cognizable claim in Michigan

2020Our Supreme Court explained in Mitchell that an appellate challenge to a judge’s calculation of a sentencing variable “on the basis of his discretionary interpretation of the unchallenged facts . . . does not state a cognizable claim for relief.” Id. at 176 .

2017Accordingly, a challenge “to the judge’s calculation of the sentencing variable on the basis of his discretionary interpretation of the unchallenged facts . . . does not state a cognizable claim for relief,” there being “no juridical basis for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines . . . or misapplication of guideline variables.” Id. at 176-177 .

1991Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).

1991Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).

2021As our Supreme Court observed in Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959): It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.

2021As our Supreme Court observed in Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959): It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.

2017It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 105-106 ; 97 S Ct 285 ; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976).] The elements of medical malpractice and § 1983 deliberate indifference do not correspond.

2017It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 105-106 ; 97 S Ct 285 ; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976).] The elements of medical malpractice and § 1983 deliberate indifference do not correspond.

2026Rather, “[u]nder the language of the statute, it appears that the only cognizable defense to a double-damages claim is if the failure to pay the commission were based on inadvertence or oversight.” In re Certified Question, 468 Mich at 118 .

2025Id.

2022Plaintiffs, for their part, asserted that they had indeed pleaded a cognizable claim for “associational” or “third-party” retaliation, pointing to the decision in Thompson v North American Stainless, LP, 562 US 170, 173-174 ; 131 S Ct 863 ; 178 L Ed 2d 694 (2011), in which the Supreme Court upheld a third-party retaliation claim under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e et seq.

2022Plaintiffs, for their part, asserted that they had indeed pleaded a cognizable claim for “associational” or “third-party” retaliation, pointing to the decision in Thompson v North American Stainless, LP, 562 US 170, 173-174 ; 131 S Ct 863 ; 178 L Ed 2d 694 (2011), in which the Supreme Court upheld a third-party retaliation claim under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e et seq.

2021ANALYSIS “[W]here . . . a cognizable claim is raised that counsel did not investigate potentially meritorious defenses to the charges, and . . . a substantial possibility appears on the record that potential defenses suggested by defendant were not considered, . . . a full evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel allegation must be conducted.” People v Kimble, 109 Mich App 659, 663 ; 311 NW2d 446 (1981).

2021ANALYSIS “[W]here . . . a cognizable claim is raised that counsel did not investigate potentially meritorious defenses to the charges, and . . . a substantial possibility appears on the record that potential defenses suggested by defendant were not considered, . . . a full evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel allegation must be conducted.” People v Kimble, 109 Mich App 659, 663 ; 311 NW2d 446 (1981).

2020Nevertheless, “[i]n both law and equity, however, there must be a cognizable claim of a substantive interest invaded or threatened.” Adkins, 440 Mich at 315 .

2018See Precopio v City of Detroit Dep’t of Transp, 415 Mich 457 , 466-467 & nn 13-14; 330 NW2d 802 (1982); Mazur v Blendea, 409 Mich 858 (1980); Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 49 ; 243 NW2d 244 (1976).

2018See Precopio v City of Detroit Dep’t of Transp, 415 Mich 457 , 466-467 & nn 13-14; 330 NW2d 802 (1982); Mazur v Blendea, 409 Mich 858 (1980); Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 49 ; 243 NW2d 244 (1976).

2013For purposes of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), this Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and construes them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2009See Otto Baedeker & Associates, Inc v Hamtramck State Bank, 257 Mich 435 ; 241 NW 249 (1932); Int’l Transportation Ass’n v Bylenga, 254 Mich 236 ; 236 NW 771 (1931); Collier v Stebbins, 236 Mich 147 ; 210 NW 264 (1926); Gardner v Johnson, 236 Mich 258 , 210 NW 295 (1926).

2001People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463, n 9 ; 619 NW2d 538 (2000); People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329 ; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). m.

2001People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463, n 9 ; 619 NW2d 538 (2000); People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329 ; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). m.

2001Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich App 110 ; 512 NW2d 13 (1993).

2001Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich App 110 ; 512 NW2d 13 (1993).

1999Accordingly, we hold that a cognizable claim for the mutilation of a dead body is not sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for its decomposition, which does not involve the active incision, dismemberment, or evisceration of the body, because “any exceptions *730 to [the] grant of immunity are [to be] narrowly construed.” Vargo v Sauer, 215 Mich App 389, 395-396 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996), rev’d on other grounds 457 Mich 49 ; 576 NW2d 656 (1998).

1999Accordingly, we hold that a cognizable claim for the mutilation of a dead body is not sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for its decomposition, which does not involve the active incision, dismemberment, or evisceration of the body, because “any exceptions *730 to [the] grant of immunity are [to be] narrowly construed.” Vargo v Sauer, 215 Mich App 389, 395-396 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996), rev’d on other grounds 457 Mich 49 ; 576 NW2d 656 (1998).

1999Accordingly, we hold that a cognizable claim for the mutilation of a dead body is not sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for its decomposition, which does not involve the active incision, dismemberment, or evisceration of the body, because “any exceptions *730 to [the] grant of immunity are [to be] narrowly construed.” Vargo v Sauer, 215 Mich App 389, 395-396 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996), rev’d on other grounds 457 Mich 49 ; 576 NW2d 656 (1998).

1999Accordingly, we hold that a cognizable claim for the mutilation of a dead body is not sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for its decomposition, which does not involve the active incision, dismemberment, or evisceration of the body, because “any exceptions *730 to [the] grant of immunity are [to be] narrowly construed.” Vargo v Sauer, 215 Mich App 389, 395-396 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996), rev’d on other grounds 457 Mich 49 ; 576 NW2d 656 (1998).

1997Jones, supra, p. 568 , 476 N.W.2d 473 . *310 To the extent that plaintiff's claim was also premised on the theory that defendant was negligent in testifying at plaintiff's preliminary examination, summary disposition was also proper.

1997Jones, supra, p 568 .

1996In Proffitt v Bartolo, 162 Mich App 35, 40-41 ; 412 NW2d 232 (1987), this Court again held that wrongful birth is a cognizable claim in Michigan: The term “wrongful birth” is a shorthand name given to actions brought by the parents of a child bom with severe defects against a physician (or other responsible party) who negligently fails to inform them in a timely fashion of the risk that the mother will give birth to such a child, effectively precluding an informed decision as to whether the pregnancy should be avoided or terminated.

1996In Proffitt v Bartolo, 162 Mich App 35, 40-41 ; 412 NW2d 232 (1987), this Court again held that wrongful birth is a cognizable claim in Michigan: The term “wrongful birth” is a shorthand name given to actions brought by the parents of a child bom with severe defects against a physician (or other responsible party) who negligently fails to inform them in a timely fashion of the risk that the mother will give birth to such a child, effectively precluding an informed decision as to whether the pregnancy should be avoided or terminated.

1995And, if discrimination based on marital status were a cognizable claim in connection with educational institutions, here there would be no violation for the reasons enunciated in Miller, supra. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 1 For purposes of our decision we assume defendants denied Fonseca admission to the program.

1990Therefore, if the trial court granted defendant’s motion for resentencing in the absence of a cognizable error affecting the first sentence, it clearly exceeded its authority and thereby infringed on the Governor’s exclusive power of commutation and pardon, Const 1963, art 5, § 14; People v Fox, 312 Mich 577 ; 20 NW2d 732 (1945), and this Court would then have superintending control jurisdiction.

1990Therefore, if the trial court granted defendant’s motion for resentencing in the absence of a cognizable error affecting the first sentence, it clearly exceeded its authority and thereby infringed on the Governor’s exclusive power of commutation and pardon, Const 1963, art 5, § 14; People v Fox, 312 Mich 577 ; 20 NW2d 732 (1945), and this Court would then have superintending control jurisdiction.

1990In re People v Burton (Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge), 429 Mich 133 ; 413 NW2d 413 (1987).

1990In re People v Burton (Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge), 429 Mich 133 ; 413 NW2d 413 (1987).

1988Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 323-324 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), cert den sub nom E R Squibb & Sons, Inc v Abel, 469 US 833 (1984). *545 The elements necessary to set forth a cognizable claim for negligence are (1) duty, (2) general standard of care, (3) specific standard of care, (4) cause in fact, (5) legal or proximate cause, and (6) damages.

1988Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 323-324 ; 343 NW2d 164 (1984), cert den sub nom E R Squibb & Sons, Inc v Abel, 469 US 833 (1984). *545 The elements necessary to set forth a cognizable claim for negligence are (1) duty, (2) general standard of care, (3) specific standard of care, (4) cause in fact, (5) legal or proximate cause, and (6) damages.