regulatory framework in New Mexico

2025According to Horwitz, judicial immunity applies when “the 14 following formula is satisfied: (a) the officials’ functions must be similar to those 15 involved in the judicial process, (b) the officials’ actions must be likely to result in 16 damages lawsuits by disappointed parties, and (c) there must exist sufficient 17 safeguards in the regulatory framework to control unconstitutional conduct.” 18 Horwitz, 822 F.2d at 1513.

2024Exam’rs of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th 11 Cir. 1987) (summarizing the holding in Butz). 12 {18} The Tenth Circuit has recognized the holding in Butz to apply to “cases 13 involving state administrative/executive officials serving in adjudicative, judicial, or 14 prosecutorial capacities.” Id. at 1515 .

2018See Costle, 445 U.S. at 214 (acknowledging that a party’s opportunity for public hearing “may be keyed to a request for a hearing”). {24} The regulation further requires that, before a party is entitled to a public hearing, the secretary must determine there is a substantial public interest in the matters that are the subject of the permit application. 20.6.2.3108(K) NMAC.

2017See Costle , 445 U.S. at 214 , 100 S.Ct. 1095 (acknowledging that a party's opportunity for public hearing "may be keyed to a request for a hearing"). {24} The regulation further requires that, before a party is entitled to a public hearing, the secretary must determine there is a substantial public interest in the matters that are the subject of the permit application. 20.6.2.3108(K) NMAC.

2021In a Penn Central inquiry, the factors for determining a regulatory taking include “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment- backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 )). {30} “[T]he nature of the State’s interest in [a challenged] regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is required.”

2021Otherwise, courts have “preferr[ed] to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” Id. at 1015 (second alteration and omission in original) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 ). {29} Such fact-intensive inquiries follow the regulatory analysis adopted in Penn Central (“Penn Central inquiries”), “designed to allow ‘careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

2021Otherwise, courts have “preferr[ed] to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” Id. at 1015 (second alteration and omission in original) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 ). {29} Such fact-intensive inquiries follow the regulatory analysis adopted in Penn Central (“Penn Central inquiries”), “designed to allow ‘careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

2021In a Penn Central inquiry, the factors for determining a regulatory taking include “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment- backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 )). {30} “[T]he nature of the State’s interest in [a challenged] regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is required.”

2003See Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F.Supp.2d 1271 , 1275 n. 3, 1277-78 (D.N.M.2000) (explaining that the phrase, “actions or transactions expressly permitted,” is to be given narrow reading and that “the specific activity,” including the manner in which it was done, must be expressly permitted to fall within exemption); cf. Shields v. Lefta, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 894, 897 (N.D.Ill.1995) (concluding that defendant’s use of model disclosure forms published by Federal Reserve did not insulate defendant from UPA claim just because alleged misrepresentations occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity)

2003See Campos v. Brooksbank, 120 F.Supp.2d 1271 , 1275 n. 3, 1277-78 (D.N.M.2000) (explaining that the phrase, “actions or transactions expressly permitted,” is to be given narrow reading and that “the specific activity,” including the manner in which it was done, must be expressly permitted to fall within exemption); cf. Shields v. Lefta, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 894, 897 (N.D.Ill.1995) (concluding that defendant’s use of model disclosure forms published by Federal Reserve did not insulate defendant from UPA claim just because alleged misrepresentations occurred within an otherwise sanctioned activity)