cognizable claim in Massachusetts

2007To establish a cognizable claim under the MCRA, Kilgallon must prove: (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 504 (2006), quoting Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989).

2007Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 504 (2006), quoting Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989).

2007To establish a cognizable claim under the MCRA, Kilgallon must prove: (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 504 (2006), quoting Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989).

2007Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 504 (2006), quoting Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989).

2005Contrast Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp., supra at 631-632, quoting Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., supra at 137-138 (“While no longer considering attendant physical harm as a necessary condition of a cognizable claim for the negligent infliction of emotional injuries, we still require ‘objective corroboration of the emotional distress alleged’ ”).

2000“While no longer considering the attendant physical harm as a necessary condition of a cognizable claim for the negligent infliction of emotional injuries, we still require(d) objective corroboration of the emotional distress alleged.” Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp., 426 Mass. 629, 631-32 (1998).

2001Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1976) (citations omitted). “[Liability cannot be predicated on ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,’ nor even is it enough ‘that the defendant acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress,’...” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1987).

1998In order to state a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Brown must allege that (1) McLaughlin “intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct”; (2) McLaughlin’s “conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) McLaughlin’s “actions . . . were the cause of [Brown’s] distress”; and (4) “the emotional distress [she] sustained . . . was severe and of a nature that no reasonable [person] coul

1999Further a motion to dismiss a complaint on such grounds should not be allowed unless it appears certain that the complaining party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 550 (1994); Harhen v. Brown, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 793 (1999).

1999Further, a motion to dismiss a complaint on such grounds should not be allowed unless it appears certain that the complaining party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” (Emphasis added.) Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 550 (1994), quoting from Logotheti v. Gordon, 414 Mass. 308, 310-311 (1993).

2025The bare assertions of grievances also fail to provide "fair notice of the claim" to the defendant, Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 665 (2008), and fail to state a cognizable claim for "a violation of a legal right which belongs 4 to the plaintiff." Donnelly v. Suffolk Univ., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 788 (1975), cert. denied, 425 Mass. 955 (1976).

2025The bare assertions of grievances also fail to provide "fair notice of the claim" to the defendant, Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 665 (2008), and fail to state a cognizable claim for "a violation of a legal right which belongs 4 to the plaintiff." Donnelly v. Suffolk Univ., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 788 (1975), cert. denied, 425 Mass. 955 (1976).

2024The relevant question is whether the evidence would permit the trier of fact to find guilt, "not whether the evidence requires such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).

2024The defendant also appears to challenge the judge's denial of his motions for a required finding of not guilty.3 "When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, 'we consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational 3 To the extent that the defendant instead challenges the nature of the prosecutor's argument in opposition to his motion, that is not a cognizable claim for relief on appeal. 10 trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonw

2017See Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 558 (1988) (‘“subsequent misuse of the process . . . constitutes the misconduct for which liability is imposed” [citation omitted]).

2017Although a party’s invocation of process alone may give rise to a colorable abuse of process claim in certain circumstances, see, e.g., Carroll v. Gillespie, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 26 (1982) (upholding abuse of process claim where automobile repair shop owner filed criminal complaint against customer to pressure her to pay repair bill), a cognizable claim can also involve a subsequent misuse of such process by the offending party that is not itself petitioning activity.

2016G.L.c. 93A, §2 (declaring unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce'') (emphasis added). “[T]o survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must show that the defendant had a commercial relationship with the plaintiffs or that defendant’s actions interfered with ‘trade or commerce.’ ” First Enterprises Ltd. v. Cooper, 425 Mass. 344, 347 (1997).

2013While Title VII does not cover employment discrimination based on handicap, Federal courts have long construed its provisions prohibiting employment discrimination based on race to cover an adverse employment action taken against an employee because of his or her association with someone of a different race against whom the discriminatory animus is directed — even though there is no mention in the statute of discrimination based on association, and even though, like § 4 (16), the statutory language on its face appears to focus only on discrimination “because of” the employee’s own protected ch

2013While Title VII does not cover employment discrimination based on handicap, Federal courts have long construed its provisions prohibiting employment discrimination based on race to cover an adverse employment action taken against an employee because of his or her association with someone of a different race against whom the discriminatory animus is directed — even though there is no mention in the statute of discrimination based on association, and even though, like § 4 (16), the statutory language on its face appears to focus only on discrimination “because of” the employee’s own protected ch

2013While Title VII does not cover employment discrimination based on handicap, Federal courts have long construed its provisions prohibiting employment discrimination based on race to cover an adverse employment action taken against an employee because of his or her association with someone of a different race against whom the discriminatory animus is directed — even though there is no mention in the statute of discrimination based on association, and even though, like § 4 (16), the statutory language on its face appears to focus only on discrimination “because of” the employee’s own protected ch

2013See also Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138-139 (2d Cir. 2008) (employee claiming he was fired because of interracial marriage stated claim of discrimination based on race under Title VII); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins.

2012Upon entry of a default under Mass.R.Civ.P. 55, “the factual allegations of a complaint are accepted as true and recovery may be granted where those facts are sufficient to establish a cognizable claim.” Adoption of Hanna, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 545 (1992).

2009Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).

2007White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 442 Mass. 64, 66 (2004).

2005In addition, we have explicitly stated that “[a] successful negligent infliction of emotional distress claim . . . must do more than allege ‘mere upset, dismay, humiliation, grief and anger.’ ” Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., supra at 137, quoting Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 653 (1979). a.

2002See Marbury v. Madison, supra. In this case, however, one plaintiff, Tolman, has demonstrated a cognizable claim under the clean elections law.

2001See Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 197-198 (D.

2001Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1976) (citations omitted). “[Liability cannot be predicated on ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,’ nor even is it enough ‘that the defendant acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress,’...” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1987).

2001Massachusetts recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination of an at-will employee only where the facts show violation of a clearly established public policy, such as where the employee is terminated for “asserting a legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing workers’ compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to do what the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury).” Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter F. Fernald State School, 404 Mass. 145, 150 (1989); see Hobson v. McClean Hosp.

2001Mkts, Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 388 (1975). 1 In light of that standard, the question presented by the motion is whether the facts alleged give rise to a cognizable claim.

2000Co.,, 379 Mass. 212, 213-214, 219-220 (1979) (employer, aware that decedent had terminal cancer and was therefore unable to continue working for employer, threatened that if decedent filed for his physical disability benefits he would not be allowed to return to his job when he regained his health); Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 213-214, 218-219 (1998) (a legal secretary, compelled and manipulated to notarize a forged document prepared by the attorney for whom she worked, on threats that he would commit suicide if she did not, suffered anxiety attacks; a cognizable

2000See also Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 95-98 (1982) (judgment properly entered on evidence that plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant landlord’s failure to address repeated flooding, with water and sewage, of her basement apartment); Bresnahan v. McAuliffe, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 283 (1999) (on summary judgment, plaintiff’s submissions “showed a reasonable expectation of proving that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous,” where defendant funeral home, inter alia, gave erroneous information that an important religious ceremony could not be conducted

2000See also Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 95-98 (1982) (judgment properly entered on evidence that plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant landlord’s failure to address repeated flooding, with water and sewage, of her basement apartment); Bresnahan v. McAuliffe, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 283 (1999) (on summary judgment, plaintiff’s submissions “showed a reasonable expectation of proving that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous,” where defendant funeral home, inter alia, gave erroneous information that an important religious ceremony could not be conducted