specificity requirement in Texas

2017In Killam, however, this court considered whether a summary judgment movant could meet the specificity requirement of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in its reply. 53 S.W.3d at 4 .

2011See Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) ("[A] movant may not use a reply brief to meet the specificity requirement [of Rule 166a] or to assert new grounds for summary judgment.") (citing Community Initiatives, Inc. v. Chase Bank of Tex., 153 S.W.3d 270, 280 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); and Sams v. N.L.

2011See Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) ("[A] movant may not use a reply brief to meet the specificity requirement [of Rule 166a] or to assert new grounds for summary judgment.") (citing Community Initiatives, Inc. v. Chase Bank of Tex., 153 S.W.3d 270, 280 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); and Sams v. N.L.

2011See Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (“[A] movant may not use a reply brief to meet the specificity requirement [of Rule 166a] or to assert new grounds for summary judgment.”) (citing Community Initiatives, Inc. v. Chase Bank of Tex., 153 S.W.3d 270, 280 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); and Sams v. N.L.

2007See Barnes v. Sulak, No. 03-01-00159-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5727 , at *26 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (citing Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied); Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 994 S.W.2d 190, 194-95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, pet. denied)); see also Sanders v. Capitol Area Council, BSA, 930 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ) (holding that, as a general rule, a non-movant “must ex

2007See Barnes v. Sulak , No. 03-01-00159-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5727 , at *26 n.4 (Tex. App.--Austin Aug. 8, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (citing Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 65 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2001, pet. denied); Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A. , 15 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P. , 994 S.W.2d 190, 194-95 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1999, pet. denied)); see also Sanders v. Capitol Area Council, BSA , 930 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ) (holding that, as a general rule, a non-movan

2024“The specificity requirement is met if the complaint made at trial was clear enough for the trial judge so as to permit the trial judge to take corrective action when the complaint was made.” Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim.

2023To satisfy this specificity requirement, “[t]he complaining party must have informed the trial judge what was wanted and why the party was entitled to it.” Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691 .

2015Moreno, 124 S.W.3d at 343 ; Morrison, 71 S.W.3d at 826 (citing Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2004Morrison, 71 S.W.3d at 826 (citing Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (per curiam); Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (op. on reh’g); Callahan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.)).

2021“To constitute a valid objection to jury instructions, the objection must be specific and clear enough to apprise the trial court of the nature of the objection — this specificity requirement is to enable the trial court ‘to know in what respect the defendant regards the charge as defective and to afford him an opportunity to correct it before reading the charge to the jury.’” Harkins, 268 S.W.3d at 747 (quoting Pennington v. State, 697 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)).

2019“To preserve error with regard to a jury charge, objections must be sufficiently specific to point out the errors complained of.” Harkins v. State, 268 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d). “[T]he objection must be specific and clear enough to apprise the trial court of the nature of the objection—this specificity requirement is to enable the trial court ‘to know in what respect the defendant regards the charge as defective and to afford him an opportunity to correct it before reading the charge to the jury.’” Id. at 747 (quoting Pennington v. State, 697 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex

2011The two purposes of the specificity requirement are ―to inform the trial judge of the basis for the objection‖ and provide ―opposing counsel the opportunity to cure the objection or supply other testimony.‖ Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim.

2011The two purposes of the specificity requirement are “to inform the trial judge of the basis for the objection” and provide “opposing counsel the opportunity to cure the objection or supply other testimony.” Zillender v. State , 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim.

2009Castleberry v. Branscum , 721 S.W.2d 270, 276-77 (Tex. 1986).

2002Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 276-77 (Tex.1986).

2010See In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 899 (separate complaints as to each of the separate grounds of termination and the best-interest finding satisfy the specificity requirement).

2009See In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 899 (separate complaints as to each of the separate grounds of termination and the best-interest finding satisfy the specificity requirement).

2009Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs. , 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown , 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick , 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1993, writ denied). paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} @page WordSection2 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:2.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:2.0in; mso-footer-margin:1.0in; mso-even-header:url("6-10-045-CR%20Burnham%20v.%20State%20Op.%20on%20Reh%27g%20mtd_files/header.htm") eh1; mso-header:url("6-10-04

2009Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick, 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).

2009Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs. , 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown , 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick , 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1993, writ denied). paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} @page WordSection2 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:2.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:2.0in; mso-footer-margin:1.0in; mso-even-header:url("6-10-045-CR%20Burnham%20v.%20State%20Op.%20on%20Reh%27g%20mtd_files/header.htm") eh1; mso-header:url("6-10-04

2009Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick, 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).

2009Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs. , 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown , 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick , 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1993, writ denied). paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} @page WordSection2 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:2.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:2.0in; mso-footer-margin:1.0in; mso-even-header:url("6-10-045-CR%20Burnham%20v.%20State%20Op.%20on%20Reh%27g%20mtd_files/header.htm") eh1; mso-header:url("6-10-04

2009Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Ralston Purina Co. v. McKendrick, 850 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).

2013Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. 1978) (traditional summary judgment case)); see also Henning v. OneWest Bank, Inc., 405 S.W.3d 950, 963 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

2013Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex.1978) (traditional summary judgment case)); see also Henning v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 405 S.W.3d 950, 963 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.).

2020Consequently, the Supreme Court imposed a new specificity requirement on new trial orders, stating that even while it was not “retreat[ing] from the position that trial courts have significant discretion in granting new trials,” trial judges could no longer simply state that they made the decision to grant a new trial “in the interest of justice.” Id. at 212-13 . “[S]uch a vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict[,]” the Court wrote, “does not enhance respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not suffici

2020Consequently, the Supreme Court imposed a new specificity requirement on new trial orders, stating that even while it was not “retreat[ing] from the position that trial courts have significant discretion in granting new trials,” trial judges could no longer simply state that they made the decision to grant a new trial “in the interest of justice.” Id. at 212-13 . “[S]uch a vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict[,]” the Court wrote, “does not enhance respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not suffici

2020Serv., Inc., No. 02-16- 00087-CV, 2017 WL 1018592 , at *5 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (“[A] movant may not use a reply brief to meet the specificity requirement or to assert new grounds for summary judgment.”).

2011See Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) ("[A] movant may not use a reply brief to meet the specificity requirement [of Rule 166a] or to assert new grounds for summary judgment.") (citing Community Initiatives, Inc. v. Chase Bank of Tex., 153 S.W.3d 270, 280 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); and Sams v. N.L.

2015Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting that defect in no evidence motion for summary judgment may be raised for first time on appeal, but declining to consider issue where parties did not raise defect before appellate court); cf. Kahng v. Verity, No. 01-07-00695- CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5775 , 2008 WL 2930195 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2008, no pet.) (assuming without deciding that complaint that no-evidence summary Trevarthen Brief of Appellant p. 15 judgment was facially defective was preserved for review).

2012Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting that defect in no evidence motion for summary judgment may be raised for first time on appeal, but declining to consider issue where parties did not raise defect before appellate court); cf. Kahng v. Verity, No. 01-07-00695-CV, 2008 WL 2930195 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2008, no pet.) (assuming without deciding that complaint that no-evidence summary judgment was facially defective was preserved for review).

2013See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2004See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2011Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim.

2011Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex.Crim.App.2009).

2008See Upchurch v. San Jose, 5 S.W.3d 274, 284-85 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1999, pet. denied) (3000 unindexed pages attached to a motion that only generally referenced the record and failed to specifically direct the court or parties to the evidence upon which the movant relied was not properly before the court).

2008See Upchurch v. San Jose , 5 S.W.3d 274, 284-85 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1999, pet. denied) (3000 unindexed pages attached to a motion that only generally referenced the record and failed to specifically direct the court or parties to the evidence upon which the movant relied was not properly before the court).

2004Morrison, 71 S.W.3d at 826 (citing Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (per curiam); Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (op. on reh’g); Callahan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.)).

2003Morrison, 71 S.W.3d at 826 (citing Long v. State, 800 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (per curiam); Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (op. on reh’g); Callahan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.)). 3.Waiver Analysis The record reflects that the trial judge was fully aware of the basis on which Moreno asserted that the cocaine and statement should be suppressed.

2015In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 , 809 Subsection (O) includes a specificity requirement and DFPS is required to “support its allegations against [appellant] by clear and convincing evidence; conjecture is not enough.” In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d 863, 878-79 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2013, no pet.)(citing In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 810 ) Proof of abuse or neglect is a required element of subsection (O).

2015In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 §161.001(1)(O) includes a specificity requirement and DFPS is required to “support its allegations against [appellant] by clear and convincing evidence; conjecture is not enough.” In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d at 878 -79 Argument & Analysis: Appellant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the required element under subsection (O) that the children were removed from appellant under 37 Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children.

2025Ex parte Jackman, 663 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ).

2025Ex parte Jackman, 663 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ).

2023An issue is not preserved “if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.” Id. at 691–92; see also Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2022An issue is not preserved “if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.” Id. at 691–92; see also Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2022See id. 11 Texas courts strictly enforce the specificity requirement.

2013The Texas Supreme Court explained that the underlying purpose of the specificity requirement is “to provide the opposing party with adequate information for opposing the motion, and to define the issues for the purpose of summary judgment.” Id. at 311 (citing Westchester Fire Ins.

2023Id. (a)(1)(A).

2017To satisfy the specificity requirement, the party must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and . . . do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in the proper position to do something about it.” Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim.

2015In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 , 809 Subsection (O) includes a specificity requirement and DFPS is required to “support its allegations against [appellant] by clear and convincing evidence; conjecture is not enough.” In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d 863, 878-79 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2013, no pet.)(citing In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 810 ) Proof of abuse or neglect is a required element of subsection (O).

2015In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 §161.001(1)(O) includes a specificity requirement and DFPS is required to “support its allegations against [appellant] by clear and convincing evidence; conjecture is not enough.” In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d at 878 -79 Argument & Analysis: Appellant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the required element under subsection (O) that the children were removed from appellant under 37 Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children.

2003Mohawk, 982 S.W.2d at 498 .

2003Mohawk, 982 S.W.2d at 498 .