regulatory factors in Massachusetts

2026Id.

2025L. c. 6, § 178C. on a sound exercise of informed discretion rather than the mechanical application of a checklist or some other reflex," Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 651 (2012).

2025See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 655 .

2020Here, the examiner did not make explicit findings regarding the need for Internet dissemination, or consider that issue in his analysis of the regulatory factors, stating instead that he did "not have the statutory authority to make dissemination determinations." This leaves unanswered the question "whether, in light of the particular risks posed by the particular offender, Internet access to that offender's information might realistically serve to protect the public against the risk of the offender's sexual reoffense." Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 655 .

2025Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of Andover, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 265, 267 (2004).

2025Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of Andover, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 265, 267 (2004).

2025Application of the regulatory factors. "[A] hearing examiner has discretion . . . to consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe each factor." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356315 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 292 , 299 (2021), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109-110 (2014).

2025The regulations were amended effective as of April 25, 2025. 4 regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe each factor." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356315 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 292 , 299 (2021) (Doe No. 356315), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109-110 (2014).

2015L. c. 127, § 33, as amended by St. 1979, c. 485, § 22.3 In particular, as we recently noted in Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 25-26 (2015), in imposing discipline against an inmate, the Department of Correction is bound to follow the regulatory framework established by the Commissioner.

2015L. c. 127, § 33, as amended by St. 1979, c. 485, § 22. 3 In particular, as we recently noted in Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 25-26 (2015), in imposing discipline against an inmate, the Department of Correction is bound to follow the regulatory framework established by the Commissioner.

2026See Doe No. 10216, 447 Mass. at 786 ("expert testimony is unnecessary in [classification] proceedings," instead, examiners "utilize[] [regulatory] factors . . . in determining the plaintiff's final classification").

2026Id. at 605, 608 .

2026See Loe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 673, 677 (2009) ("a party claiming ineffective 11 assistance must establish that better work might have accomplished something material for [him]" [quotation and citation omitted]).

2025"We 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88 (2019) (Doe No. 523391), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015). 4 a.

2025"We 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88 (2019) (Doe No. 523391), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015). 4 a.

2025"A plaintiff challenging the validity of regulations promulgated by an agency pursuant to its statutory authority faces a heavy burden to establish that those regulations are invalid." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 620 (2010) (Doe 151564).

2024See Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 290-292, 295 (1988). 4.

2024The Sex Offender Registry Board (board) "is constitutionally required to prove the appropriateness of an offender's risk classification by clear and convincing evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298 (2015) (Doe No. 380316).

2023Our analysis begins with the recognition that "[d]uly promulgated regulations of an administrative agency are presumptively valid and 'must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.'" Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520 (2019), quoting Pepin v. Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014).

2023Our analysis begins with the recognition that "[d]uly promulgated regulations of an administrative agency are presumptively valid and 'must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.'" Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520 (2019), quoting Pepin v. Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014).

2019See Wyatt, petitioner , 428 Mass. 347 , 360 (1998).

2009We add that Commonwealth v. Kelley, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 448-449 (1995), does not aid the Commonwealth, as that case was decided under a different statutory and regulatory scheme corresponding to the date of the offense in that case, September 25, 1988. 3.

2001See Del Duca v. Town Administrator of Methuen, 368 Mass. 1, 13 (1975) (“[wjhenever various portions of a statute have independent force, thus justifying the inference that the enacting body would have passed one without the other, this court will uphold the remainder of the enactment after the offending portion has been struck”).

2000A 93A letter complies with the statute if it reasonably sets forth “the acts relied on and was sufficient to give the defendant an opportunity to review the facts and the law to see if the requested relief should be granted and to make a reasonable settlement offer so as to limit damages.” Piccuirro v. Gaitenby, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 292 (1985).

1997Chapter 93A, §9(3), however, does grant a remedy in damages for the regulatory violation that occurred prior to the grant of the variance. 7 Poncz v. Loftin, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 909, 910 (1993).

1983But this does not mean that the application of the zoning ordinance or by-law may not validly call for the exercise of judgment (see Zaltman v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham, 357 Mass. 482, 483-485 [1970]; S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. at 362) or require findings of fact to determine whether particular land falls within the regulatory framework estab *589 lished by the ordinance or by-law.

1983But this does not mean that the application of the zoning ordinance or by-law may not validly call for the exercise of judgment (see Zaltman v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham, 357 Mass. 482, 483-485 [1970]; S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 4 Mass. App. Ct. at 362) or require findings of fact to determine whether particular land falls within the regulatory framework estab *589 lished by the ordinance or by-law.

1983See, e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. at 234 (whether land was “subject to seasonal or periodic flooding” and thus properly included in a flood plain district).