cognizable claim (Maryland) · Go Syfert
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cognizable claim in Maryland

14 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2024 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Zook v. Pescegreen
md · 2014 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022Undue influence “amounts to physical or moral coercion that forces a [person] to follow another’s judgment instead of his own.” Zook v. Pesce, 438 Md. 232, 248 (2014).

2022Undue influence “amounts to physical or moral coercion that forces a [person] to follow another’s judgment instead of his own.” Zook v. Pesce, 438 Md. 232, 248 (2014).

22
State v. Wilkinsgreen
md · 2006 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022So, if a violation of the mandatory procedural requirement in Rule 4-342(e) does not give rise to a cognizable claim of illegality under Rule 4-345(a), see State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 275 (2006), then it stands to reason that the same applies to a violation of Rule 4-346(a). *** Ultimately, the issue comes down to whether the sentencing judge had the authority to impose the sentence that he did.

11
Bailey v. Stategreen
md · 2019 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022To shed light on why the error here falls on the procedural side of the divide, we will briefly review a subset of such cases. 1 In Bailey v. State, 464 Md. 685, 690 (2019), the defendant was tried and convicted by a jury of driving while impaired by alcohol and related offenses.

11
Jordan v. St. Johns Countygreen
fladistctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Johns Cnty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist.

2016Johns Cnty., 63 So.3d 835, 839 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011).

11
Hixon v. Buchbergergreen
md · 1986 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Id. at 711 . (“While the injury to parental rights may be less severe in a case involving what is usually called visitation, that is a matter of degree that logically relates to damages rather than liability.”) In Hixon , we accepted that part of the Ruffalo Court’s ruling that recognized interference with visitation rights as a cognizable claim, but rejected the Ruffalo Court’s conclusion that even the most trivial departures from court-ordered visitation could create a sustainable cause of action: This Court does not accept “that portion of the reasoning in Ruffalo which indicates that, beca

2008Id. at 711 . (“While the injury to parental rights may be less severe in a case involving what is usually called visitation, that is a matter of degree that logically relates to damages rather than liability.”) In Hixon , we accepted that part of the Ruffalo Court’s ruling that recognized interference with visitation rights as a cognizable claim, but rejected the Ruffalo Court’s conclusion that even the most trivial departures from court-ordered visitation could create a sustainable cause of action: This Court does not accept “that portion of the reasoning in Ruffalo which indicates that, beca

11
Estelle v. Gamblegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 106 , 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 261 (1976).

2000It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 106 , 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 261 (1976).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance green
md · 1993
2 sentences

2024Id. at 138 .

2024Id. at 138 .

32001–2024
Padilla v. Kentucky green
scotus · 2010
2 sentences

2014Analysis Although a multitude of contentions are presented by the parties, we conclude that this case turns on the retroactive applicability of the holding of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), to guilty pleas— such as Guardado’s—made prior to March 31, 2010 (the date of the Padilla decision). 6 The State contends that Guardado did not bring a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Padilla in the context of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.

2014Analysis Although a multitude of contentions are presented by the parties, we conclude that this case turns on the retroactive applicability of the holding of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), to guilty pleas— such as Guardado’s—made prior to March 31, 2010 (the date of the Padilla decision). 6 The State contends that Guardado did not bring a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Padilla in the context of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.

22014–2014
Arroyo v. Board of Education green
md · 2004
2 sentences

2019Id. at 664-65 , 851 A.2d 576 .

2019Id. at 664-65 , 851 A.2d 576 .

12019–2019
Norfolk Southern Railway Corp. v. Tiller green
mdctspecapp · 2008
2 sentences

2013To be sure, there is broad language in Tiller, saying that "[ejvidence bearing on the expected work-life of the employee is not a cognizable exception to the collateral source rule.” 179 Md.App. at 340 , 944 A.2d at 1286 .

2013To be sure, there is broad language in Tiller, saying that "[ejvidence bearing on the expected work-life of the employee is not a cognizable exception to the collateral source rule.” 179 Md.App. at 340 , 944 A.2d at 1286 .

12013–2013
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Bickerstaff green
mdctspecapp · 2009
2 sentences

2012In Bickerstaff, 187 Md.App. at 244 , 978 A.2d 760 , we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion “in excluding appellant’s cross examination question regarding industry retirement age statistics.” In Bickerstaff CSX (appellant) attempted to cross-examine Dr. Hamilton (the same witness as in this case) about statistics showing that the standard retirement age in the railroad industry was age sixty. 187 Md.App. at 241-42, 244 , 978 A.2d 760 .

2012In Bickerstaff, 187 Md.App. at 244 , 978 A.2d 760 , we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion “in excluding appellant’s cross examination question regarding industry retirement age statistics.” In Bickerstaff CSX (appellant) attempted to cross-examine Dr. Hamilton (the same witness as in this case) about statistics showing that the standard retirement age in the railroad industry was age sixty. 187 Md.App. at 241-42, 244 , 978 A.2d 760 .

12012–2012
Ruffalo v. United States green
mowd · 1984
2 sentences

2008Id. at 711 . ("While the injury to parental rights may be less severe in a case involving what is usually called visitation, that is a matter of degree that logically relates to damages rather than liability.") In Hixon , we accepted that part of the Ruffalo Court's ruling that recognized interference with visitation rights as a cognizable claim, but rejected the Ruffalo Court's conclusion that even the most trivial departures from court-ordered visitation could create a sustainable cause of action: *1264 This Court does not accept "that portion of the reasoning in Ruffalo which indicates that

2008Id. at 711 . (“While the injury to parental rights may be less severe in a case involving what is usually called visitation, that is a matter of degree that logically relates to damages rather than liability.”) In Hixon , we accepted that part of the Ruffalo Court’s ruling that recognized interference with visitation rights as a cognizable claim, but rejected the Ruffalo Court’s conclusion that even the most trivial departures from court-ordered visitation could create a sustainable cause of action: This Court does not accept “that portion of the reasoning in Ruffalo which indicates that, beca

12008–2008

Where else courts name it

TN 279 (1994–2026) PA 185 (1976–2026) NY 168 (1973–2026) OH 107 (1981–2026) IL 87 (1973–2026) CA 86 (1985–2026) FL 82 (1981–2025) TX 62 (1986–2026) CT 45 (1990–2026) DE 43 (1997–2026) MO 38 (1988–2025) AR 35 (1991–2025) MI 33 (1981–2026) AZ 32 (1986–2025) NJ 31 (1983–2026) OR 30 (1981–2026) CO 29 (1982–2026) WA 29 (1987–2026) IN 28 (1986–2023) GA 27 (1987–2026) MA 25 (1986–2025) AL 24 (1985–2025) MS 19 (1994–2022) KY 18 (1995–2026) ME 15 (1986–2025) MD 14 (2000–2024) OK 12 (1987–2017) NC 12 (1986–2021) DC 12 (1980–2024) NM 12 (1992–2023) WV 11 (1991–2024) MT 10 (1997–2025) KS 10 (1995–2024) WI 10 (1994–2023) WY 9 (1994–2026) NV 8 (1994–2014) LA 8 (1994–2020) MN 8 (1988–2026) VA 7 (1986–2026) SC 7 (2011–2023) UT 7 (1986–2025) ID 6 (1998–2023) VT 6 (2016–2026) RI 5 (1979–2019) HI 5 (1978–2018) IA 5 (2016–2022) NE 5 (1990–2026) VI 5 (1998–2026) AK 3 (2012–2024) SD 3 (1989–1998) NH 2 (2013–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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