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7 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DiFranco v. Kleingreen2 sentences2014However, the objection must be “specific enough to alert the trial justice as to the nature of [the trial justice’s] alleged error.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 147 . “[T]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009As we have had occasion to note, “[t]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Mead, 899 A.2d at 444 n. 5; see also DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 147 (R.I.1995) (“The rationale behind this rule is to allow the trial justice an opportunity to make any necessary corrections to his or her instructions before the jury begins its deliberations.”). | 2 | 2 |
Botelho v. Caster's Inc.green2 sentences2014However, the objection must be “specific enough to alert the trial justice as to the nature of [the trial justice’s] alleged error.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 147 . “[T]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014However, the objection must be “specific enough to alert the trial justice as to the nature of [the trial justice’s] alleged error.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DiFranco, 657 A.2d at 147 . “[T]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallenbeckgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Hollenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1007 (R.I.2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 935 (R.I.2005). . 2006See State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1007 (R.I.2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 935 (R.I.2005). [6] The full sentence in which the disputed phrase occurs reads as follows: "Spoliation of evidence may be innocent or intentional or it can be somewhere in between the two." [7] Even if we were to reach that argument, we would do so mindful of our repeated caution against focusing excessively on one small portion of the overall instructions. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2006See Brown, 744 A.2d at 837 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crowgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Hollenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1007 (R.I.2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 935 (R.I.2005). . 2006See State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1007 (R.I.2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 935 (R.I.2005). [6] The full sentence in which the disputed phrase occurs reads as follows: "Spoliation of evidence may be innocent or intentional or it can be somewhere in between the two." [7] Even if we were to reach that argument, we would do so mindful of our repeated caution against focusing excessively on one small portion of the overall instructions. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kinggreen1 sentence1998"The specificity requirement provides the subpoenaed party or other party having standing with enough knowledge about what documents are being requested so as to lodge any objections on relevancy or admissibility." United States v. King, 164 F.R.D. 542, 545 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mead v. Papa Razzi
green
2 sentences2009As we have had occasion to note, “[t]he purpose of the specificity requirement is to give the trial justice a chance to remedy any deficiency in the charge while there is still a meaningful opportunity to effectuate such a remedy.” Mead, 899 A.2d at 444 n. 5; see also DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145, 147 (R.I.1995) (“The rationale behind this rule is to allow the trial justice an opportunity to make any necessary corrections to his or her instructions before the jury begins its deliberations.”). 2009In the absence of a sufficiently specific objection, “the trial justice cannot be expected to divine the nature of counsel’s objection.” Mead, 899 A.2d at 444 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lennon v. Dacomed Corp.
green
1 sentence2006ORDER This products liability action was previously before this Court on the parties’ cross appeals, and on June 23, 2006, we filed an Opinion (see Lennon v. Dacomed Corp., 901 A.2d 582 ) wherein a) we granted the appeal of defendant manufacturer Da-comed Corporation (Dacomed) and dismissed the judgment for plaintiff against Dacomed on res judicata grounds; b) we denied and dismissed the appeal of the defendant, National Union Fire Insurance (National Union), for noncompliance with the specificity requirement of Article I, Rule 3(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure; and c) we | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.
red
2 sentences2006The Supreme Court concluded however, that the petitioner “failed to comply with the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c), even liberally construed.” Torres, 487 U.S. at 317 , 108 S.Ct. 2405 . 2006The Supreme Court concluded however, that the petitioner “failed to comply with the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c), even liberally construed.” Torres, 487 U.S. at 317 , 108 S.Ct. 2405 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fred B. Black, Jr. v. Sheraton Corporation of America Appeal of United States of America
green
1 sentence1998Kansas 1996) (citing Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531 , 545 (D.C. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.