regulatory violation in New Jersey

2009The Court then decided the public also has "a legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern." Id. at 413, 655 A. 2d 417 .

2008We also determined that the public has a compelling “interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern.” Id. at 413 , 655 A.2d 417 .

2021See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 555-57 (2009) (applying the "ascertainable loss" requirement of the CFA to private claims of regulatory violations); Cf. Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 523-24 (2018) (noting, by analogy, proof of harm in the form of monetary damages or "adverse consequences" is required for a regulatory violation under the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18).

2019However, where, as alleged by plaintiff here, the claim is based on a regulatory violation, a plaintiff need not demonstrate intent "because 'the regulations impose strict liability for such violations.' *186 " Bosland , 197 N.J. at 556 , 964 A.2d 741 (first quoting Cox , 138 N.J. at 18 , 647 A.2d 454 ; then citing Fenwick v. Kay Am.

2022Where the alleged unlawful practice is based upon a regulatory violation, "[a] showing of intent is not essential," Dugan, 231 N.J. at 51 , and "the regulations impose strict liability for such violations," Cox, 138 N.J. at 18 .

2021Law Inst. 1977)).] "A showing of intent is not essential if the claimed CFA violation is an affirmative act or a regulatory violation, but such a showing is necessary if the claimed violation is an omission pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2." Dugan, 231 N.J. at 51 (citations omitted).

2019"A showing of intent is not essential if the claimed CFA violation is an affirmative act or a regulatory violation, but such a showing is necessary if the claimed violation is an omission pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8 - 2." Ibid. (citing Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 556 (2009); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 605 (1997); Cox, 138 N.J. at 17-18 ).

2017Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 556 , 964 A.2d 741 (2009); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 605 , 691 A.2d 350 (1997); Cox, supra, 138 N.J. at 17-18 , 647 A.2d 454 .

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A. 2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A. 2d 417 (1995) (public has "legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 700 (1996). [6] The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A.2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A.2d 417 (1995) (public has “legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern”), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). 6 The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A.2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A.2d 417 (1995) (public has “legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern”), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). 6 The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A.2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A.2d 417 (1995) (public has “legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern”), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). 6 The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A.2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A.2d 417 (1995) (public has “legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern”), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). 6 The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2006See id. at 379 , 662 A.2d 546 ; see also Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 139 N.J. 392, 413 , 655 A.2d 417 (1995) (public has “legitimate interest in any business charged with criminal fraud, a substantial regulatory violation, or consumer fraud that raises a matter of legitimate public concern”), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1066 , 116 S.Ct. 752 , 133 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). 6 The presumption of openness to court proceedings requires more than a passing nod.

2022Where the alleged unlawful practice is based upon a regulatory violation, "[a] showing of intent is not essential," Dugan, 231 N.J. at 51 , and "the regulations impose strict liability for such violations," Cox, 138 N.J. at 18 .

2019However, where, as alleged by plaintiff here, the claim is based on a regulatory violation, a plaintiff need not demonstrate intent "because 'the regulations impose strict liability for such violations.' *186 " Bosland , 197 N.J. at 556 , 964 A.2d 741 (first quoting Cox , 138 N.J. at 18 , 647 A.2d 454 ; then citing Fenwick v. Kay Am.

2025Super. at 193 -94 (quoting Spade, 232 N.J. at 523 ), "[i]n the absence of evidence that the consumer suffered adverse consequences as a result of the defendant's regulatory violation, a consumer is A-0079-24 16 not an aggrieved consumer for purposes of the TCCWNA," id. at 194 (quoting Spade, 232 N.J. at 524 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025Super. at 193 -94 (quoting Spade, 232 N.J. at 523 ), "[i]n the absence of evidence that the consumer suffered adverse consequences as a result of the defendant's regulatory violation, a consumer is A-0079-24 16 not an aggrieved consumer for purposes of the TCCWNA," id. at 194 (quoting Spade, 232 N.J. at 524 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372, 376 , 371 A.2d 13 (1977)), thus implicating notions of fairness were a regulatory violation to be utilized to impose individual liability on corporate employees and officers.

2011Jeep, Inc., 72 N.J. 372, 376 , 371 A.2d 13 (1977)), thus implicating notions of fairness were a regulatory violation to be utilized to impose individual liability on corporate employees and officers.

2001Nonetheless, the Court concluded: Although the regulatory framework does not create a private cause of action, it does declare state policy and we do not think that finding a cause of action for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing would conflict with that policy. [ Id. at 468 , 621 A. 2d 445 .] Gaydos's common-law claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is complicated by the fact that Gaydos's claim is based solely on its allegations that NCIC violated FAIRA.

2001Nonetheless, the Court concluded: Although the regulatory framework does not create a private cause of action, it does declare state policy and we do not think that finding a cause of action for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing would conflict with that policy. [Id. at 468, 621 A.2d 445 .] Gaydos’s common-law claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is complicated by the fact that Gaydos’s claim is based solely on its allegations that NCIC violated FAIRA.

2026See In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27-28 ; see also Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (court will not disturb a penalty absent the capability of producing an unjust result).

2026See In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27-28 ; see also Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (court will not disturb a penalty absent the capability of producing an unjust result).

2024Application of Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch. ("Englewood"), 164 N.J. 316, 323 (2000).

2021Because the purpose of a regulatory analysis is "to determine [its] true intention," the words chosen by the regulator "are to be made responsive to the essential purpose of the law." Jimenez v. Baglieri, 152 N.J. 337, 351 (1998).

2021And yet, "it is not [the court's] function to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment,' or to presume that the drafter intended a meaning other than the one 'expresse d by way of the plain language.'" U.S. Bank, 210 N.J. at 199 (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

2019In support of this contention, defendant cites Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 441 (1997) (explaining that A-4003-15T2 53 "[w]hen clients sue their attorneys, attorney-client communications may become discoverable" through the attorney's assertion of a defense) and Carchidi v. Iavicoli, 412 N.J.

2019In support of this contention, defendant cites Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 441 (1997) (explaining that A-4003-15T2 53 "[w]hen clients sue their attorneys, attorney-client communications may become discoverable" through the attorney's assertion of a defense) and Carchidi v. Iavicoli, 412 N.J.

2018Furthermore, a plaintiff asserting a claim under the CFA must demonstrate an "ascertainable loss" and "a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss." Id. at 52 (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 184 (2013)).

2018An employee or officer of a corporation can be held individually liable under the CFA "when the basis for the CFA claim is a regulatory violation rather than an affirmative act or knowing misrepresentation." Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 133 (2011).

2018In Allen, the Court recognized this involved "fact-sensitive determinations." "[I]ndividual liability for a violation of the CFA will necessarily depend upon an evaluation of both the specific source of the claimed violation that forms the basis for the plaintiff's complaint as well as the particular acts that the individual has undertaken." Id. at 136 .

2017Under that section of the CFA, it is an “unlawful practice” “to sell, attempt to sell or offer for sale any merchandise at retail unless the total selling price of such merchandise is plainly marked by a stamp, tag, label or sign either affixed to the merchandise or located at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5; see also In re Johnny Popper, Inc., 413 N.J.Super. 580, 588-89 , 997 A.2d 257 (App. Div. 2010) (concurring with Division of Consumer Affairs’ determination that used car dealer’s practice of listing vehicle prices only on price list in its building,

2017Under that section of the CFA, it is an “unlawful practice” “to sell, attempt to sell or offer for sale any merchandise at retail unless the total selling price of such merchandise is plainly marked by a stamp, tag, label or sign either affixed to the merchandise or located at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5; see also In re Johnny Popper, Inc., 413 N.J.Super. 580, 588-89 , 997 A.2d 257 (App. Div. 2010) (concurring with Division of Consumer Affairs’ determination that used car dealer’s practice of listing vehicle prices only on price list in its building,

2017JB II, supra, 444 N.J.Super, at 161-62, 131 A.3d 413 ; see A.O., supra, 198 N.J. at 83-84 , 965 A.2d 152 ; Domicz, supra, 188 N.J. at 312-13 , 907 A.2d 395 ; McDavitt, supra, 62 N.J. at 43-44 , 297 A.2d 849 ; Driver, supra, 38 N.J. at 261 , 183 A.2d 655 .

2017JB II, supra, 444 N.J.Super, at 161-62, 131 A.3d 413 ; see A.O., supra, 198 N.J. at 83-84 , 965 A.2d 152 ; Domicz, supra, 188 N.J. at 312-13 , 907 A.2d 395 ; McDavitt, supra, 62 N.J. at 43-44 , 297 A.2d 849 ; Driver, supra, 38 N.J. at 261 , 183 A.2d 655 .