cognizable claim in Tennessee

2026See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004); Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 .

2012See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004). -3- Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-23-101(c) provides that the trial court “shall, at the time the sentence is imposed . . . render the judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant credit on the sentence for any period of time for which the defendant was committed and held . . . pending arraignment and trial.” Due to this statutory mandate for the trial court to credit a defendant with pretrial jail time, the failure to do so creates an illegal sentence which is a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

2008We note that convicting courts will retain the ability to summarily dismiss petitions when the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief, see Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim.

2008We note that convicting courts will retain the ability to summarily dismiss petitions when the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief, see Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); Cou ry, 2004 WL 2346151 , at *3 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-109), but if it is apparent on the face of the judgment or from the record of the proceedings that the sentence the court previously imposed is illegal (i.e., in direct contravention of an express statutory provision), the convicting court can correct the sentence.

2026Yates v. Parker, 371 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tenn. Crim.

2025Yates v. Parker, 371 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tenn. 2012); Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004).

2013See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 262 ; Tucker, 335 S.W.3d at 123-24 . -4- In the instant case, the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, via order, concluding that the Petitioner “failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief” and that the issue should be addressed through administrative channels or the chancery court.

2012See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 (stating that “the habeas corpus statutes are for the purpose of challenging a void judgment” while “a post-conviction petition may challenge a conviction or sentence that is alleged to be void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an allegation of a due process violation is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief); Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2019In Tucker, this court determined that a claim that the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit was a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief because “[t]he failure of the trial court to credit the petitioner with the credits mandated under Code section 40-23-101(c) contravenes the requirements of that statute and results, therefore, in an illegal sentence, an historically cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.” Tucker, 335 S.W.3d at 123 .

2014Further, while the failure of a trial court to credit a petitioner with mandated pretrial jail credit results in an illegal sentence, making it a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, see Tucker v. Morrow, 335 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim.

2021Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000). -4- Accordingly, we agree with the habeas corpus court that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief.

2012The State responds that the trial court properly dismissed the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim. -2- “The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)).

2018“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)).

2012The State responds that the trial court properly dismissed the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim. -2- “The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)).

2018App. Mar. 14, 2017) (citing Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 163-64 ) (“[T]he Petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to coercion, if proven, would render the challenged judgment voidable rather than void and does not present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.”); Larry L.

2010“A trial court is not required, as a matter of law, to grant the writ or conduct an inquiry into the allegations contained in the petition if the petitioner fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.” Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 21-21-109 ).

2022App. Sept. 9, 2009), no perm. app. filed; see also Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (claims regarding violation of due process and equal protection do not state colorable claims for habeas corpus relief). “[C]onstitutional infirmities create voidable judgments not void judgments unless the face of the record establishes that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence the petitioner.” Wayford Demonbreun, Jr. v. State, No. M2004-03037-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 1541873 , at *2 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 (stating that “the habeas corpus statutes are for the purpose of challenging a void judgment” while “a post-conviction petition may challenge a conviction or sentence that is alleged to be void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an allegation of a due process violation is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief); Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2005In Tennessee, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except [those held under federal authority], may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Church v. State, 987 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tenn. Crim.

2005In Tennessee, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except [those held under federal authority], may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Church v. State, 987 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tenn. Crim.

2024See Gant v. State, 507 S.W.2d 133, 135-136 (Tenn. 1973) (holding that habeas corpus petitions may not be employed to review and question the sufficiency of the evidence introduced at trial); Jackson v. State, No. 03C01-9904-CC-00164, 2000 WL 66090 , at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

2014See Gant v. State, 507 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tenn. 2008) (observing that “habeas corpus relief is not available to remedy non-jurisdictional errors, i.e., factual or legal errors a court makes in the exercise of its jurisdiction”).

2012See Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tenn. 2008) (“Simply stated, habeas corpus relief is not available to correct errors or irregularities in offender classification.”); Jackie F. Curry v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. E2011-00607-CCA-R3-HC, 2011 WL 4600621 , at *4 (Tenn. Crim.

2005Notwithstanding procedural default and waiver, we acknowledge that, although in most instances a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment is not a cognizable claim in a habeas corpus proceeding, see Haggard v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim.

2004Although in most instances a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment is not a cognizable claim in a habeas corpus proceeding, see Haggard v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim.

2014See Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000).

2014See Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000).

2021A writ of error coram nobis lies “for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.” T.C.A. § 40-26-105(b) (2012); State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim.

2013“The decision to grant or deny a petition for the writ of error coram nobis on the ground of subsequently or newly discovered evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim.

2022See Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 451 (concluding that the length of a defendant’s sentence, including the consideration of enhancement and mitigating factors, whether the defendant is sentenced to probation or confinement, and whether the sentences are ordered to be served consecutively or concurrently, is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief).

2012App., at Knoxville, Oct. 6, 2011) (“[A] challenge to a defendant’s offender classification is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief as it would render the judgment, at most, voidable and not void.”); See Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 455 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that a sentence that is the result of an erroneous offender classification is “neither illegal nor void”).

2015Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 868 (Tenn. 2008).

2013The deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel presents a cognizable claim under the Post-Conviction *80 Procedure Act. 9 Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 868 (Tenn.2008).

2012See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 (stating that “the habeas corpus statutes are for the purpose of challenging a void judgment” while “a post-conviction petition may challenge a conviction or sentence that is alleged to be void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an allegation of a due process violation is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief); Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 (stating that “the habeas corpus statutes are for the purpose of challenging a void judgment” while “a post-conviction petition may challenge a conviction or sentence that is alleged to be void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an allegation of a due process violation is not a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief); Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2019The supreme court agreed “that a statute requires trial courts to award pretrial jail credits,” but it nevertheless concluded that this court erred by holding in Tucker “that a trial court’s erroneous failure to comply with this statute renders the sentence illegal.” Id.

2019Following this ruling, in 2013, Tennessee Rule of Criminal -6- Procedure 36.1 was adopted “with its express purpose ‘to provide a mechanism for the defendant or the State to seek to correct an illegal sentence.’” Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 208 - 209 (quoting Tenn. R.

2025See Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630 .

2015Unlike the federal writ of habeas corpus, in Tennessee the writ does not reach “as far as allowed by the Constitution.” Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630 .

2025Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 595 .

2018See Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 595 .

2011See Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2003).

2011Id. at 553 (citing Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 374–75).

2026See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-104 ; Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tenn. 2009) (“[A] court has the discretion to treat a pleading according to the relief sought.”).

2025Appeal Bond The Petitioner asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to his being taken into custody after the trial, which denied the Petitioner “the opportunity to remain free pending post-trial options or appeal, further compounding the harm resulting from ineffective representation.” The State responds that counsel’s alleged failure to request an appeal bond is not a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief because the Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to bail after he was convicted and because an appeal bond does not impact the constit

2019See Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 476 (concluding that CSL is a direct and punitive consequence of a guilty plea and that a trial court has an affirmative duty to inform a defendant of the sentence before accepting a guilty plea); see also State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112 (Tenn. 2011).

2019See Ward, 315 S.W.3d at 476 (concluding that CSL is a direct and punitive consequence of a guilty plea and that a trial court has an affirmative duty to inform a defendant of the sentence before accepting a guilty plea); see also State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112 (Tenn. 2011).