lack instruction in Tennessee

2018The Defendant has not established that the State’s comment breached a “clear and - 26 - unequivocal rule of law[.]” See Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 640–41.

2015Further, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-129, regarding stipulations, also permits the trial court to “upon stipulation to or proof of any ground of divorce . . . grant a divorce to the party who was less at fault or, if either or both parties are entitled to a divorce or if a divorce is to be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences declare the parties to be divorced, rather than awarding a divorce to either party alone.” (Emphasis added.) Our case of Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49 S.W.3d 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), supports the plain reading of the statutes as it pertains to t

2011The Petitioner’s co- defendants raised additional issues regarding: (1) denial of a motion to suppress; (2) violations of the proper use of peremptory challenges pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (3) election of offenses related to co-defendant Bryant’s handgun possession charge; (4) rehabilitation of two State’s witnesses using an uncertified transcript of the preliminary hearing; (5) a police officer’s statement of opinion about the guilt of co- -4- defendant Bryant; (6) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (7) the amount of time afforded trial counsel for co-d

2010He said that his concern was not with Agent Fite’s qualifications as an expert witness but with the lack of a hearing on the admissibility of his testimony given the methodology employed, under the legal principles of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as they existed at the time of the first trial.

2010He said that his concern was not with Agent Fite’s qualifications as an expert witness but with the lack of a hearing on the admissibility of his testimony given the methodology employed, under the legal principles of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as they existed at the time of the first trial.

1996Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution’s case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me.1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissible; Hill v. State, 366 So.2d 318 (Ala.1979).

1996Regarding the testimonial nature of refusal evidence, the Court stated: The distinction between real or physical evidence and testimonial or communicative evidence is not easily made in every case. *475 Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution's case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me. 1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissibl

1996Although the language at the end of Section I in Kirby, 892 S.W.2d at 406 , appears to imply that we found that the lack of standard metal guardrails did not make the bridge defective because the decision to install guardrails is a discretionary function, that was not our intent.

1996Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution’s case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me.1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissible; Hill v. State, 366 So.2d 318 (Ala.1979).

1996Regarding the testimonial nature of refusal evidence, the Court stated: The distinction between real or physical evidence and testimonial or communicative evidence is not easily made in every case. *475 Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution's case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me. 1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissibl

1996Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution’s case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me.1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissible; Hill v. State, 366 So.2d 318 (Ala.1979).

1996Regarding the testimonial nature of refusal evidence, the Court stated: The distinction between real or physical evidence and testimonial or communicative evidence is not easily made in every case. *475 Courts which have concluded that refusal evidence was not testimonial have done so by justifying its relevance on an issue not essential to the prosecution's case, see State v. Pineau, 491 A.2d 1165 (Me. 1985); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983), to explain the lack of test result evidence, or by concluding that the refusal evidence may be introduced because test results are admissibl

1987Furthermore, Justice Dudley of that Court in his dissent in that case expressed similar reservations concerning the judicial use of indefinite sentiments of public policy to justify the results in these cases, stating that “[f]or some time I have been disquieted by the lack of a standard by which we determine when to apply public policy and the lack of a meaningful definition by which we discover what constitutes public policy.” 628 S.W.2d at 572 .

1984In Rule v. Empire Gas Corporation, 563 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn.1978), Justice Brock left little room for doubt as to the effect of allegedly incomplete instructions of the trial court to the jury in the absence of the special request therefore: We hold that Rule 51 .02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure has not abolished or altered the rule announced in the Provence and Holmes cases, supra, that in order to predicate error upon an alleged omission in the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge he must have pointed out such omission to the trial judge at trial by an appropriate reques