specificity requirement in Oregon

2025But we emphasize that the Supreme Court concluded that the search command lacked “any specificity—let alone * * * as much specificity as reasonably possible under the circumstances.” Turay, 371 Or at 151 (emphasis in original). 472 State v. Gaskill particular types of evidence.

2025But we emphasize that the Supreme Court concluded that the search command lacked “any specificity—let alone * * * as much specificity as reasonably possible under the circumstances.” Turay, 371 Or at 151 (emphasis in original). 472 State v. Gaskill particular types of evidence.

2024See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381 , 8 P3d 200 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 331 Or 595 , 18 P3d 1096 (2001) (holding that a party’s motion did not meet the speci- ficity requirements of ORCP 21 A when the motion “neither referred to ORCP 21 A(8) nor worded its objection to resem- ble the wording contained in that rule”).

2024See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381 , 8 P3d 200 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 331 Or 595 , 18 P3d 1096 (2001) (holding that a party’s motion did not meet the speci- ficity requirements of ORCP 21 A when the motion “neither referred to ORCP 21 A(8) nor worded its objection to resem- ble the wording contained in that rule”).

2024See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381 , 8 P3d 200 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 331 Or 595 , 18 P3d 1096 (2001) (holding that a party’s motion did not meet the speci- ficity requirements of ORCP 21 A when the motion “neither referred to ORCP 21 A(8) nor worded its objection to resem- ble the wording contained in that rule”).

2024See Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381 , 8 P3d 200 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 331 Or 595 , 18 P3d 1096 (2001) (holding that a party’s motion did not meet the speci- ficity requirements of ORCP 21 A when the motion “neither referred to ORCP 21 A(8) nor worded its objection to resem- ble the wording contained in that rule”).

2023As we explained in Mansor, to ensure that the governmental intrusion into a defendant’s privacy inter- ests in digital data is as limited “as reasonably possible under the circumstances,” the particularity requirement of Article I, section 9, requires a warrant to search digital data to “describe the information the state seeks (the ‘what’) with as much specificity as reasonably possible under the cir- cumstances, including, if available and relevant, a temporal description of when the information was created, accessed, or otherwise used.” 363 Or at 222 .14 Thus, as emphasized earlier in this

2019To the extent, however, that the above language from Rose can be read to suggest that describing the information simply as "evidence of a particular crime" can satisfy the specificity requirement, we note that Mansor expressly rejected the argument that a warrant is "sufficiently particular if it simply identifies the crime or crimes being investigated." 363 Or. at 222 , 421 P.3d 323 .

2019Young, 347 Or at 171 (applying the general civil pleading requirement—that one must “allege the factual basis for a 784 Ogle v. Nooth claim for relief, not just the general legal theory on which the party is proceeding”—to a post-conviction petition).