specificity requirement in Washington

2013Therefore, courts must determine "whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position." In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). 4 In Re Recall of Bolt In re Recall of Jenson No. 88227-4 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the "'acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a vi

2013Therefore, courts must determine “whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position.” In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). ¶7 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the “ ‘acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.’ ” Kast, 144 Wn.2d at 8

2013Therefore, courts must determine "whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position." In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). 4 In Re Recall of Bolt In re Recall of Jenson No. 88227-4 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the "'acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a vi

2013Therefore, courts must determine “whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position.” In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). ¶7 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the “ ‘acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.’ ” Kast, 144 Wn.2d at 8

2013Therefore, courts must determine "whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position." In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). 4 In Re Recall of Bolt In re Recall of Jenson No. 88227-4 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the "'acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a vi

2013Therefore, courts must determine “whether, accepting the allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer abused his or her position.” In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 792 , 72 P.3d 170 (2003). ¶7 Factual sufficiency means that the charges (1) satisfy the specificity requirement described above and (2) enable the public and the challenged public official to identify the “ ‘acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.’ ” Kast, 144 Wn.2d at 8

2013If an official is charged with a violation of the law, “the petitioners must at least have knowledge of facts which indicate an intent to commit an unlawful act.” In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wn.2d 544, 549 , 799 P.2d 1179 (1990). ¶8 Legal sufficiency requires that the petitioner “state with specificity substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of the oath of office.” Chandler, 103 Wn.2d at 274 (emphasis added).

2013If an official is charged with a violation of the law, “the petitioners must at least have knowledge of facts which indicate an intent to commit an unlawful act.” In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wn.2d 544, 549 , 799 P.2d 1179 (1990). ¶8 Legal sufficiency requires that the petitioner “state with specificity substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of the oath of office.” Chandler, 103 Wn.2d at 274 (emphasis added).

2009But it does not contain the specificity requirement. ¶ 23 The fifth Ishikawa factor specifies, "`The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose ...' ... it shall apply for a specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court at a time specified to justify continued sealing." Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash.2d 51, 62-63 , *332 615 P.2d 440 (1980), Revised GR 15 does not contain equivalent restrictions. ¶ 24 The Judicial Information Systems Committee (JISC) GR 9 disclosure form regarding proposed GR 15 amendment

2009But it does not contain the specificity requirement. ¶23 The fifth Ishikawa factor specifies, “ ‘The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose . . .’ [and] it shall apply for a specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court at a time specified to justify continued sealing.” Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 914 (quoting Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d at 64 ).

2023There was no violation of the specificity requirement of RCW 59.18.650(6)(b).5 We hold that Hill’s 20-day notice was lawful because it both substantially complied with RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) and provided sufficient facts to allow Huddleston to respond to and prepare a defense under RCW 59.18.650(6)(b). 5 Huddleston also relies on a federal case interpreting a federal statute related to Department of Housing and Urban Development owned projects, Swords to Plowshares v. Smith, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D.

2013Federal courts have identified several factors to be considered in determining whether denying a motion for continuance deprives an accused of his right to compulsory process: "The diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony." Dickerson, 667 F.2d at 1370 , quoti

2009But it does not contain the specificity requirement. ¶23 The fifth Ishikawa factor specifies, “ ‘The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose . . .’ [and] it shall apply for a specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court at a time specified to justify continued sealing.” Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 914 (quoting Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d at 64 ).

1990State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1 , 711 P.2d 1000 (1985).

1990State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1 , 711 P.2d 1000 (1985).