8 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Barry (Clyde's Place LLC) Novgreen1 sentence2011Compare In re Barry and Clyde’s Place LLC, 2011 VT 7, ¶ 20 . 7 It is would also be an impermissible advisory opinion to determine Question 6 of the Statement of Questions as to whether the regulatory standard of “significant adverse effect on surrounding properties” is unconstitutionally vague, except to note that the two prior cases decided by this Court under that standard and cited by Appellant: In re Appeals of Jackson and Appeal of McCue, Nos. 165-9-99, 43-2-00, 190-9-00, 258-12-99 Vtec (Vt. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Molganogreen1 sentence2010Broad policy statements phrased as “nonregulatory abstractions” cannot be the basis for denial under Act 250 criterion 10, since they may not be given the legal force and effect of a regulatory requirement, such as zoning laws In re Molgano, 163 Vt. 25, 31 (1994). 45 Turning first to the Town Plan, we note that the Plan reinforces the Town’s designation of the area in and surrounding the project site as a commercial growth area. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLCgreen1 sentence2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. | 1 | 1 |
Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp.green1 sentence2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. | 1 | 1 |
Olcott v. Southworthgreen2 sentences1997Indeed, by definition an encumbrance creates a “diminution of the value of the estate of the tenant [that is] consistent!] with the passing of the fee.” Olcott v. Southworth, 115 Vt. 421, 424 , 63 A.2d 189, 191 (1949) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouvier Law Dictionary, “Incumbrance” (Rawle’s 3d rev.)). 1997Indeed, by definition an encumbrance creates a “diminution of the value of the estate of the tenant [that is] consistent!] with the passing of the fee.” Olcott v. Southworth, 115 Vt. 421, 424 , 63 A.2d 189, 191 (1949) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouvier Law Dictionary, “Incumbrance” (Rawle’s 3d rev.)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colby v. Umbrella, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 4 . 14 In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that Appellants are free to advocate for what they believe to be the appropriate regulatory standard(s) in the context of the Court’s de novo hearing on any issues properly raised by the Statement of Questions. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Nehemiah Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020In announcing this conclusion, the DRB noted that “when the applicant [sic] purchased the property [in 2013], they were aware of the conditions of approval affecting the property, and the regulatory framework pertaining to financing established years prior to the applicant’s [sic] purchase of the property.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Greene v. Stevens Gas Service
green
1 sentence2020In both Gilman, 2003 VT 55, ¶ 10 , and Greene, 2004 VT 67, ¶ 29 , we rejected the homeowners’ arguments that the insurer waived the contractual limitation by violating this regulatory requirement on the basis that the homeowners had not proffered sufficient evidence of ongoing negotiations to support the argument. 11 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gilman v. Maine Mutual Fire Insurance
green
1 sentence2020In both Gilman, 2003 VT 55, ¶ 10 , and Greene, 2004 VT 67, ¶ 29 , we rejected the homeowners’ arguments that the insurer waived the contractual limitation by violating this regulatory requirement on the basis that the homeowners had not proffered sufficient evidence of ongoing negotiations to support the argument. 11 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Appeal of Shaw
green
2 sentences2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. 2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. 2009The language of § 1.2(A)(1) is not specific enough to create a regulatory requirement; rather, it is “’aspirational,’ and ‘abstract and advisory.’” In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29, ¶ 18 , 183 Vt. 587 (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 52, ¶ 33 , 180 Vt. 520 (mem.); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 223 (1979)); accord In re Appeal of JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110 , ¶¶ 16–17. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Andrulonis v. United States
green
2 sentences2006In denying the government’s motion for summary judgment, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that there was “neither a regulatory framework nor a defined policy that could serve as the basis for infusing all decisions of [Center for Disease Control] employees with policy implications.” Id. at 655 . 2006The court continued, “it is hardly conceivable that the CDC would ever have a policy to keep silent about obvious, easily-correctable dangers in experiments using drugs supplied by the CDC.” Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.