regulatory immunity in Illinois

2003The United States Supreme Court has recently taken a different position on this issue, arguing that wide dissemination of sex-offender information was “not so excessive a regulatory requirement as to become a punishment.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 , 155 L.

2003The United States Supreme Court has recently taken a different position on this issue, arguing that wide dissemination of sex-offender information was “not so excessive a regulatory requirement as to become a punishment.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 , 155 L.

2018This court reversed the trial court's dismissal, stating: "Where defendants privately disclose information about the price adjustment of a stock option to selected market participants before that information is made publicly available, the doctrine of regulatory immunity does not apply." Platinum Partners , 2012 IL App (1st) 112903 , ¶ 2, 364 Ill.Dec. 137 , 976 N.E.2d 415 . ¶ 3 In addition, we found that the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010) ), because the complaint had stated multip

2018This court reversed the trial court's dismissal, stating: "Where defendants privately disclose information about the price adjustment of a stock option to selected market participants before that information is made publicly available, the doctrine of regulatory immunity does not apply." Platinum Partners , 2012 IL App (1st) 112903 , ¶ 2, 364 Ill.Dec. 137 , 976 N.E.2d 415 . ¶ 3 In addition, we found that the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010) ), because the complaint had stated multip

2018"If the record contains evidence to support the agency's decision, it should be affirmed." Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation , 153 Ill. 2d 76 , 88, 180 Ill.Dec. 34 , 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). ¶ 21 We briefly set forth the regulatory framework relevant to the plaintiffs' argument on appeal.

2018"If the record contains evidence to support the agency's decision, it should be affirmed." Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation , 153 Ill. 2d 76 , 88, 180 Ill.Dec. 34 , 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). ¶ 21 We briefly set forth the regulatory framework relevant to the plaintiffs' argument on appeal.

2010In Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1990), the North Dakota Supreme Court explained: "There is a vast difference between allowing use of a regulatory violation as a `shield' in the form of an equitable defense to foreclosure, and allowing its use as a `sword' to create a state-based tort action for recovery of damages where no direct private right of action for damages is recognized." Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 125 .

2010In Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1990), the North Dakota Supreme Court explained: "There is a vast difference between allowing use of a regulatory violation as a `shield' in the form of an equitable defense to foreclosure, and allowing its use as a `sword' to create a state-based tort action for recovery of damages where no direct private right of action for damages is recognized." Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 125 .

2025The Supreme Court of Illinois noted [in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 339 (2002)], that, [‘]where the court is in the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction [i.e., reviewing an administrative action], “if the mode of procedure prescribed by statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court.[”] ’ The statute requires that the executive branch acquire a VSD 190 form from citizens of Illinois before enforcement of commercial regulations under the *** Vehicle Code can proceed from anyone, especially against privat

2021See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. McMullin, 47 N.Y.S.3d 882, 890 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“It seems inconceivable that the HUD regulations, promulgated in respect to the federal agency’s role as an insurer of mortgages, were intended to create a permanent and impenetrable barrier to foreclosing on the property of a borrower who has not made a mortgage payment for more than eight years”; “the Court concludes that the first sentence of 24 C.F.R. 203.606(a), which encompasses the regulatory requirement of a face-to-face meeting before a borrower misses three payments, does not prohibit a lender from

2016See Lombard Public Facilities Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 378 Ill.

2012Regulatory immunity applies whenever the “plaintiff’s allegations concern the exercise of powers within the bounds of the government functions delegated to [the SRO].” In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation, 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

2012Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations of impropriety concerning defendants’ announcement–i.e., that the announcement was tainted by fraud or was not sufficiently public because defendants were motivated to generate profits–are irrelevant. ¶ 37 Regulatory immunity applies whenever “the plaintiff’s allegations concern the exercise of powers within the bounds of the governmental functions delegated to [the SRO],” and the court should not ask “whether the SRO is acting (or not acting) ‘consistent with’ the laws it is supposed to apply.” Id.; see also Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1215 (regulat

2012See Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297 (“[B]ecause the law favors providing legal remedy to injured parties, grants of immunity must be narrowly construed; that is, courts must be ‘careful not to extend the scope of the protection further than its purposes require.’ ” (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 (1988))). ¶ 19 III.

2012See Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297 (“[B]ecause the law favors providing legal remedy to injured parties, grants of immunity must be narrowly construed; that is, courts must be ‘careful not to extend the scope of the protection further than its purposes require.’ ” (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 (1988))). ¶ 19 III.

2012See Flores v. Palmer Marketing, Inc., 361 Ill.

2012See Flores v. Palmer Marketing, Inc., 361 Ill.

2012Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations of impropriety concerning defendants’ announcement–i.e., that the announcement was tainted by fraud or was not sufficiently public because defendants were motivated to generate profits–are irrelevant. ¶ 37 Regulatory immunity applies whenever “the plaintiff’s allegations concern the exercise of powers within the bounds of the governmental functions delegated to [the SRO],” and the court should not ask “whether the SRO is acting (or not acting) ‘consistent with’ the laws it is supposed to apply.” Id.; see also Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1215 (regulat

2012Just as allegations of fraud or irregularity about the manner in which an SRO reached a regulatory decision do not suffice to circumvent the doctrine of absolute immunity (Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1215 ; DL Capital Group, LLC, 409 F.3d at 98-99 ), so too an allegation that an SRO announced a regulatory decision in a manner that failed to inform all market participants simultaneously fails to move a claim outside the ambit of the SRO’s delegated power and, thus, outside the scope of the SRO’s regulatory immunity. ¶ 47 Plaintiff’s allegations that CBOE and OCC announced the adjustment

2002Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 562 , 110 S.Ct. at 908-09 , 107 L.Ed.2d at 1004 , quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58-59 , 88 S.Ct. 697, 708 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889, 903-04 (1968).

2002Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 562 , 110 S.Ct. at 908-09 , 107 L.Ed.2d at 1004 , quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58-59 , 88 S.Ct. 697, 708 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889, 903-04 (1968).