specificity requirement (Colorado) · Go Syfert
← Colorado issues

specificity requirement in Colorado

6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2004 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Tri-State Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thorntongreen
colo · 1982 · cited in 2 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1996–2004
2 sentences

2004However, “a [specificity] requirement, properly applied, does not undercut a desirable degree of flexibility.” Tri-State Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, supra, 647 P.2d at 678 ; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Conder, supra, 927 P.2d at 1348 (“broad criteria such as ‘[c]ompatability with the surrounding area’ and ‘harmony with the character of the neighborhood’ when applied in conjunction with more specific criteria relating to utilities and traffic” satisfy the specificity requirement) (quoting Tri-State, supra, 647 P.2d at 678-79 ).

2004However, “a [specificity] requirement, properly applied, does not undercut a desirable degree of flexibility.” Tri-State Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, supra, 647 P.2d at 678 ; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Conder, supra, 927 P.2d at 1348 (“broad criteria such as ‘[c]ompatability with the surrounding area’ and ‘harmony with the character of the neighborhood’ when applied in conjunction with more specific criteria relating to utilities and traffic” satisfy the specificity requirement) (quoting Tri-State, supra, 647 P.2d at 678-79 ).

12
Board of County Commissioners v. Condergreen
colo · 1996 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004However, “a [specificity] requirement, properly applied, does not undercut a desirable degree of flexibility.” Tri-State Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, supra, 647 P.2d at 678 ; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Conder, supra, 927 P.2d at 1348 (“broad criteria such as ‘[c]ompatability with the surrounding area’ and ‘harmony with the character of the neighborhood’ when applied in conjunction with more specific criteria relating to utilities and traffic” satisfy the specificity requirement) (quoting Tri-State, supra, 647 P.2d at 678-79 ).

11
Reves v. Ernst & Younggreen
scotus · 1993 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997Id. at 168-69, 113 S.Ct. at 1163.

11
Chidester v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associatesgreen
coloctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997See Chidester v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 859 P.2d 222 (Colo.App. 1993) (promise, made to induce employees to transfer to division, that they would have five years and a minimum specific budget to recuperate division enforceable); Tuttle v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 797 P.2d 825 (Colo.App.1990) (employee handbook’s statement of no gender discrimination and specific method of determining wage rate support female employee’s wage claim).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

1997Id. at 168-69 , 113 S.Ct. at 1163 .

1997Id. at 168-69 , 113 S.Ct. at 1163 .

11997–1997
Tuttle v. ANR Freight System, Inc. green
coloctapp · 1990
1 sentence

1997See Chidester v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 859 P.2d 222 (Colo.App. 1993) (promise, made to induce employees to transfer to division, that they would have five years and a minimum specific budget to recuperate division enforceable); Tuttle v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 797 P.2d 825 (Colo.App.1990) (employee handbook’s statement of no gender discrimination and specific method of determining wage rate support female employee’s wage claim).

11997–1997
Cottrell v. City & County of Denver green
colo · 1981
2 sentences

1996In holding legislative bodies to this additional standard, courts "protect against unnecessary and uncontrolled exercise of discretionary power." Cottrell, 636 P.2d at 709 . [14] Still, the specificity requirement, "properly applied, does not undercut a desirable degree of flexibility." Tri-State, 647 P.2d at 678 .

1996In holding legislative bodies to this additional standard, courts “protect against unnecessary and uncontrolled exercise of discretionary power.” Cottrell, 636 P.2d at 709 . 14 Still; the specificity requirement, “properly applied, does not undercut a desirable degree of flexibility.” Tri-State, 647 P.2d at 678 .

11996–1996
Beigel v. People green
colo · 1984
1 sentence

1986Taken together the jury's findings met the specificity requirement of the violent crime statute. 10 Cf. *1106 Beigel v. People, 683 P.2d 1188 (Colo.1984); Ramirez v. People, 682 P.2d 1181 (Colo.1984).

11986–1986
Ramirez v. People green
colo · 1984
1 sentence

1986Taken together the jury's findings met the specificity requirement of the violent crime statute. 10 Cf. *1106 Beigel v. People, 683 P.2d 1188 (Colo.1984); Ramirez v. People, 682 P.2d 1181 (Colo.1984).

11986–1986
Jenkins v. Georgia green
scotus · 1974
2 sentences

1985In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 , 94 S.Ct. 2750 , 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), for example, the Court made clear that, while the examples given in Miller of material properly subject to regulation by the state were not meant to be exhaustive, they were intended to indicate the “substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of material” that could be proscribed.

1985In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 , 94 S.Ct. 2750 , 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), for example, the Court made clear that, while the examples given in Miller of material properly subject to regulation by the state were not meant to be exhaustive, they were intended to indicate the “substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of material” that could be proscribed.

11985–1985

Where else courts name it

TX 152 (1974–2025) CA 67 (1969–2024) IL 41 (1966–2026) PA 38 (1975–2026) NY 33 (1975–2026) OH 28 (1976–2025) KY 23 (1998–2026) IN 21 (1977–2020) KS 17 (1974–2024) FL 14 (1963–2026) AL 14 (1985–2014) NC 12 (1972–2025) WY 12 (1979–2022) UT 12 (1992–2025) WI 11 (1988–2023) MA 10 (1981–2007) AZ 9 (1978–2024) NE 9 (2018–2025) NJ 9 (1974–2022) TN 8 (2001–2014) OR 8 (2001–2025) ND 8 (1986–2025) WA 7 (1990–2023) MD 7 (1975–2017) LA 7 (1974–2012) RI 7 (1998–2014) MO 7 (1994–2007) CT 6 (1992–2017) CO 6 (1985–2004) VA 5 (2006–2024) MI 5 (1979–2010) ID 5 (1983–2024) VT 4 (2012–2014) MS 4 (1986–1999) IA 4 (2020–2024) NM 4 (1991–2020) DC 4 (1976–2022) AR 3 (1974–2026) DE 3 (2020–2022) ME 2 (1984–2006) SC 2 (2005–2014) MN 2 (1987–1987) AK 2 (1982–1983) GA 2 (1987–1999) GU 2 (1978–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check