cognizable claim in Illinois

2023A plaintiff must satisfy all four factors, “and if the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim, and thus, fails the first factor, courts of review will often not proceed with further analysis.” Hayes Mechanical, 351 Ill.

2022“The plaintiff must meet all four factors, and ‘if the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim, and thus, fails the first factor, courts of review will often not proceed with further analysis.’ ” Id. at 220 (quoting Hayes Mechanical, Inc. v. First Industrial, L.P., 351 Ill.

2023The circuit court stated that “[w]hile their testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence based on their averments that they would have refused to testify due to fear of incriminating themselves, People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984), it does not satisfy the remaining elements necessary for a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” The circuit court noted their proposed testimony was cumulative because defendant had testified about the facts set forth in his cousins’ affidavits.

2018The circuit court stated that "[w]hile their testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence based on their averments that they would have refused to testify due to fear of incriminating themselves, People v. Molstad , 101 Ill. 2d 128 , 135, 77 Ill.Dec. 775 , 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984), it does not satisfy the remaining elements necessary for a freestanding claim of actual innocence." The circuit court noted their proposed testimony was cumulative because defendant had testified about the facts set forth in his cousins' affidavits.

2015Instead, defendant solely claims that his retained postconviction counsel failed to provide him reasonable assistance with his petition because he failed to contest the State's assertion that the untimely filing of his petition was due to his culpable negligence. ¶ 10 The State, relying on our decision in People v. Csaszar, 2013 IL App (1st) 100467, ¶ 15 , responds that the Act does not require reasonable assistance of privately retained counsel, and thus defendant failed to state a cognizable claim on appeal.

2015Instead, defendant solely claims that his retained postconviction counsel failed to provide him reasonable assistance with his petition because he failed to contest the State’s assertion that the untimely filing of his petition was due to his culpable negligence. ¶ 10 The State, relying on our decision in People v. Csaszar, 2013 IL App (1st) 100467, ¶ 25 , responds that the Act does not require reasonable assistance of privately retained counsel, and thus defendant failed to state a cognizable claim on appeal.

2022App. 3d 211, 220 , 931 N.E.2d 318, 325 (2010) (“ ‘[I]f the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim, and thus, fails the first factor, courts of review will often not proceed with further analysis.’ ”) (quoting Hayes Mechanical, Inc. v. First Industrial, L.P., 351 Ill.

2015Illinois, Inc. v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill.

2020See 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 2016) (motion for a new trial must be filed within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict). ¶ 14 However, since Shellstrom and Pearson, our supreme court has decided People v. Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 106 (2010), in which the circuit court recharacterized a defendant’s untimely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence as a postconviction petition.

2019See 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 2016) (motion for a new trial must be filed within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict). ¶ 14 However, since Shellstrom and Pearson, our supreme court has decided People v. Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 106 (2010), in which the circuit court recharacterized a defendant’s untimely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence as a postconviction petition.

2010People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (1997), but see People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 75 (2002) (the supreme court stated it was required to ensure that capital cases are rationally distinguished from noncapital cases).

2010People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (1997); but see People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 75 (2002) (the supreme court stated it was required to ensure that capital cases are rationally distinguished from noncapital cases).

2023Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87 (1996).

2016Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86-87 . ¶ 37 The language of section 2-615(a) explicitly refers to necessary parties in describing the relief available through motions brought under that section: “The motion shall point out specifically the defects complained of, and shall ask for appropriate relief, such as: that a pleading or portion thereof be stricken because substantially insufficient in law, or that the action be dismissed, or that a pleading be made more definite and certain in a specified particular, or that designated immaterial matter be stricken out, or that necessary parties be added, or th

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 487-89 .

2009People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 , 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (1996).

2019See id. ¶ 41 The City next argues that we should affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claims because they are barred by the Tort Immunity Act. 2 Such immunity is an “affirmative matter” 1 The City also cites a Michigan case, Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005), in support of its argument that medical monitoring is not a cognizable claim for plaintiffs’ injuries.

2019The doctrine, derived from Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 1 The City also cites a Michigan case, Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005), in support of its argument that medical monitoring is not a cognizable claim for plaintiffs’ injuries.

2010People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (1997), but see People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 75 (2002) (the supreme court stated it was required to ensure that capital cases are rationally distinguished from noncapital cases).

2010People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (1997); but see People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 75 (2002) (the supreme court stated it was required to ensure that capital cases are rationally distinguished from noncapital cases).

2000People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 328-29 , 245 Ill.Dec. 1 , 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000) (holding a trial court's failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 when a defendant is taking psychotropic drugs at trial or sentencing does not constitute a violation of due process, and, therefore, is not a cognizable claim in post-conviction proceedings).

2000People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 328-29 (2000) (holding a trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 when a defendant is taking psychotropic drugs at trial or sentencing does not constitute a violation of due process, and, therefore, is not a cognizable claim in post-conviction proceedings).

2026People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 188 (2005).

2025See People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220400, ¶¶ 31-32 (considering whether postplea counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to raise certain arguments during the defendant’s postplea proceedings).

2025See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . ¶ 26 Finally, we consider whether defendant was entitled to file a successive petition raising a claim that the trial court erred in admitting his confession to the police.

2023Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (2003). -6- No. 1-22-0998 ¶ 20 Because the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim, Ellis cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle her to recover.