specificity requirement in Illinois

2007In discussing the specificity requirement, the Andersen court relied upon the case of Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill. 2d 344 , 415 N.E.2d 337 (1980).

2007In discussing the specificity requirement, the Andersen court relied upon the case of Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill. 2d 344 , 415 N.E.2d 337 (1980).

1998This court clarified, however, that the specificity requirement for section 2-1203 motions "should not be construed as imposing hypertechnical drafting requirements governing post-trial motions." Sho-Deen, Inc., 263 Ill.App.3d at 293 , 200 Ill.Dec. 729 , 635 N.E.2d 1068 .

1998This court clarified, however, that the specificity requirement for section 2-1203 motions "should not be construed as imposing hypertechnical drafting requirements governing post-trial motions." Sho-Deen, Inc., 263 Ill.App.3d at 293 , 200 Ill.Dec. 729 , 635 N.E.2d 1068 .

1998While the specificity requirement was again pronounced in Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill.2d 232 , 162 Ill.Dec. 10 , 579 N.E.2d 824 (1991), there the court decided that a letter which plaintiff had contended was in substance a "post-trial motion" did not meet the statutory requirements in that it failed to include a request for at least one of the forms of relief specified in section 2-1203.

1998While the specificity requirement was again pronounced in Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill.2d 232 , 162 Ill.Dec. 10 , 579 N.E.2d 824 (1991), there the court decided that a letter which plaintiff had contended was in substance a "post-trial motion" did not meet the statutory requirements in that it failed to include a request for at least one of the forms of relief specified in section 2-1203.

1994(Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351, 356 , 221 N.E.2d 410, 414 .) SIAA argues that Smith’s discovery request demanded the disclosure of comparable-sale properties and, from SIAA’s viewpoint, the Crane sale was not a comparable-sale property.

1994(Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351, 356 , 221 N.E.2d 410, 414 .) SIAA argues that Smith’s discovery request demanded the disclosure of comparable-sale properties and, from SIAA’s viewpoint, the Crane sale was not a comparable-sale property.

2002In light of the substantially invasive nature of involuntary treatment, the liberty interests implicated when a person is medicated against his or her will, and the potential for misuse of psychotropic medication (see C.E. , 161 Ill. 2d at 213-15 ), we believe that the specificity requirement for involuntary treatment orders reflects the legislature’s legitimate concern that only qualified health care professionals, familiar with the respondent’s mental and physical status, be permitted to administer the treatment and that the respondent, as well as the treaters, be notified of the exact natur

2002In light of the substantially invasive nature of involuntary treatment, the liberty interests implicated when a person is medicated against his or her will, and the potential for misuse of psychotropic medication (see C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 213-15 ), we believe that the specificity requirement for involuntary treatment orders reflects the legislature’s legitimate concern that only qualified health care professionals, familiar with the respondent’s mental and physical status, be permitted to administer the treatment and that the respondent, as well as the treaters, be notified of the exact nature

2024Instead, the agreement said, “Any arbitration pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted in accordance with, and governed by, a mutually agreeable arbitration forum, but, in the absence of such agreement, then the American Arbitration Association and its Code of Arbitration Procedure.” (Emphasis added.) This language is distinguishable from the arbitration provisions in Mikoff v. Unlimited Development, Inc., 2024 IL App (4th) 230513, ¶ 52 , for example, which said that “the arbitration ‘shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.’ ” Thus, the agr

2022Anderson, 852 N.E.2d at 583-84 .

2022(Emphases and internal quotation marks omitted.) Marsh, 707 N.E.2d at 1000 . - 20 - ¶ 51 In Powell, 694 N.E.2d at 759 , the plaintiff was a member of the defendant health club and injured her foot while using a whirlpool on the defendant’s premises.

2022(Emphases and internal quotation marks omitted.) Marsh, 707 N.E.2d at 1000 . - 20 - ¶ 51 In Powell, 694 N.E.2d at 759 , the plaintiff was a member of the defendant health club and injured her foot while using a whirlpool on the defendant’s premises.

2004The majority here trashes the intent of the parties by its insistence that the lease "indicate the precise location or the dimensions of either the Prange farm or the 500 feet of riverfront property" (op. 286 Ill.Dec. at 4 , 812 N.E.2d at 1019 .), a specificity requirement that is disavowed by the cases.

2004The majority here trashes the intent of the parties by its insistence that the lease "indicate the precise location or the dimensions of either the Prange farm or the 500 feet of riverfront property" (op. 286 Ill.Dec. at 4 , 812 N.E.2d at 1019 .), a specificity requirement that is disavowed by the cases.

2002Respondent’s reliance on Voss v. Voss, 55 Ill.

1999Without explanation or citation to authority, the plurality departs from these long-established rules by shifting the focus of the specificity inquiry exclusively to the "nature of the defendants." 188 Ill.2d at 194 , 242 Ill.Dec. at 125 , 720 N.E.2d at 1080 .

1999Without explanation or citation to authority, the plurality departs from these long-established rules by shifting the focus of the specificity inquiry exclusively to the "nature of the defendants." 188 Ill.2d at 194 , 242 Ill.Dec. at 125 , 720 N.E.2d at 1080 .

1994App. 2d 124 , 234 N.E.2d 409 ; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm’n (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 385, 402 , 251 N.E.2d 253 .) This approach is also consistent with the record of the Senate debates on the Illinois provisions which indicates that the specificity requirement was intended to ameliorate "the problem of companies providing ambiguous reasons for cancellation or nonrenewal of policies.” 80th Ill.

1994App. 2d 124 , 234 N.E.2d 409 ; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm’n (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 385, 402 , 251 N.E.2d 253 .) This approach is also consistent with the record of the Senate debates on the Illinois provisions which indicates that the specificity requirement was intended to ameliorate "the problem of companies providing ambiguous reasons for cancellation or nonrenewal of policies.” 80th Ill.

1994App. 2d 124 , 234 N.E.2d 409 ; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm’n (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 385, 402 , 251 N.E.2d 253 .) This approach is also consistent with the record of the Senate debates on the Illinois provisions which indicates that the specificity requirement was intended to ameliorate "the problem of companies providing ambiguous reasons for cancellation or nonrenewal of policies.” 80th Ill.

1993In absence thereof, Illinois courts have concluded under Rudd, Harrel, Koch, and Crenshaw v. DeVry, Inc. (1988), 172 Ill.

1987App. 3d 524, 529 , 478 N.E.2d 1198 .) Because of this specificity requirement, the argument continues, and the important interest served by it, failure to comply strictly therewith deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction.

1985Ed. 2d 419, 437-38 , 102 S. Ct. 252, 267-68 ; Haring v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 530, 532-33 , 470 N.E.2d 288 ; Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry.

1985Ed. 2d 419, 437-38 , 102 S. Ct. 252, 267-68 ; Haring v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 530, 532-33 , 470 N.E.2d 288 ; Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry.