21 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'Connor Ex Rel. Connor v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2016Id. 2010O'Connor by O'Connor v. Stewart, 668 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). | 3 | 4 |
Intelogic Trace Texcom Group, Inc. v. Merchants National Bankgreen2 sentences1996Bank, 626 N.E.2d 839, 842, n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied, this Court further placed practitioners on' notice that designating various pleadings, discovery material, and affidavits in their entirety fails to meet the specificity requirement of TR. 56(C). 1994Intelogic Trace Texcom v. Merchants National Bank, et al. (1993), Ind.App., 626 N.E.2d 839 , 842 n. 4. | 1 | 2 |
Filip v. Blockgreen2 sentences2016See Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind.2008) (explaining that Trial Rule 56(C) requires sufficient specificity to identify the relevant portions of a document relied upon). 2016(Compare T.R. 56(C) with Resp’t Br.; Resp’t Reply Br.) See also Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1081 (explaining that page numbers are usually sufficient to meet the specificity requirement of Indiana Trial Rule 56(C)). | 1 | 1 |
Boczar v. Reubengreen1 sentence2008So, “unless a document in its entirety is required as designated evidentiary matter, regardless of how concise or short the document is, in order to be properly designated, specific reference to the relevant portion of the document must be made.” Boczar v. Reuben, 742 N.E.2d 1010, 1016-17 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citations omitted), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of Tjfgreen1 sentence2007“A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 33 ); see also Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142 , 1148 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (noting that “a recitation to the effect that the evidence ‘suggests’ or ‘indicates’ the existence of a particular fact is not adequate to constitute a finding of that fact”), clarified on denial of reh’g, 678 N.E.2d 421 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; but see Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201 | 1 | 1 |
Norlund v. Faustgreen1 sentence2007“A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 33 ); see also Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142 , 1148 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (noting that “a recitation to the effect that the evidence ‘suggests’ or ‘indicates’ the existence of a particular fact is not adequate to constitute a finding of that fact”), clarified on denial of reh’g, 678 N.E.2d 421 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; but see Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201 | 1 | 1 |
Norlund v. Faustgreen1 sentence2007“A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 33 ); see also Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142 , 1148 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (noting that “a recitation to the effect that the evidence ‘suggests’ or ‘indicates’ the existence of a particular fact is not adequate to constitute a finding of that fact”), clarified on denial of reh’g, 678 N.E.2d 421 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; but see Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201 | 1 | 1 |
Whinery v. Robersongreen1 sentence2006See Whinery v. Roberson, 819 N.E.2d 465, 471 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (discussing how a party can meet the specificity requirement by providing specific page numbers and citations but cannot meet the specificity requirement by designating pleadings and affidavits in their entirety), trans. dismissed; see also Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998) (noting that "a party does not comply with TR. 56(C) merely by designating entire portions of the record"), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Durnilgreen1 sentence2006See Whinery v. Roberson, 819 N.E.2d 465, 471 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (discussing how a party can meet the specificity requirement by providing specific page numbers and citations but cannot meet the specificity requirement by designating pleadings and affidavits in their entirety), trans. dismissed; see also Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998) (noting that "a party does not comply with TR. 56(C) merely by designating entire portions of the record"), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Van Eaton v. Finkgreen1 sentence2004Van Eaton v. Fink, 697 N.E.2d 490, 494-95 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Stategreen2 sentences2002“We require such specificity in a sentencing order or statement of reasons for imposing a sentence to insure the trial court considered only proper matters when imposing sentence, thus safeguarding against the imposition of sentences which are arbitrary or capricious, and to enable the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (citation omitted). 2002"We require such specificity in a sentencing order or statement of reasons for imposing a sentence to insure the trial court considered only proper matters when imposing sentence, thus safeguarding against the imposition of sentences which are arbitrary or capricious, and to enable the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence imposed." Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Holsinger v. Stategreen2 sentences2002To satisfy the specificity requirement of Harrison, the sentencing order must “explicitly indicate which mitigating circumstances the trial court found ... [and] explain the specific facts and reasons that led the court to find the existence of whatever mitigating circumstances it did find.” Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind.2001). 2002To satisfy the specificity requirement of Harrison, the sentencing order must "explicitly indicate which mitigating circumstances the trial court found ... [and] explain the specific facts and reasons that led the court to find the existence of whatever mitigating circumstances it did find." Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Stategreen1 sentence1995Henderson v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 68, 72 (purpose of specificity requirement satisfied where trial court failed to recite the prior crimes constituting defendant's criminal record in its sentencing statement but judge considered presentence report). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weiss v. Harpergreen1 sentence2007“A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 33 ); see also Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142 , 1148 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (noting that “a recitation to the effect that the evidence ‘suggests’ or ‘indicates’ the existence of a particular fact is not adequate to constitute a finding of that fact”), clarified on denial of reh’g, 678 N.E.2d 421 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; but see Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lindsey v. State
green
2 sentences2020However, we disagree with Scruggs that Lindsey v. State, 485 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1985), supports his argument that the trial court’s sentencing statement failed the specificity requirement. 2020Our supreme court found this to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, concisely explaining that “[t]his offered justification does not satisfy the specificity requirement.” Id. | 2 | 1990–2020 |
Duncan v. M & M Auto Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Id. [14] Here, the Levendoski Children note that Stanley designated twenty-three items in support of his summary judgment motion and contend that his “designation of evidence contained everything but the proverbial ‘kitchen sink.’ By way of example, Stanley’s entire 122 page deposition was designated with the exception of only twelve (12) pages and page and line number references were omitted.” Appellants’ Br. p. 11 (internal citation omitted). [15] Stanley concedes that he could have done a better job of reducing the amount of materials he submitted as designated evidence. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Perez v. United States Steel Corp.
green
1 sentence2007“A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 33 ); see also Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142 , 1148 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (noting that “a recitation to the effect that the evidence ‘suggests’ or ‘indicates’ the existence of a particular fact is not adequate to constitute a finding of that fact”), clarified on denial of reh’g, 678 N.E.2d 421 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; but see Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Powell v. American Health Fitness Center of Fort Wayne, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006However, we expounded on this specificity requirement and noted "that an exculpatory clause not referring to the negligence of the releasee may act to bar liability for those damages incurred which are inherent in the nature of the activity" and that "[t]he requirement of specificity is only necessary when the *584 risk of harm is a latent danger, ie. the defendant's own negligence." Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Page v. State
green
2 sentences1994Page v. State (1981), Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1021 . 1994Page v. State (1981), Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1021 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Matter of Estate of Parlock
green
1 sentence1992Matter of Estate of Parlock, 486 N.E.2d 567, 569 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pillow v. State
green
1 sentence1986Pillow v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1301 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1977Johnson v. State (1975), 167 Ind. App. 292 , *437 338 N.E.2d 680 , and cases .there cited. 1977Johnson v. State (1975), 167 Ind. App. 292 , *437 338 N.E.2d 680 , and cases .there cited. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.