016(Cf. Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1027 ; People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1096, fn. 7 (Hill); see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021 (CHP).) “This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. [Citation.] And it enables the trial court to identify what types of officer misconduct information, among those requested, will support the defense or defenses proposed to the pending charges. 2014“A request for information that is irrelevant to the pending charges does not satisfy the specificity requirement.” (People v. Hill, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096, fn. 7 ; Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021 ; People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416 .) Ruddell’s requests for complaints regarding “all acts of aggressive behavior” and “any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude” were not supported by good cause in light of their vagueness and overbreadth. | 2 | 2 |
Chapman v. Skype, Inc.green2 sentences2022Elements and Pleading of Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation “The essential elements of . . . intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citations.] The essential elements of . . . negligent misrepresentation are the same except that it does not require knowledge of falsity but instead requires a misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231 2020Elements and Pleading of Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation “The essential elements of . . . intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citations.] The essential elements of . . . negligent misrepresentation are the same except that it does not require knowledge of falsity but instead requires a misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231 | 1 | 8 |
Lazar v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023“In California, fraud must be pled 37 specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] . . . ‘This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” ’ ” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 .) “ ‘The specificity requirement serves two purposes. 2020Law Applicable to Plaintiff’s Fraud-Related Claims “‘Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.’” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73 , quoting Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & 20 Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 ; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”) This specific | 1 | 6 |
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitzgreen2 sentences2020Law Applicable to Plaintiff’s Fraud-Related Claims “‘Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.’” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73 , quoting Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & 20 Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 ; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”) This specific 1983The effect of this rule is twofold: (a) General pleading of the legal conclusion of `fraud' is insufficient; the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged. (b) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner (i.e., factually and specifically), and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 574; see Hall v. Department of Adoptions (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 898, 904 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 223 ]; Roberts v. Ball, Hun | 1 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016The prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 ].) Defendant presented no argument establishing why the prosecution’s justification for the warrantless swabs was inadequate. 2016The prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 ].) Defendant presented no argument establishing why the prosecution’s justification for the warrantless swabs was inadequate. | 1 | 2 |
Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013(See, e.g., Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 551, 565 [“[t]he principal reason for the specificity requirement is to adequately apprise the custodian of what records are desired and the requested identification may be defeated by generality of description”]; Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 785-786 .) Contrary to the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, Marino‟s notice to appear did not specify “exact” materials to be brought to trial. 1971The principal reason for the specificity requirement is to adequately apprise the custodian of what records are desired and the requested identification may be defeated by generality of description (Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 79 ]). | 1 | 2 |
MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.green2 sentences2009(MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 554 [ 343 P.2d 36 ].)” (Kapellas v. Koftnan, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 31 .) As can be noted, the cited language in Kapellas refers to the specificity requirement in Civil Code section 48a, subdivision 1. 2009(MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 554 [ 343 P.2d 36 ].)” (Kapellas v. Koftnan, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 31 .) As can be noted, the cited language in Kapellas refers to the specificity requirement in Civil Code section 48a, subdivision 1. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hundalgreen1 sentence2023(Id. at pp.977- 978.) The requirement for a detailed recitation “may be satisfied by incorporating by reference ‘papers setting forth the conduct, circumstances, and legal arguments underlying the court’s conclusions.’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, at p. 1388 .) Because section 177.5 requires the order to be in writing, “A trial judge’s on-the-record oral recitation of reasons for imposing sanctions is insufficient.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 ; see also People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970 [imposing sanctions “orally f | 1 | 1 |
| Jeanette V. v. Jerry V.green | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. M.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Super. Ct. (Johnson)green | 1 | 1 |
| Thrifty Payless v. The Americana at Brand CA2/1green | 1 | 1 |
| Brovelli v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curcini v. County of Alamedagreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Highway Patrol v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grannis v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Butlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. David L.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. George T.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moocgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sedillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Colemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. De La Roigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hogan v. City of Miami Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Department of Adoptionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lavine v. Jessupgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bouie v. City of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Risergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
red
2 sentences2023(Ibid.) The heightened pleading standard for fraud requires “‘pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid, italics omitted.) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: (1) to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges that can be intelligently met, and (2) to ensure the complaint is specific enough so that the court can “weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217 .) “Civil conspirac 2015(Ibid.) The heightened pleading standard for fraud requires “‘pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically . . . .” (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331 .) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: (1) to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges that can be intelligently met; and (2) to ensure the complaint is specific enough so that the court can “ | 6 | 2015–2024 |
Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Elements and Pleading of Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation “The essential elements of . . . intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citations.] The essential elements of . . . negligent misrepresentation are the same except that it does not require knowledge of falsity but instead requires a misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231 2021If TraPac promoted Holt’s trustworthiness as a financial planner, having no reasonable basis for such representation, it could be liable for negligent misrepresentation. 31 However, because “[c]auses of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud . . . each element must be pleaded with specificity. [Citation] ‘The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the represe | 5 | 2017–2022 |
City of Pomona v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022McCann v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 .) “Allegations of the defendant’s knowledge and intent to deceive may use conclusive language, however.” (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 .) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. 2022McCann v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 .) “Allegations of the defendant’s knowledge and intent to deceive may use conclusive language, however.” (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 .) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. | 3 | 2020–2022 |
State ex rel. McCann v. Bank of America, N.A.
green
2 sentences2022McCann v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 .) “Allegations of the defendant’s knowledge and intent to deceive may use conclusive language, however.” (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 .) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. 2022McCann v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 .) “Allegations of the defendant’s knowledge and intent to deceive may use conclusive language, however.” (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 .) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. | 3 | 2021–2022 |
Pitchess v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences2021(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 537 .) This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges; it also enables the trial court to identify what types of officer misconduct information, among those requested, will support the defense or defenses proposed to the pending charges. 2013(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 537 ; accord, People v. Mooc [(2001)] 26 Cal.4th [1216,] 1226; [City of] Santa Cruz [v. Municipal Court (1989)] 49 Cal.3d [74,] 85.) [¶] This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. | 3 | 2005–2021 |
Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell
green
2 sentences2015(Ibid.) The heightened pleading standard for fraud requires “‘pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically . . . .” (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331 .) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: (1) to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges that can be intelligently met; and (2) to ensure the complaint is specific enough so that the court can “ 2015(See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 .)8 “[E]very element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically.” (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331 .) The specificity requirement serves two purposes: (1) to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges that can be intelligently met, and (2) to 7 The denial of coverage letter states: “Specifically, the following facts are the basis for this decision: Based on our conversation at the time of my inspection & subsequent conversation with Byron at Sch | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Goodman v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2024(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 ; Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 ; Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472 .) For instance, in a case such as this, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient factual basis for establishing a duty of disclosure on the part of the defendant independent of the parties’ contract. 2014(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 346 .) B. | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Estate of Eddy
green
2 sentences2018In this way, the language of John's will is different from that in Eddy , which, as the Eddy court pointed out, referred to the property over which the wife held a power and not the power itself. ( Eddy , supra , 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 300 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 521 .) The Eddy court's further discussion concerning the specificity requirement is simply dictum. 2018In this way, the language of John's will is different from that in Eddy , which, as the Eddy court pointed out, referred to the property over which the wife held a power and not the power itself. ( Eddy , supra , 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 300 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 521 .) The Eddy court's further discussion concerning the specificity requirement is simply dictum. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank
green
2 sentences2018Though we need not rely on out-of-state authorities such as Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank , we observe that the Holzbach court found the donee's will did not meet a specific reference requirement imposed by the donor because it made "no specific reference to donor, to his will, or to the power created by his will." ( Holzbach , supra , 219 S.E.2d at p. 872 .) John's will, unlike that in Holzbach , refers to each of these things. 2018(Eddy, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 300 .) The Eddy court's further discussion concerning the specificity requirement is simply dictum. 20 Though we need not rely on out-of-state authorities such as Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank, we observe that the Holzbach court found the donee's will did not meet a specific reference requirement imposed by the donor because it made "no specific reference to donor, to his will, or to the power created by his will." (Holzbach, supra, 219 S.E.2d at p. 872 .) John's will, unlike that in Holzbach, refers to each of these things. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 ; Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 ; Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472 .) For instance, in a case such as this, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient factual basis for establishing a duty of disclosure on the part of the defendant independent of the parties’ contract. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Comstock v. Aber
green
1 sentence2024(Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 894; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 948 .) The material must be specifically identified for the court so it can determine as a matter of law whether the material is facially defamatory “‘or capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to it by the innuendo.’” (Comstock, at p. 948.) The defamatory material must be identified for the defendant so he “‘may have notice of the particular charge which he is required to answer.’” (Des Granges v. Crall (1915) 27 Cal.App. 313, 315 .) Defendants contend the complaint failed to specifically id | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Des Granges v. Crall
green
1 sentence2024(Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 894; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 948 .) The material must be specifically identified for the court so it can determine as a matter of law whether the material is facially defamatory “‘or capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to it by the innuendo.’” (Comstock, at p. 948.) The defamatory material must be identified for the defendant so he “‘may have notice of the particular charge which he is required to answer.’” (Des Granges v. Crall (1915) 27 Cal.App. 313, 315 .) Defendants contend the complaint failed to specifically id | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi
green
2 sentences2023The purpose of the specificity requirement of section 177.5 “ ‘is to fulfill the “rudiments” of due process required for governmental imposition of a penalty . . .—both for due process’ own, constitutional sake and to ensure that the power conferred by the statute will not be abused. [Citation.] Moreover, in some cases the court’s recitation will be an invaluable aid to a reviewing court determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. [Citation.]’ ” (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 977 .) In order to comply with the specificity requireme 2023(Id. at pp.977- 978.) The requirement for a detailed recitation “may be satisfied by incorporating by reference ‘papers setting forth the conduct, circumstances, and legal arguments underlying the court’s conclusions.’ ” (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, at p. 1388 .) Because section 177.5 requires the order to be in writing, “A trial judge’s on-the-record oral recitation of reasons for imposing sanctions is insufficient.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 ; see also People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970 [imposing sanctions “orally f | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Childs v. PAINE WEBBER INCORPORATED green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.
green
1 sentence2023It must be activated by the commission of an actual tort.’ [Citation.]” (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 206 .) To adequately plead a claim for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead facts showing “(1) the formation and 5 Kirby reached a settlement with Oliver in which he agreed to return title to the Property in exchange for a release of liability. 6 operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 .) Wh | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Manderville v. PCG & S GROUP, INC. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation District green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Golden Eagle Insurance v. Foremost Insurance green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Stansfield v. Starkey green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Bock v. Hansen green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Anson v. County of Merced green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Kapellas v. Kofman green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| King v. State Board of Equalization green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Martin neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Collins v. California neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Waterman Steamship Corp. v. U. S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Hicks v. Miranda green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Miranda v. Hicks green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Miller v. California green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.