9 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1996–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665, 690 , 855 A.2d 212 (2004) (finding that ‘‘combi- nation of statutory cross-references help[ed] to explain [statutory] language’’). 2025See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665, 690 , 855 A.2d 212 (2004) (finding that ‘‘combi- nation of statutory cross-references help[ed] to explain [statutory] language’’). | 1 | 1 |
Deshpande v. Deshpandegreen2 sentences2018See Deshpande v. Deshpande , 142 Conn. App. 471 , 478-79, 65 A.3d 12 (2013) ("[b]ecause the court failed to specify the presumptive amount or make any findings regarding a deviation from that amount, we can only speculate as to the amount, whether the court's child support order deviated from that amount and, to the extent that there was a deviation, whether the circumstances of this case justified a variance from the presumptive amount based on the court's application of the deviation criteria"); see also Righi v. Righi , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 439 , 160 A.3d 1094 ("enactment's 'specific fi 2018See Deshpande v. Deshpande , 142 Conn. App. 471 , 478-79, 65 A.3d 12 (2013) ("[b]ecause the court failed to specify the presumptive amount or make any findings regarding a deviation from that amount, we can only speculate as to the amount, whether the court's child support order deviated from that amount and, to the extent that there was a deviation, whether the circumstances of this case justified a variance from the presumptive amount based on the court's application of the deviation criteria"); see also Righi v. Righi , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 439 , 160 A.3d 1094 ("enactment's 'specific fi | 1 | 1 |
Righi v. Righigreen2 sentences2018See Deshpande v. Deshpande , 142 Conn. App. 471 , 478-79, 65 A.3d 12 (2013) ("[b]ecause the court failed to specify the presumptive amount or make any findings regarding a deviation from that amount, we can only speculate as to the amount, whether the court's child support order deviated from that amount and, to the extent that there was a deviation, whether the circumstances of this case justified a variance from the presumptive amount based on the court's application of the deviation criteria"); see also Righi v. Righi , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 439 , 160 A.3d 1094 ("enactment's 'specific fi 2018See Deshpande v. Deshpande , 142 Conn. App. 471 , 478-79, 65 A.3d 12 (2013) ("[b]ecause the court failed to specify the presumptive amount or make any findings regarding a deviation from that amount, we can only speculate as to the amount, whether the court's child support order deviated from that amount and, to the extent that there was a deviation, whether the circumstances of this case justified a variance from the presumptive amount based on the court's application of the deviation criteria"); see also Righi v. Righi , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 439 , 160 A.3d 1094 ("enactment's 'specific fi | 1 | 1 |
Muniz v. Kravisgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Muniz v. Kravis, 59 Conn. App. 704, 714 , 757 A.2d 1207 (2000) (concluding that plaintiff who was not tenant failed to allege unfair trade practice under CUTPA). 2006See, e.g., Muniz v. Kravis, 59 Conn. App. 704, 714 , 757 A.2d 1207 (2000) (concluding that plaintiff who was not tenant failed to allege unfair trade practice under CUTPA). | 1 | 1 |
Unkelbach v. McNarygreen2 sentences2003See Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 367 , 710 A.2d 717 (1998) (trial court’s failure to apply statutory guidelines constitutes incorrect application of law, and, therefore, abuse of discretion). 2003See Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 367 , 710 A.2d 717 (1998) (trial court’s failure to apply statutory guidelines constitutes incorrect application of law, and, therefore, abuse of discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Pamela B. v. Mentgreen2 sentences2003See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 331 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). 2003See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 331 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Battistotti v. Suzanne A.
green
2 sentences2018"Given this regulatory framework, a court errs in calculating child support on the basis of a parent's earning capacity without first stating the presumptive support amount at which it arrived by applying the guidelines and using the parent's actual income and second finding application of the guidelines to be inequitable or inappropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Battistotti v. Suzanne A ., supra, 182 Conn. App. at 52 n.8, 188 A.3d 798 ; see also Barcelo v. Barcelo , supra, 158 Conn. App. at 215 , 118 A.3d 657 ; Fox v. Fox , supra, 152 Conn. App. at 635 , 99 A.3d 1206 . 2018"Given this regulatory framework, a court errs in calculating child support on the basis of a parent's earning capacity without first stating the presumptive support amount at which it arrived by applying the guidelines and using the parent's actual income and second finding application of the guidelines to be inequitable or inappropriate." (Emphasis in original.) Battistotti v. Suzanne A ., supra, 182 Conn. App. at 52 n.8, 188 A.3d 798 ; see also Barcelo v. Barcelo , supra, 158 Conn. App. at 215 , 118 A.3d 657 ; Fox v. Fox , supra, 152 Conn. App. at 635 , 99 A.3d 1206 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2003The state further asserts that the registration requirement in this case was not intended as a punitive measure; State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 90-95 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001); but, rather, was a regulatory requirement over which the trial court had no discretion. 2003The state further asserts that the registration requirement in this case was not intended as a punitive measure; State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 90-95 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001); but, rather, was a regulatory requirement over which the trial court had no discretion. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Evon v. Andrews
green
1 sentence2000No matter how objective a regulatory standard may be, "an inspector's decision as to whether a building falls below a standard and whether remedial orders are therefore required involves the exercise of his or her judgment." Id., 506 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Carothers v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co.
neutral
2 sentences1996Proof of a regulatory violation is not required if “the defendant has chosen not to attack the reasonableness of the order . . . [and] factfinding has been entrusted by the legislature to the administrative agency and an injunction is sought to enforce an administrative order in furtherance of a vital public interest.” Carothers v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 19 Conn. App. 216, 222 , 561 A.2d 971 (1989), citing Water Resources Commission v. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp., 170 Conn. 27 , 364 A.2d 208 (1975). 1996Proof of a regulatory violation is not required if “the defendant has chosen not to attack the reasonableness of the order . . . [and] factfinding has been entrusted by the legislature to the administrative agency and an injunction is sought to enforce an administrative order in furtherance of a vital public interest.” Carothers v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 19 Conn. App. 216, 222 , 561 A.2d 971 (1989), citing Water Resources Commission v. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp., 170 Conn. 27 , 364 A.2d 208 (1975). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Water Resources Commission v. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp.
green
2 sentences1996Proof of a regulatory violation is not required if “the defendant has chosen not to attack the reasonableness of the order . . . [and] factfinding has been entrusted by the legislature to the administrative agency and an injunction is sought to enforce an administrative order in furtherance of a vital public interest.” Carothers v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 19 Conn. App. 216, 222 , 561 A.2d 971 (1989), citing Water Resources Commission v. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp., 170 Conn. 27 , 364 A.2d 208 (1975). 1996Proof of a regulatory violation is not required if “the defendant has chosen not to attack the reasonableness of the order . . . [and] factfinding has been entrusted by the legislature to the administrative agency and an injunction is sought to enforce an administrative order in furtherance of a vital public interest.” Carothers v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 19 Conn. App. 216, 222 , 561 A.2d 971 (1989), citing Water Resources Commission v. Connecticut Sand & Stone Corp., 170 Conn. 27 , 364 A.2d 208 (1975). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.