regulatory requirement in North Carolina

2014Alternatively, "the violation of a regulatory scheme may be a violation of the [Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act] where the regulatory violation satisfies the three elements of [an Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act] claim." Id. at 171 , 681 S.E.2d at 455 .

2014Alternatively, "the violation of a regulatory scheme may be a violation of the [Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act] where the regulatory violation satisfies the three elements of [an Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act] claim." Id. at 171 , 681 S.E.2d at 455 .

2011As the Wisconsin Court reasoned in Jusufi , "[t]he [statute's] *552 method of distinguishing private clubs from other restaurants [and bars] seeks to protect the greatest number of restaurant [and bar] patrons [and employees], while preserving the right to associate in truly private clubs that are not open to the public." Jusufi, 763 N.W.2d at 205 .

2011Stat.] § 75-1.1, the violation does not automatically result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under that statute.” Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70 , 653 S.E.2d 393, 398 (2007) (quoting Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, 108 N.C.

2011Stat.] § 75-1.1, the violation does not automatically result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under that statute.” Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70 , 653 S.E.2d 393, 398 (2007) (quoting Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, 108 N.C.

2011Stat.] § 75-1.1, the violation does not automatically result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under that statute.” Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70 , 653 S.E.2d 393, 398 (2007) (quoting Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, 108 N.C.

2006In addition, although 4 N.C.A.C. 2S.0206 professedly was enacted to “serve the public welfare,” see 4 N.C.A.C. 2R.0101; Boyd, 246 N.C. at 154 , 97 S.E.2d at 867 , neither the regulation itself nor any provision of Chapter 18B impose civil liability for violation of the regulation.

2006In addition, although 4 N.C.A.C. 2S.0206 professedly was enacted to “serve the public welfare,” see 4 N.C.A.C. 2R.0101; Boyd, 246 N.C. at 154 , 97 S.E.2d at 867 , neither the regulation itself nor any provision of Chapter 18B impose civil liability for violation of the regulation.

2006Nor does the regulatory requirement “carry out [any] provisions,” id., of the Dram Shop Act, which our Suprefne Court has held is limited to “protecting the public from” the hazards created by underage drinkers, see Hart, 332 N.C. at 304 , 420 S.E.2d at 177 .

2006Nor does the regulatory requirement “carry out [any] provisions,” id., of the Dram Shop Act, which our Suprefne Court has held is limited to “protecting the public from” the hazards created by underage drinkers, see Hart, 332 N.C. at 304 , 420 S.E.2d at 177 .

2004A court, however, may presume preemption when federal legislation comprehensively regulates a field and a reasonable inference exists “that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary regulation.” Id. at 491 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). {15} The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the “Safety Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq., sets forth a regulatory framework for the federal government to address the recall of automobiles for safety concerns.

1995“A statute or ordinance designed for the protection of the public is a ‘safety’ enactment and its violation constitutes negligence per se . . . .” Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 73 N.C.