12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Washington v. John T. Rhines Co.green1 sentence2011Id. at 348-49. | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Chinngreen1 sentence2006The “trial court is not bound by a plaintiffs characterization of an action and ... use of the terms ‘carelessly and negligently,’ without more, are conclusory and do not raise a cognizable claim of negligence.” District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Reaves-Bey v. Karrgreen1 sentence2006“In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.” Reaves-Bey v. Karr and Zoom Courier Sou., 840 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C.2004). | 1 | 1 |
Etheredge v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1998See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 , 64 n. 6 (D.C.1997); compare Maddox, supra, 422 A.2d at 764-65 ("The terms `carelessly and negligently' are conclusory assertions, and without more the complaint does not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. . . .") with Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 918 (recognizing that claims of assault and battery and negligence were separate, though "related," because plaintiff had presented evidence that defendant departed from applicable standard of care). 1998See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 , 64 n. 6 (D.C.1997); compare Maddox, supra, 422 A.2d at 764-65 ("The terms `carelessly and negligently' are conclusory assertions, and without more the complaint does not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. . . .") with Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 918 (recognizing that claims of assault and battery and negligence were separate, though "related," because plaintiff had presented evidence that defendant departed from applicable standard of care). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Tinkergreen1 sentence1998See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 , 64 n. 6 (D.C.1997); compare Maddox, supra, 422 A.2d at 764-65 ("The terms `carelessly and negligently' are conclusory assertions, and without more the complaint does not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. . . .") with Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 918 (recognizing that claims of assault and battery and negligence were separate, though "related," because plaintiff had presented evidence that defendant departed from applicable standard of care). | 1 | 1 |
Maddox v. Banogreen2 sentences1998See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 , 64 n. 6 (D.C.1997); compare Maddox, supra, 422 A.2d at 764-65 ("The terms `carelessly and negligently' are conclusory assertions, and without more the complaint does not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. . . .") with Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 918 (recognizing that claims of assault and battery and negligence were separate, though "related," because plaintiff had presented evidence that defendant departed from applicable standard of care). 1998See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57 , 64 n. 6 (D.C.1997); compare Maddox, supra, 422 A.2d at 764-65 ("The terms `carelessly and negligently' are conclusory assertions, and without more the complaint does not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. . . .") with Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 918 (recognizing that claims of assault and battery and negligence were separate, though "related," because plaintiff had presented evidence that defendant departed from applicable standard of care). | 1 | 1 |
Wieck v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen2 sentences1980See Wieck v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 7 (1978); District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C. 1980See Wieck v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 7 (1978); District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1980See Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 282, 286 (1974). [2] I note in passing that the Board's conclusions and findings of fact seem insufficient to defeat what the Board itself seems to concede is a prima face case of estoppel against the municipality, which is a cognizable defense to Zoning Board jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. | 1 | 1 |
Kelton v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1980See Kelton v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 413 A.2d 919 , 922 n.5 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gooding v. United States
green
2 sentences1997In weighing this factor against Pierce, the trial court took into consideration "his confession, the strength of the government's proffer, and his sworn adoption of the facts contained in that proffer when he pled guilty." Thus, the court apparently weighed the evidence, rather than determining from the facts underlying the asserted defense whether Pierce presented a cognizable defense, as Gooding contemplates. [2] Id. at 306-07 . 1997In weighing this factor against Pierce, the trial court took into consideration “his confession, the strength of the government’s proffer, and his sworn adoption of the facts contained in that proffer when he pled guilty.” Thus, the court apparently weighed the evidence, rather than determining from the facts underlying the asserted defense whether Pierce presented a cognizable defense, as Gooding contemplates. 2 Id. at 306-07 . | 2 | 1992–1997 |
Eagle Wine & Liquor Co. v. Silverberg Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2024Because the trial court’s denial of Ms. Andrews’s motion to amend was not “predicated on some valid ground,” Edwards v. Safeway, Inc., 216 A.3d 17 , 19 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Eagle Wine & Liquor Co., 402 A.2d at 34 ), the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Harrison Richardson v. Thomas E. Gregory
green
2 sentences2000D.C. at 266, 281 F.2d at 629 ). [18] Therefore, Adam Jarrett, or his parents on his behalf, state a cognizable claim that Winston's breached a duty to him if it violated the standard established in D.C.Code § 25-121(b). [19] III. 2000D.C. at 266, 281 F.2d at 629 ). 18 Therefore, Adam Jarrett, or his parents on his behalf, state a cognizable claim that Winston’s breached a duty to him if it violated the standard established in D.C.Code § 25-121(b). 19 III. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Household Finance Corp. v. Frye
green
1 sentence1998Id. at 993 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 111 . 1993Id. at 111 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Charles Daniel Everett v. United States
green
2 sentences1992In Gooding II, we observed that “[o]ne important factor in these fair and just withdrawal motions is whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence.” Gooding II, supra, 529 A.2d at 306 (citing Everett v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 60 , 63 n. 10, 336 F.2d 979 , 982 n. 10 (1964)). 1992In Gooding II, we observed that “[o]ne important factor in these fair and just withdrawal motions is whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence.” Gooding II, supra, 529 A.2d at 306 (citing Everett v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 60 , 63 n. 10, 336 F.2d 979 , 982 n. 10 (1964)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Andrews v. United States
green
2 sentences1985We interpret that statute by reference to the parallel federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), [3] and in construing that law the Supreme Court has held that a cognizable claim incorrectly asserted by way of a Rule 35 motion must be considered by the court under the collateral attack statute instead, for "in this area of the law . . . `adjudication upon the underlying merits of claim is not [to be] hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents.'" Andrews v. *1156 United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338 , 83 S.Ct. 1236, 1239 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963) (holding that lower court w 1985We interpret that statute by reference to the parallel federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), [3] and in construing that law the Supreme Court has held that a cognizable claim incorrectly asserted by way of a Rule 35 motion must be considered by the court under the collateral attack statute instead, for "in this area of the law . . . `adjudication upon the underlying merits of claim is not [to be] hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents.'" Andrews v. *1156 United States, 373 U.S. 334, 338 , 83 S.Ct. 1236, 1239 , 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963) (holding that lower court w | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.