230 California opinions name it 3 courts 1943–2026 73 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc.green2 sentences2022Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 .) “Whether a party waived the right to contractual arbitration is a factual question we review under the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citations.] The trial courts ‘determination of this factual issue, “ ‘if 6 supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court.’ ” [Citations.] Only “ ‘in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] [¶] We infer all necessary findin 2022(Lewis, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 [“It is not enough the trial court potentially could have reached a different conclusion; 12 rather, we may reverse the trial court’s waiver finding only if the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law.”].) DISPOSITION The order denying the petition to compel arbitration is affirmed. | 4 | 7 |
Adolph v. COASTAL AUTO SALES, INC.green2 sentences2021A trial court’s determination of waiver, “ ‘ “if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court’ ” ” and “[o]nly ‘ “in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court.” ’ ” (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 ; see Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 205, 211 [reversal of waiver finding appropriate where “the record as a matter of law compels finding nonwaiver”].) Even assuming, without de 2016Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; Augusta v. Keehn & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 (Augusta).) We construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolve ambiguities to favor the judgment and must affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the trial court’s determination. 8 (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Lewis); Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 .) “Only ‘“in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate cou | 4 | 5 |
Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Higway & Transportation Districtgreen2 sentences2003Waiver of a contractual *744 right to arbitration is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the trial court; however, where the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, this court may reverse a finding of waiver. ( Doers, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 185 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 837 , 588 P.2d 1261 .) It is an abuse of the trial court's discretion not to stay proceedings and order arbitration unless the record establishes waiver as a matter of law. ( Nathan v. French American Bilingual School (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 605 .) It is Saint Agnes who has the burden of est 2003Waiver of a contractual *744 right to arbitration is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the trial court; however, where the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, this court may reverse a finding of waiver. ( Doers, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 185 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 837 , 588 P.2d 1261 .) It is an abuse of the trial court's discretion not to stay proceedings and order arbitration unless the record establishes waiver as a matter of law. ( Nathan v. French American Bilingual School (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 605 .) It is Saint Agnes who has the burden of est | 3 | 7 |
Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences2021A trial court’s determination of waiver, “ ‘ “if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court’ ” ” and “[o]nly ‘ “in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court.” ’ ” (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 ; see Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 205, 211 [reversal of waiver finding appropriate where “the record as a matter of law compels finding nonwaiver”].) Even assuming, without de 2015(Augusta v. Keene & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 ; Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 (Burton).) The trial court's "determination of this factual issue, ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' " (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamor | 3 | 4 |
Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2024(Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 131 (Save Our Peninsula Committee) [errata not “subjected to the same ‘ “critical evaluation that occurs in the draft stage” ’ ”].) Otherwise, the public would be denied the “ ‘ opportunity to test, assess, and evaluate the [newly revealed information] and make an informed judgment as to the validity of 7 We note that disclosures in the County’s initial study — which promises “[p]otential impacts related to wildfire will be addressed in the Wildfire section of the EIR” — does not suffice. 2024(See Guidelines, § 15370, subd. (d).) We are not persuaded that making it a project objective to be a “ ‘ “model project” of wildfire mitigation’ ” converts such measures into project design features. 16 project’s environmental impacts and analysis of potential mitigation measures.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 185 (Mission Bay); cf. Save Our Peninsula Committee, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 130 [finding information regarding mitigation measure disclosed in errata “does not make up for the lack of analysis in the EIR”].) It | 3 | 3 |
Berman v. Health Netgreen2 sentences2015(Augusta v. Keene & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 ; Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 (Burton).) The trial court's "determination of this factual issue, ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' " (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamor 2013(See Augusta, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 946 .) The superior court's "determination of [waiver], ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' [Citation.]" (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamora).) We imply all necessary | 3 | 3 |
Zamora v. Lehmangreen2 sentences2015(Augusta v. Keene & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 ; Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 (Burton).) The trial court's "determination of this factual issue, ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' " (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamor 2013(See Augusta, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 946 .) The superior court's "determination of [waiver], ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' [Citation.]" (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamora).) We imply all necessary | 3 | 3 |
Hoover v. American Income Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2014(See Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 449-453.) “It is not enough that the trial court potentially could have reached a different conclusion; rather, we may reverse the trial court’s waiver finding only if the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law.” (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 , italics added; Hoover, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 [same].) Further, as explained in St. 2014(See Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 449-453.) “It is not enough that the trial court potentially could have reached a different conclusion; rather, we may reverse the trial court’s waiver finding only if the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law.” (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 , italics added; Hoover, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 [same].) Further, as explained in St. | 3 | 3 |
Baldridge v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences1955As was said in Maus v. Scavenger Protective Assn., 2 Cal.App.2d 624, 629 [ 39 P.2d 209 ]: “. . . the instruction was correct so far as it went; and if it failed to state a proper qualification or limitation it was the defendant’s duty to request a more specific instruction.” In Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 478 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], the rule was stated as follows: “Ordinarily, before an appellant may complain of the lack of an instruction, he must have made a request that the charge be made more specific, or ask for qualifying instructions.” The same rule was stated in Baldridge v. Cunningham, 1955As was said in Maus v. Scavenger Protective Assn., 2 Cal.App.2d 624, 629 [ 39 P.2d 209 ]: “. . . the instruction was correct so far as it went; and if it failed to state a proper qualification or limitation it was the defendant’s duty to request a more specific instruction.” In Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 478 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], the rule was stated as follows: “Ordinarily, before an appellant may complain of the lack of an instruction, he must have made a request that the charge be made more specific, or ask for qualifying instructions.” The same rule was stated in Baldridge v. Cunningham, | 3 | 3 |
Ornales v. Wiggergreen2 sentences1961For this proposition defendant relies on Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], which announces the general rule that before the appellant may complain of the lack of an instruction he must have made some request in the matter. 1961For this proposition defendant relies on Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474 [ 218 P.2d 531 ], which announces the general rule that before the appellant may complain of the lack of an instruction he must have made some request in the matter. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Brevermangreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136 [defendant has no “unilateral entitlement to instructions on lesser offenses which are not necessarily included in the charge”].) “ ‘Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, fn. 5 .) “ ‘An attempt to commi 2023(See People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136 [defendant has no “unilateral entitlement to instructions on lesser offenses which are not necessarily included in the charge”].) “ ‘Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, fn. 5 .) “ ‘An attempt to commi | 2 | 4 |
Augusta v. Keehn & Associatesgreen2 sentences2016Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; Augusta v. Keehn & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 (Augusta).) We construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolve ambiguities to favor the judgment and must affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the trial court’s determination. 8 (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Lewis); Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 .) “Only ‘“in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate cou 2015(Augusta v. Keene & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 ; Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 (Burton).) The trial court's "determination of this factual issue, ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' " (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamor | 2 | 4 |
Rosario E. Sobremonte v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences2015(Augusta v. Keene & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 ; Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 (Burton).) The trial court's "determination of this factual issue, ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' " (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamor 2013(See Augusta, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 337 ; Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 946 .) The superior court's "determination of [waiver], ' "if supported by substantial evidence, is binding on an appellate court." ' [Citations.] Only ' "in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate court . . . reverse a finding of waiver made by the trial court." ' [Citation.]" (Adolph v. Coastal Auto Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450 (Adolph); Zamora v. Lehman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 (Zamora).) We imply all necessary | 2 | 3 |
In Re Dakota S.green2 sentences2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i 2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i | 2 | 2 |
In Re Aaron B.green2 sentences2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i 2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i | 2 | 2 |
In Re Crystal J.green2 sentences2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i 2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i | 2 | 2 |
In Re Lorenzo C.green2 sentences2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i 2024(See In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [failure to object to inadequacy of adoption assessment]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to lack of preliminary assessment of prospective guardian]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to object to lack of bonding study].) Finally, we note that father fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the lack of analysis in the reports, since he appears to concede that the relevant i | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Birksgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Cleveland Nat'l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass'n of Governmentsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Murtishawgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Honiggreen | 2 | 2 |
| Keating v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Prietogreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Crittendengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Posey v. State of Californiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Kruckow v. Lessergreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hughesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re Browngreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Riberogreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Kempgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Maus v. Scavenger Protective Assn.green | 2 | 2 |
Burton v. Cruisegreen2 sentences2016Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; Augusta v. Keehn & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 (Augusta).) We construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolve ambiguities to favor the judgment and must affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the trial court’s determination. 8 (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Lewis); Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 .) “Only ‘“in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate cou 2016Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; Augusta v. Keehn & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 (Augusta).) We construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolve ambiguities to favor the judgment and must affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the trial court’s determination. 8 (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Lewis); Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 .) “Only ‘“in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate cou | 1 | 5 |
People v. Whisenhuntgreen2 sentences2022The California Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 213 , holding: “An accessory instruction was not essential to defendant’s defense. 2010(People v. McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 875 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 , 209 P.3d 596 ]; see also People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275 [constitutionality of death penalty law not undercut by reasoning of Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584 ].) There is no constitutional requirement that a trial court instruct the jury on the “ ‘presumption of life.’ ” (People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 228.) The lack of a requirement that the jury make a written statement of its findings and its reasons for the death verdict does not deprive a | 1 | 3 |
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2026However, “[t]he record does not reflect what evidence might have been presented” as a result of further investigation or efforts to retain an expert, so we are “unable to infer anything about its existence, probative force, or the probable consequences at trial, had such evidence been presented.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1033 .) As to the lack of a defense expert, counsel could have “rationally conclude[d] that it would be counterproductive” to “highlight[]” the People’s expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) by presenting more testimony ab 2004We conclude, nonetheless, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on second degree murder because "`[s]peculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense.'" ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 620 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 ; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941 , 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 , 838 P.2d 1212 ( Wilson ).) "[T]he existence of ` any evidence, no matter how weak' will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense...." ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2025(Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) “[I]nstructional error is harmless ‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Mil, at p. 417.) 21 We conclude the lack of instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2025(Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) “[I]nstructional error is harmless ‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Mil, at p. 417.) 21 We conclude the lack of instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 6 | 1984–2025 |
Saint Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California
green
2 sentences2020Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 .) Reversal is not justified simply because the trial court could have potentially reached a different conclusion on the question of waiver; “rather, we may reverse the trial court’s waiver finding only if the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law.” (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 .) Where the relevant facts are undisputed and only one inference may reasonably be drawn from the facts, the waiver issue may be reviewed de novo. 2016Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; Augusta v. Keehn & Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 337 (Augusta).) We construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolve ambiguities to favor the judgment and must affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the trial court’s determination. 8 (Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Lewis); Burton, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 .) “Only ‘“in cases where the record before the trial court establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law, [may] the appellate cou | 5 | 2014–2020 |
People v. Burnett
green
2 sentences2021The error in Appellant’s reasoning is that he is focusing on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial (which was different), rather than on the offense alleged in the information, shown at the preliminary hearing, and proven at trial (all of which was the same, i.e., a violation of § 166(c)(1)(B)). 17 For this reason, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to the lack of an instruction regarding Appellant’s tracking of Gloria’s cellphone. 28 Appellant’s reliance on People v. Burnett (1999) 71 2021The error in Appellant’s reasoning is that he is focusing on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial (which was different), rather than on the offense alleged in the information, shown at the preliminary hearing, and proven at trial (all of which was the same, i.e., a violation of § 166(c)(1)(B)). 17 For this reason, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to the lack of an instruction regarding Appellant’s tracking of Gloria’s cellphone. 28 Appellant’s reliance on People v. Burnett (1999) 71 | 4 | 2021–2021 |
Denham v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2021While the lack of analysis alone would be sufficient to deem the issue waived and uphold the trial court’s ruling (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971 ), McCloskey is also wrong on the merits. 2021While the lack of analysis alone would be sufficient to deem the issue waived and uphold the trial court’s ruling (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971 ), McCloskey is also wrong on the merits. | 3 | 2016–2021 |
People v. Carreon
green
2 sentences1985In People v. Carreon (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 559 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] this court recognized reversible error only when the defendant can show he suffered prejudice from the lack of defense interpreter services. 1985In People v. Carreon (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 559 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] this court recognized reversible error only when the defendant can show he suffered prejudice from the lack of defense interpreter services. | 3 | 1984–1985 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025Sam has failed to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 .) Defense counsel’s main theory of the case was that Sam was guilty of voluntary manslaughter and not guilty of first or second degree murder. 2014This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 .) Whether we examine the failure to give an instruction on accident on its merits or under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, Arbuckle must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the lack of such an instruction. | 2 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Cook
green
2 sentences2025“Because the jury resolved the factual finding requisite to involuntary manslaughter against [them], [they] cannot have been prejudiced by the lack of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter . . . .” (Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 597 ; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 884 [when jury was instructed on lesser included offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and found defendant guilty of first degree murder, “there [was] no reasonable probability that, had the jury been instructed on involuntary manslaughter, it would have chosen that option”]; People v. Gutierr 2016Because the jury resolved the factual finding requisite to involuntary manslaughter against [appellant], he cannot have been prejudiced by the lack of an instruction on involuntary manslaughter instruction [sic]. [Citation.]" (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597 .) IV. | 2 | 2016–2025 |
| People v. Allen green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2023(See Sullivan, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 719–721.) While the discussion in Sullivan did focus on the lack of immunity for false imprisonment, we ultimately enunciated what we described as a “narrow interpretation of section 821.6’s immunity, confining its reach to malicious prosecution actions.” (Id. at p. 721.) We explained that narrow interpretation was consistent with the statute’s language and history. 2021The Court did recognize that false imprisonment is identified in a different section (Government Code §820.4) as one for which public employees can be liable.3 But it did so by explaining that its “narrow interpretation of section 821.6 immunity, confining its reach to malicious prosecution actions, finds corroboration in another governmental immunity provision, [Government Code] section 820.4.” (Sullivan, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 2 (See, e.g., Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 283 [applying section 821.6 to afford absolute immunity as to a claim of negligence during an inve | 2 | 2021–2023 |
| King v. Hinderstein green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
green
2 sentences2023(See Semtek, supra, at pp. 505-506 .) We perceive of no reason that the high court’s conclusion regarding the lack of claim-preclusive effect under Rule 41(b) would not apply equally to a second voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a). 2023(See Semtek, supra, at pp. 505-506 .) We perceive of no reason that the high court’s conclusion regarding the lack of claim-preclusive effect under Rule 41(b) would not apply equally to a second voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Van Ngo green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Saunders green | 2 | 2021–2022 |
| Manduley v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2021–2022 |
| People v. Rundle green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Harris green | 2 | 2021–2022 |
| Fundamental Investment Growth Shelter Realty Fund v. Gradow green | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Ibrahim green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| Fierro v. International Harvester Co. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Heishman green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Watson green | 2 | 2013–2014 |
| People v. White green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Blakely green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Osuna green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Fiu green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Jenkins green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Stocker Resources, Inc. v. Assessment Appeals Board green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Seidman & Seidman v. Wolfson green | 2 | 1979–1986 |
| People v. Reeves green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Strawder green | 2 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Ramos green | 2 | 1977–1977 |
| United States v. Watson green | 2 | 1977–1977 |
| Kuehn v. Lowthian green | 2 | 1955–1955 |
| O'Connor v. United R.R. of S.F. green | 2 | 1955–1955 |
| People v. Lucas green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.