specificity requirement in Connecticut

1992Bouchard v. People's Bank, supra. Although the plaintiffs' motion to strike is fatally defective because it merely states that plaintiffs "move to strike the Special Defenses raised by the Defendants for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum of law," the defendants have failed to object to the form of the motion.

1992Bouchard v. People's Bank, supra. The defendants' motion to strike merely moves to strike the plaintiff's complaint and states only that "[i]n furtherance of said Motion, a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike is attached hereto and made part hereof." Although the form of the defendant's motion to strike is defective for failure to set forth a claim of insufficiency and specify reason or reasons for the insufficiency this court may address the merits of the motion because the plaintiff has filed to object to the form of the defendant's motion.

2017Our Supreme Court concluded, in relevant part, that § 52-146 o (b)(3)"must be accepted as a declaration of the legislature's original intent that the department may obtain access to medical records containing otherwise privileged communications when such access is sought in connection with the investigation of a complaint against a physician, and when the records are related to that complaint." Edelstein v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services , supra, 240 Conn. at 670 , 692 A.2d 803 .

2017Our Supreme Court concluded, in relevant part, that § 52-146 o (b)(3)"must be accepted as a declaration of the legislature's original intent that the department may obtain access to medical records containing otherwise privileged communications when such access is sought in connection with the investigation of a complaint against a physician, and when the records are related to that complaint." Edelstein v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services , supra, 240 Conn. at 670 , 692 A.2d 803 .

2017The trial court also concluded that the pretermination notice did not comply with the federal regulations' specificity requirement because it included nonrent charges, i.e., late fees and attorney's fees. 9 In its *709 decision, the trial court explicitly relied on Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency v. Taylor , 171 N.J. 580 , 595, 796 A.2d 193 (2002), noting that "[r]ent under Section 8 means the amount that may be charged for the right to occupy the dwelling unit, period-it cannot include charges for late payments, utilities, attorney's fees, property damage, or any other item." (

2017The trial court also concluded that the pretermination notice did not comply with the federal regulations' specificity requirement because it included nonrent charges, i.e., late fees and attorney's fees. 9 In its *709 decision, the trial court explicitly relied on Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency v. Taylor , 171 N.J. 580 , 595, 796 A.2d 193 (2002), noting that "[r]ent under Section 8 means the amount that may be charged for the right to occupy the dwelling unit, period-it cannot include charges for late payments, utilities, attorney's fees, property damage, or any other item." (

2012General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A) provides: “ ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee’s employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.” (Emphasis added.) See also Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324, 332 , 49 A.3d 211 (2012) (legislature intended to include repetitive trauma injuries among those com-pens

2012General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A) provides: “ ‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ includes, in addition to accidental injury that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee’s employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease.” (Emphasis added.) See also Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324, 332 , 49 A.3d 211 (2012) (legislature intended to include repetitive trauma injuries among those com-pens

1995Housing Authority Town of Glastonbury v. Rankl, H-346, August 6, 1982 (Maloney, J.), Nikolaidis v. East Main Pizza House, Inc., H-788, November 24, 1986 (Goldstein, J.), Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport v. Rogers, SNBR 371, March 2, 1992 (Leheny, J), 1992 Ct. Sup. 1930 .