regulatory requirement in California

2016(Id. at p. 114.) Compliance with a general plan in and of itself “does not insulate a project from the EIR requirement, where it may be fairly argued that the project will generate significant environmental effects.” (City of Antioch v. City Council (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1325, 1332 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 507 ].) A project’s effects can be significant even if “they are not greater than those deemed acceptable in a general plan.” ( Gentry, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 ; see also Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 732 [ 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 ] [EIR required “i

2013Second, MM W-2 requires compliance with SMARA, which is administered by the OMR. “ ‘[A] condition requiring compliance with environmental regulations is a common and reasonable mitigating measure.’ [Citation.]” (Gentry, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394 ; see Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1276 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 176 ].) Furthermore, these two definitions dovetail neatly, for the Report’s definition of “adverse” “hydraulic impacts” closely tracks the regulatory standard of SMARA set forth in CEQA Guidelines section 3710, subdivision (c).

2022(See, e.g., Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788 , 806–808 (CAAP); Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515 , 531–532 (CREEP).) The regulatory requirement may be new, one court explained, but “the potential environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions has been known since the 1970’s.” (CAAP, at p. 807; see also CREEP, at p. 531 [“An SEIR is not required absent new information, and . . . information on the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on climate was known long before the Ci

2022(See, e.g., Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788 , 806–808 (CAAP); Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515 , 531–532 (CREEP).) The regulatory requirement may be new, one court explained, but “the potential environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions has been known since the 1970’s.” (CAAP, at p. 807; see also CREEP, at p. 531 [“An SEIR is not required absent new information, and . . . information on the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on climate was known long before the Ci

2022(See, e.g., Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788 , 806–808 (CAAP); Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515 , 531–532 (CREEP).) The regulatory requirement may be new, one court explained, but “the potential environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions has been known since the 1970’s.” (CAAP, at p. 807; see also CREEP, at p. 531 [“An SEIR is not required absent new information, and . . . information on the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on climate was known long before the Ci

2022(See, e.g., Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788 , 806–808 (CAAP); Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515 , 531–532 (CREEP).) The regulatory requirement may be new, one court explained, but “the potential environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions has been known since the 1970’s.” (CAAP, at p. 807; see also CREEP, at p. 531 [“An SEIR is not required absent new information, and . . . information on the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on climate was known long before the Ci

2020Finally, I disagree with the majority’s view that Bello v. ABA Energy Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 301 (Bello) entitles 1 a private utility to place lines on public land; rather, it allows the utility to place them on private land with a publicly granted permit.

2020Finally, I disagree with the majority’s view that Bello v. ABA Energy Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 301 (Bello) entitles 1 a private utility to place lines on public land; rather, it allows the utility to place them on private land with a publicly granted permit.

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018GENERAL BACKGROUND To assist in a better understanding of the factual and procedural background of these cases and the discussion that follows, we begin with the general background of the regulatory framework underlying the Act and its jurisdictional provisions. *1055 I Regulatory Framework And Background The Act "sets forth a cooperative state-federal scheme for improving the nation's air quality." ( Vigil v. Leavitt (9th Cir. 2004) 381 F.3d 826 , 830.) The Agency establishes the national air quality standards and the states devise, adopt, and implement a SIP to satisfy those standards. ( Ibi

2018I Regulatory Framework And Background The Act “sets forth a cooperative state-federal scheme for improving the nation’s air quality.” (Vigil v. Leavitt (9th Cir. 2004) 381 F.3d 826 , 830.) The Agency establishes the national air quality standards and the states devise, adopt, and implement a SIP to satisfy those standards.

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018Instead, the Court-reciting language from a different United States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 -found that a regulatory error alone does not amount to a taking if it is "part of a reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate government interests ...." ( Landgate, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 .) As the Landgate Court explained, "[t]he proper inquiry is ... whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a legitimate go

2018As pointed out by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin , proportionality review should be informed by " 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent.' " ( Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1000 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 (plurality opn.), quoting Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263 , 274-275, 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 .) Age is among the Board's regulatory factors tending to show suitability for release, but only inasmuch as "the prisoner's present age reduces the probability of recidivism" (Regs., §§ 2281, subd. (d)(7), 2402, subd. (d)(7), italics added); the Board's regulations relating

2018As pointed out by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin , proportionality review should be informed by " 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent.' " ( Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1000 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 (plurality opn.), quoting Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263 , 274-275, 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 .) Age is among the Board's regulatory factors tending to show suitability for release, but only inasmuch as "the prisoner's present age reduces the probability of recidivism" (Regs., §§ 2281, subd. (d)(7), 2402, subd. (d)(7), italics added); the Board's regulations relating

2026Safariland argues that unlike the election cases upon which the Imagistics court relied (see Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588−589, citing Barnes v. Wong (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 390 and Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167 ), the question of correctly tendering the filing fee and arbitration deposit is more like payment of a filing fee, which is not a prerequisite for a timely filing, as set forth in the rules of court and affirmed in Rapp v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2026The reviewing court held that the coordinator did not possess any such discretion, because the regulation 10 “specifically calls for forfeiture of a protest for noncompliance.” (Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 588 .) We also reject Safariland’s argument that Imagistics was wrongly decided because its application of the principle of strict compliance was unwarranted in the absence of a legislative mandate for the particular regulatory requirement.

2026Safariland argues that unlike the election cases upon which the Imagistics court relied (see Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588−589, citing Barnes v. Wong (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 390 and Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167 ), the question of correctly tendering the filing fee and arbitration deposit is more like payment of a filing fee, which is not a prerequisite for a timely filing, as set forth in the rules of court and affirmed in Rapp v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2026Safariland argues that unlike the election cases upon which the Imagistics court relied (see Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588−589, citing Barnes v. Wong (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 390 and Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167 ), the question of correctly tendering the filing fee and arbitration deposit is more like payment of a filing fee, which is not a prerequisite for a timely filing, as set forth in the rules of court and affirmed in Rapp v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2023Absolute immunity has been granted “to administrative officials performing functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors if the following formula is satisfied: (a) the officials’ functions must be similar to those involved in the judicial process, (b) the officials’ actions must be likely to result in damages lawsuits by disappointed parties, and (c) there must exist sufficient safeguards in the regulatory framework to control unconstitutional conduct.” (Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1987) 822 F.2d 1508 , 1513, citing, generally, Butz v. Economou (1978) 438 U.S. 478 .) He

2023(Id. at pp. 66–71.) Indeed, we observed that in each case in which an appellate court has found the evidentiary presumption rebutted, it has done so only when the licensee established one or more regulatory violations casting “doubt [on] the reliability of the test.” (Id. at pp. 70–71.) Further, we noted that the “caselaw [was] … scattered with comments that emphasize[d] substantive reliability in analyzing the import of regulatory violations.” (Id. at p. 71, fn. 7 [collecting cases].) As part of our caselaw analysis, we examined one decision especially closely— Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th

2023(Id. at pp. 66–71.) Indeed, we observed that in each case in which an appellate court has found the evidentiary presumption rebutted, it has done so only when the licensee established one or more regulatory violations casting “doubt [on] the reliability of the test.” (Id. at pp. 70–71.) Further, we noted that the “caselaw [was] … scattered with comments that emphasize[d] substantive reliability in analyzing the import of regulatory violations.” (Id. at p. 71, fn. 7 [collecting cases].) As part of our caselaw analysis, we examined one decision especially closely— Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th

2023Absolute immunity has been granted “to administrative officials performing functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors if the following formula is satisfied: (a) the officials’ functions must be similar to those involved in the judicial process, (b) the officials’ actions must be likely to result in damages lawsuits by disappointed parties, and (c) there must exist sufficient safeguards in the regulatory framework to control unconstitutional conduct.” (Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1987) 822 F.2d 1508 , 1513, citing, generally, Butz v. Economou (1978) 438 U.S. 478 .) He

2021The United States Supreme Court has further reiterated that the simple filing of a tax return does not by itself implicate the privilege against self-incrimination. “[T]he fact that incriminating evidence may be the byproduct of obedience to a regulatory requirement, such as filing an income tax return, maintaining required records, or reporting an accident, does not 12 clothe such required conduct with the testimonial privilege.” (U.S. v. Hubbell (2000) 530 U.S. 27, 35 .) For the reasons above, we conclude the prosecution of defendants for the underpayment of sales tax did not violate their F