regulatory violation in New York

2019"On the other hand, where a good[-]faith reason for the denial appears on the record, this amounts to a regulatory violation requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing" ( Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer , 104 AD3d 978, 978 [2013] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Humphrey v Venettozzi , 149 AD3d 1435, 1436 [2017]).

2016Therefore, because “a good faith reason for the denial [of petitioner’s rights] appears on the record, this amounts to a regulatory violation” rather than a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights, “requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing” (Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer, 104 AD3d 978, 978 [2013]; see generally Matter of Johnson v Prack, 122 AD3d 1323, 1324 [2014]).

2017However, we find that her failure to provide any written notice to petitioner concerning her effective denial of his request amounts to a regulatory violation requiring the matter to be remitted for a new hearing (see 7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]; Matter of Texeira v Fischer, 26 NY3d 230, 234-235 [2015]; see generally Matter of Alvarez v Goord, 30 AD3d 118, 119-121 [2006]; Matter of Hill v Selsky, 19 AD3d at 66-67; compare Matter of Reyes v Keyser, 150 AD3d 1502, 1504 [2017]; Matter of Doleman v Prack, 145 AD3d 1289, 1290-1291 [2016]).

2016Thus, while respondent maintains that this is a regulatory violation for which remittal is appropriate, we find that the circumstances presented give rise to a constitutional violation for which expungement is the proper remedy (see Matter of Gross v Prack, 127 AD3d at 1533 ; Matter of Moye v Fischer, 93 AD3d at 1007 ; Matter of Hill v Selsky, 19 AD3d at 67-68 ; compare Matter of Alvarez v Goord, 30 AD3d 118, 121 [2006]).

2017As to the remedy, where a hearing officer has set forth a good faith basis for the denial of a requested witness, this amounts to a regulatory violation and, therefore, the disciplinary matter generally should be remitted for a new hearing (see Matter of Ellison v Annucci, 142 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016]; Matter of Peterson v Annucci, 141 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2016]; Matter of Santiago v Fischer, 76 AD3d 1127 , 1127 [2010]).

2017As to the remedy, where a hearing officer has set forth a good faith basis for the denial of a requested witness, this amounts to a regulatory violation and, therefore, the disciplinary matter generally should be remitted for a new hearing (see Matter of Ellison v Annucci, 142 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016]; Matter of Peterson v Annucci, 141 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2016]; Matter of Santiago v Fischer, 76 AD3d 1127 , 1127 [2010]).

2017Equity, however, “may also dictate expungement of the charges rather than a remittal” (Matter of Allah v LeFevre, 132 AD2d 293, 295 [1987]).

2017Equity, however, “may also dictate expungement of the charges rather than a remittal” (Matter of Allah v LeFevre, 132 AD2d 293, 295 [1987]).

2017However, given that the Hearing Officer articulated a good faith reason for such denial, this was at most a regulatory violation entitling petitioner to a new hearing and not expungement (see Matter of Ellison v Annucci, *1056 142 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016]; Matter of Williams v Annucci, 137 AD3d 1355, 1356 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 908 [2016]; Matter of Hand v Gutwein, 113 AD3d 975, 976 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 866 [2014]).

2016Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Hearing Officer set forth a good faith reason for the denial, this was at most a regulatory violation of petitioner’s right to call witnesses for which the appropriate remedy is a new hearing, particularly given that substantial evidence otherwise supports the determination (see Matter of Allaway v Prack, 139 AD3d 1203, 1205 [2016]; Matter of Hand v Gutwein, 113 AD3d 975, 976 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 866 [2014]).

2017As to the remedy, where a hearing officer has set forth a good faith basis for the denial of a requested witness, this amounts to a regulatory violation and, therefore, the disciplinary matter generally should be remitted for a new hearing (see Matter of Ellison v Annucci, 142 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016]; Matter of Peterson v Annucci, 141 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2016]; Matter of Santiago v Fischer, 76 AD3d 1127 , 1127 [2010]).

2017As to the remedy, where a hearing officer has set forth a good faith basis for the denial of a requested witness, this amounts to a regulatory violation and, therefore, the disciplinary matter generally should be remitted for a new hearing (see Matter of Ellison v Annucci, 142 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2016]; Matter of Peterson v Annucci, 141 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2016]; Matter of Santiago v Fischer, 76 AD3d 1127 , 1127 [2010]).

2016Therefore, because “a good faith reason for the denial [of petitioner’s rights] appears on the record, this amounts to a regulatory violation” rather than a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights, “requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing” (Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer, 104 AD3d 978, 978 [2013]; see generally Matter of Johnson v Prack, 122 AD3d 1323, 1324 [2014]).

2016Therefore, because “a good faith reason for the denial [of petitioner’s rights] appears on the record, this amounts to a regulatory violation” rather than a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights, “requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing” (Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer, 104 AD3d 978, 978 [2013]; see generally Matter of Johnson v Prack, 122 AD3d 1323, 1324 [2014]).

2013Inasmuch as this constitutes a regulatory violation, the appropriate remedy is to remit the matter for a new hearing (see Matter of McFadden v Bezio, 92 AD3d at 989-990 ; Matter of Alvarez v Goord, 30 AD3d 118, 121 [2006]; Matter of Martinez v Goord, 15 AD3d 737, 738 [2005]).

2013Inasmuch as this constitutes a regulatory violation, the appropriate remedy is to remit the matter for a new hearing (see Matter of McFadden v Bezio, 92 AD3d at 989-990 ; Matter of Alvarez v Goord, 30 AD3d 118, 121 [2006]; Matter of Martinez v Goord, 15 AD3d 737, 738 [2005]).

2023Contrary to being conclusive, proof of a regulatory violation is merely "some evidence" to be considered on the question of negligence ( see Paolangeli v Cornell Univ. , 296 AD2d 691, 693 [3d Dept 2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2023Contrary to being conclusive, proof of a regulatory violation is merely "some evidence" to be considered on the question of negligence ( see Paolangeli v Cornell Univ. , 296 AD2d 691, 693 [3d Dept 2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2016Insofar as the Hearing Officer articulated a good-faith reason for the denial of the witness, “this amounts to a regulatory violation requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing” (Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer, 104 AD3d at 978 ; see Matter of Jackson v Brack, 126 AD3d at 1244 ).

2016Insofar as the Hearing Officer articulated a good-faith reason for the denial of the witness, "this amounts to a regulatory violation requiring that the matter be remitted for a new hearing" (Matter of Morris-Hill v Fischer, 104 AD3d at 978 ; see Matter of Jackson v Prack, 126 AD3d at 1244 ).

2012Under section 200 and at common law, no liability attaches to an owner or general contractor if the defect or dangerous condition arose from the manner or method in which a subcontractor performed its work and the owner or general contractor had no supervisory control over the activity that caused the injury (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2012Under section 200 and at common law, no liability attaches to an owner or general contractor if the defect or dangerous condition arose from the manner or method in which a subcontractor performed its work and the owner or general contractor had no supervisory control over the activity that caused the injury (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

2011Dept. of Fin., 179 AD2d 796, 798 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 758 [1992]).

2010Dept, of Fin., 179 AD2d 796, 798 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 758 [1992]).

2007Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505 [1993]; Fairchild v Servidone Constr.

2004Co., 81 NY2d 494 [1993]).

2000“A vagueness challenge to an administrative regulation raises the question of whether a reasonable person subject to the regulatory standard would comprehend what conduct was being prohibited” (Matter of Choe v Axelrod, 141 AD2d 235, 239 ). “[Regulations must give ‘sufficiently definite warning * * * when measured by common understanding and practices’ * * * and articulate an objective standard which governs the exercising of the discretion and affords the possibility of meaningful judicial review” (Matter of Slocum v Berman, 81 AD2d 1014, 1015 [quoting United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1, 7-8

1988A vagueness challenge to an administrative regulation raises the question of whether a reasonable person subject to the regulatory standard would comprehend what conduct was being prohibited (see, Matter of Prusky v Webb, 134 AD2d 718, 721 ; Matter of Slocum v Berman, 81 AD2d 1014, 1015 , mot to dismiss appeal granted 54 NY2d 752 ).

2026In this regard, as demonstrated by testimony at the administrative hearing, the overall purposes of the regulatory framework include the safety of the horses, parity among the competitors and fairness for the wagering public ( see generally Matter of Casse v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd. , 70 NY2d 589, 595-596 [1987]).

2026In this regard, as demonstrated by testimony at the administrative hearing, the overall purposes of the regulatory framework include the safety of the horses, parity among the competitors and fairness for the wagering public ( see generally Matter of Casse v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd. , 70 NY2d 589, 595-596 [1987]).

2023United States v Myers, 426 F3d 117, 123-126 [2d Cir 2005] [reviewing constitutionality of a supervised release condition requiring sex offender to obtain governmental permission before seeing his child unsupervised] [citing Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65-66 [2000] [plurality]; Arciniega v Freeman, 404 US 4, 4 [1971] [parole condition restricting association “with other ex-convicts” could not include “incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the court of work on a legitimate job for a common employer”]).

2023Even if we were to accept petitioner's allegation as true, he has failed to demonstrate any prejudice given that the record reflects that he filed a timely administrative appeal, which was decided on the merits just four days after the conclusion of the hearing ( see Matter of Hinton v Fischer , 102 AD3d 1018, 1018-1019 [3d Dept 2013]).

2023United States v Myers, 426 F3d 117, 123-126 [2d Cir 2005] [reviewing constitutionality of a supervised release condition requiring sex offender to obtain governmental permission before seeing his child unsupervised] [citing Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65-66 [2000] [plurality]; Arciniega v Freeman, 404 US 4, 4 [1971] [parole condition restricting association “with other ex-convicts” could not include “incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the court of work on a legitimate job for a common employer”]).

2023United States v Myers, 426 F3d 117, 123-126 [2d Cir 2005] [reviewing constitutionality of a supervised release condition requiring sex offender to obtain governmental permission before seeing his child unsupervised] [citing Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65-66 [2000] [plurality]; Arciniega v Freeman, 404 US 4, 4 [1971] [parole condition restricting association “with other ex-convicts” could not include “incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the court of work on a legitimate job for a common employer”]).

2022Accordingly, Fulton does not bar the holding of Catholic Charities that a regulation, like the one at issue here, was neutral and generally applicable despite the presence of exemptions based upon specified criteria ( see Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v Serio , 7 NY3d at 519-520, 522-523 ).