regulatory standard in Alaska

2025CONCLUSION The superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Division and the sponsors is AFFIRMED. 85 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 324 P.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kuzmin, 223 P.3d at 89 ). -28- 7775

2025CONCLUSION The superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Division and the sponsors is AFFIRMED. 85 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 324 P.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kuzmin, 223 P.3d at 89 ). -28- 7775

2018In support of the Commissioner’s interpretation we note that the reinstatement letter advised White not only that he had an additional 90 days to complete the well or face “automatic termination of this lease” but also that after 90 days DNR would “review [White’s] progress to determine whether continued lease extension [was] 36 Id. 37 109 P.3d 914 , 920 (Alaska 2005). 38 Id. at 921-23. -22- 7283 warranted.”39 We note also that White continued to have the protection of the force majeure clause in paragraph 4(f) of the lease, by which he could seek further extensions if his failure to meet the

2018In support of the Commissioner’s interpretation we note that the reinstatement letter advised White not only that he had an additional 90 days to complete the well or face “automatic termination of this lease” but also that after 90 days DNR would “review [White’s] progress to determine whether continued lease extension [was] 36 Id. 37 109 P.3d 914 , 920 (Alaska 2005). 38 Id. at 921-23. -22- 7283 warranted.”39 We note also that White continued to have the protection of the force majeure clause in paragraph 4(f) of the lease, by which he could seek further extensions if his failure to meet the

2003See, e.g., Payton v. State, 938 P.2d 1036, 1044 (Alaska 1997) (citing, as error, the failure of the Board of Fisheries to explain why a regulatory exception allowing residents to stop using certain methods of handling, preparing, preserving and storing salmon did not apply to Skwentna-area residents’ decision to stop drying salmon).

2003Cf. Cano v. Municipality of Anchorage, 627 P.2d 660, 664 (Alaska App.1981) (holding that the superior court’s "outright refusal to consider the various alternatives available as a matter of discretion to the court is a failure to exercise any discretion at all”). 23 . 42U.S.C. § 12132. 24 . 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 . 25 .

1995Likewise, in Heckler , the statute did not require the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to investigate the unapproved use of an approved drug even when that use became widespread or endangered public health. 470 U.S. at 835-36 , 105 S.Ct. at 1657-58 (holding statute granted FDA unreviewable discretion to refrain from enforcement despite policy statement stating FDA was obligated to investigate such uses which were widespread or endangered public health). 11 .

1976Similarly, if jury issues are determined to exist as to either, or both, of these issues, then it becomes the jury's task, under appropriate instructions, to resolve such factual issues. [13] Subsequent to the accident in this case, the legislature reaffirmed that the employer's statutory duties extended to compliance with the Code, by amending AS 18.60.075(a) to read in part: An employer shall do everything necessary to protect the life, health and safety of employees including: (1) complying with all occupational safety and health standards and regulations promulgated by the department... .

1976Ass'n, 546 P.2d 1305, 1314 (Alaska 1976), where this court recognized that a decision not to adopt a regulatory standard may be justified in the circumstance "[w]here a party's infraction is due to innocent ignorance of the operative facts which make the statute or regulation applicable." [12] Once the legislative enactment or administrative regulation is adopted as the applicable standard of care, the role of the trial court is to then determine whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the statute or regulation was violated and whether there was suff

1976Ass’n, 546 P.2d 1305, 1314 (Alaska 1976), where this court recognized that a decision not to adopt a regulatory standard may be justified in the circumstance “[w]here a party’s infraction is due to innocent ignorance of the operative facts which make the statute or regulation applicable.” .Once the legislative enactment or administrative regulation is adopted as the applicable standard of care, the role of the trial court is to then determine whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the statute or regulation was violated and whether there was sufficie