cognizable claim in Texas

2013See Tovar, 901 S.W.2d at 486 . 11 III.

2013See Tovar, 901 S.W.2d at 486 .11 11 This opinion is limited to post-conviction habeas claims challenging the legality of a sentence.

2010If, on the other hand, an indictment alleges that the statute of limitations is tolled, the sufficiency of that tolling allegation may not be challenged by a pretrial writ of habeas corpus." Ex parte Brooks at ___ (citing Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 803 ) (citations omitted). [3] While the court of appeals used the language "for want of jurisdiction" in dismissing appellant's first two points of error, more appropriate terminology might be "for want of a cognizable claim." See Ex parte McCullough, 966 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [1] Appellant raised this as an issue to the court of

2010While die court of appeals used the language "for want of jurisdiction” in dismissing appellant’s first two points of error, more appropriate terminology might be "for want of a cognizable claim.” See Ex parte McCullough, 966 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2025Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

2025Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

2020Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993); see Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998) (“Defendants’ motions for summary judgment argued only that plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim, the trial court’s judgment can be upheld, if at all, only on that ground.”).

2018See also Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998) (“[d]efendants' motions for summary judgment argued only that plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim, the trial court's judgment can be upheld, if at all, only on that ground.”).

2025See Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79 .

2025See Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79 .

2021See id. at 895-98 .

2018See Perry, 483 S.W.3d at 895 ; Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 724 . 10 Conclusion The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Herbert’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus as Herbert failed to present a cognizable claim for pretrial habeas relief.

2015See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452 , 458 n.16 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Ex parte Harrington , 310 S.W.3d 452 , 458 n.16 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 (holding that a section 1983 plaintiff has a cognizable claim once he can show that ―the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 8 federal court‘s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus‖).

2012See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372 (holding that a section 1983 plaintiff has a cognizable claim once he can show that ―the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 8 federal court‘s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus‖).

2006See, e.g. , Penick v. Penick , 783 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1988) (holding that "the payment by one marital estate of the debt of another creates a prima facie right of reimbursement").

2006See, e.g., Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1988) (holding that “the payment by one marital estate of the debt of another creates a prima facie right of reimbursement”).

2024Second, Gonzalez Delgadillo does not have an adequate remedy by way of appeal because, as we stated in Ex parte Aparicio, Gonzalez Delgadillo’s “constitutional right to equal protection would be effectively undermined if not vindicated before trial.” Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 711 (citing Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617 , 619–20 (Tex. Crim.

2010The State argues that the IAD speedy trial provisions are similar to constitutional and statutory speedy trial provisions that this Court has held may not form the basis for interlocutory review.12 Relying upon Ex parte Sanchez,13 a postconviction habeas case involving the IAD, the State further argues that an IAD violation does not constitute a cognizable claim because it does not involve a “jurisdictional defect 9 Ex parte Doster, 282 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.–Waco 2009). 10 Due to the disposition of the issue we raised in our request for supplemental briefing, we need not address the UCEA issue

2026See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983); see also Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998). 1 Boeing’s motion seeks judgment on the pleadings.

2026See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983); see also Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998). 1 Boeing’s motion seeks judgment on the pleadings.

2025A forcible-detainer suit is intended to be a “speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property.” Marshall v. Housing Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); see also Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919 .

2025See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, 381 S.W.3d at 476 .7 7 The Amended Petition appears to only state a takings claim against UT Southwestern.

2025A forcible-detainer suit is intended to be a “speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property.” Marshall v. Housing Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); see also Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919 .

2025See Hunt v. City of Diboll, 574 S.W.3d 406, 433 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, pet. denied).

2025“It is well settled that the Texas Constitution waives government immunity with respect to inverse-condemnation claims.” Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764 , 772 (Tex. 2021) (quoting City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014)) (internal quotation marks removed).

2024See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).

2024Id. at *4; Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 609 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) (“a court reviewing a petition for a basis in law should evaluate whether the plaintiff has provided fair notice of a cognizable claim for relief and whether the petition alleges facts that, if true, bar recovery”).

2024See Davis, 2023 WL 3735115 , at *3; see also Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 609 .

2022See Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (claims with no basis in law properly dismissed); see also In re Essex Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (error to deny Rule 91a motion where cause of action barred by legal rule).

2022See Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (claims with no basis in law properly dismissed); see also In re Essex Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (error to deny Rule 91a motion where cause of action barred by legal rule).

2021Lazer Spot, Inc. v. Hiring Partners, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 40, 53 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) (holding mere hiring of another’s at-will employee legally insufficient to prove tortious interference).

2021See Ingram, 533 S.W.3d at 892 .

2020Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex. 1993); see Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998) (“Defendants’ motions for summary judgment argued only that plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim, the trial court’s judgment can be upheld, if at all, only on that ground.”).

2020Code § 21.001(4) (listing among TCHRA’s purposes “secur[ing] for persons in this state . . . freedom from discrimination in certain employment transactions, in order to protect their personal dignity”); B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. 2017) (stating that legislature enacted TCHRA “for the purpose of balancing the needs of the citizens of our state to have a cognizable claim for sexual harassment with the interests of employers who are required to provide a workplace free from gender-based discrimination” and that that “balance affords an aggrieved party a clai

2020Code § 21.001(4) (listing among TCHRA’s purposes “secur[ing] for persons in this state . . . freedom from discrimination in certain employment transactions, in order to protect their personal dignity”); B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. 2017) (stating that legislature enacted TCHRA “for the purpose of balancing the needs of the citizens of our state to have a cognizable claim for sexual harassment with the interests of employers who are required to provide a workplace free from gender-based discrimination” and that that “balance affords an aggrieved party a clai