lack requirement in Maryland

2025Two key factors in the Court’s analysis included the lack of instruction from the court about what the parties needed to do to resume the court proceedings, coupled with no “clear procedural mechanism through which” the party could bring their claim before the administrative agency, id. at 50 , and the potentially “indefinite and protracted” administrative proceedings the parties would have to endure before they could resume court proceedings.

2025Id. at 53 .

2025Unlike in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 , where the trial court forced the defendant to accept a public defender against his will, and in Snead, 286 Md. at 131 , 406 A.2d at 103 , where it was not clear given the lack of inquiry whether it was appropriate for the trial court to deny the defendant’s request to proceed self-represented and to have him be represented by counsel, 15 Mr. Goodrich also contends that, with this remark, the administrative judge demonstrated that he was either “unaware of the dictates of Faretta or simply made no effort to apply them.” - 34 - the circuit court did not fo

2025Unlike in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 , where the trial court forced the defendant to accept a public defender against his will, and in Snead, 286 Md. at 131 , 406 A.2d at 103 , where it was not clear given the lack of inquiry whether it was appropriate for the trial court to deny the defendant’s request to proceed self-represented and to have him be represented by counsel, 15 Mr. Goodrich also contends that, with this remark, the administrative judge demonstrated that he was either “unaware of the dictates of Faretta or simply made no effort to apply them.” - 34 - the circuit court did not fo

2025Unlike in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 , where the trial court forced the defendant to accept a public defender against his will, and in Snead, 286 Md. at 131 , 406 A.2d at 103 , where it was not clear given the lack of inquiry whether it was appropriate for the trial court to deny the defendant’s request to proceed self-represented and to have him be represented by counsel, 15 Mr. Goodrich also contends that, with this remark, the administrative judge demonstrated that he was either “unaware of the dictates of Faretta or simply made no effort to apply them.” - 34 - the circuit court did not fo

2018Id. at 467 , 164 A.3d at 366 .

2018Id. at 467 , 164 A.3d at 366 .

2011Snyder, 361 Md. at 596 , 762 A.2d at 134 .

2011Snyder, 361 Md. at 596 , 762 A.2d at 134 .

2008In State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1067 , the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was called upon to decide whether the trial judge had provided the jury with an incorrect jury instruction.

2008In State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1067 , the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was called upon to decide whether the trial judge had provided the jury with an incorrect jury instruction.

2007It was the candidate's complete lack of bar membership that led the court to conclude that the candidate "[did] not meet the constitutional requirement to seek or hold the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme of Georgia,” id., and that is a far ciy from defining what it means to practice law when someone is actually a member of the bar of a particular state.

2007It was the candidate's complete lack of bar membership that led the court to conclude that the candidate "[did] not meet the constitutional requirement to seek or hold the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme of Georgia," id., and that is a far cry from defining what it means to practice law when someone is actually a member of the bar of a particular state.

2005See, e.g., State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 367 , 400 S.E.2d 611, 612-13 (1990) (jury not even told what crimes for which defendant was tried); Gardner v. State, 185 Ga.App. 184 , 363 S.E.2d 843 (1987).

2005See, e.g., State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 367 , 400 S.E.2d 611, 612-13 (1990) (jury not even told what crimes for which defendant was tried); Gardner v. State, 185 Ga.App. 184 , 363 S.E.2d 843 (1987).

1993Because the purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendants, retroactive application of Zenobia best serves this purpose. 325 Md. at 471 , 601 A.2d 633 .

1993Because the purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendants, retroactive application of Zenobia best serves this purpose. 325 Md. at 471 , 601 A.2d 633 .

1987This is so because the offense of statutory breaking and entering lacks the proof of any conduct that “could lead a rational person reasonably to conclude that one who would commit such a crime would be less likely to speak the truth than one who would not commit such a crime,” Burrell v. State, 42 Md.App. at 140 , 399 A.2d 1354 , and the lack of a requirement of any particular mens rea makes it impossible to say that one’s conduct in committing that crime renders his credibility suspect.

1987This is so because the offense of statutory breaking and entering lacks the proof of any conduct that “could lead a rational person reasonably to conclude that one who would commit such a crime would be less likely to speak the truth than one who would not commit such a crime,” Burrell v. State, 42 Md.App. at 140 , 399 A.2d 1354 , and the lack of a requirement of any particular mens rea makes it impossible to say that one’s conduct in committing that crime renders his credibility suspect.

1986Windsor Hills Improvement Association v. Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 389 , 73 A. (2) 531, 533.

1977Dorsey v. State, 278 Md. 221 , 362 A. 2d 642 (1976).

1977Dorsey v. State, 278 Md. 221 , 362 A. 2d 642 (1976).

1972Although the Court indicated in Millbrae that the Planning Commission had departed from the specified standards in approving the Project Precise Plan in that case, no point was made in regard to the lack of a requirement of any hearing prior to approval of such a plan. (4) The appellants fourthly contend that Resolution 244 is invalid as contrary to the Prince George’s County Charter which, in its terms, prohibits “floating zones” and “conditional zoning.” See Dal Maso v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 691 , 288 A. 2d 119 (1972).

1972Although the Court indicated in Millbrae that the Planning Commission had departed from the specified standards in approving the Project Precise Plan in that case, no point was made in regard to the lack of a requirement of any hearing prior to approval of such a plan. (4) The appellants fourthly contend that Resolution 244 is invalid as contrary to the Prince George’s County Charter which, in its terms, prohibits “floating zones” and “conditional zoning.” See Dal Maso v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 691 , 288 A. 2d 119 (1972).

1972The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cheney, supra, held that the planned unit *363 development zone involved in that case was not a “floating zone,” 429 Pa. at 634 , 241 A. 2d at 85 .

1972The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cheney, supra, held that the planned unit *363 development zone involved in that case was not a “floating zone,” 429 Pa. at 634 , 241 A. 2d at 85 .

1966Pritchard v. Warden, 209 Md. 662 , 121 A. 2d 696 (1956).

1966Pritchard v. Warden, 209 Md. 662 , 121 A. 2d 696 (1956).

1962Cf. City of Baltimore v. Walker, 208 Md. 454 .

1957In deciding the case before us, we apply the familiar rule that “The question of contributory negligence must be considered in the light of all the inferences favorable to the plaintiff’s case that may be fairly deduced from the evidence.” Baltimore Transit Co. v. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 434 .

1951In that case, this Court found, 189 Md. at page 691 , 57 A. 2d at page 828 : “The appellee not having safety gates, in the absence of all other safety devices for' crossing warnings at night, reasonable minds might differ as to whether the watchman gave the warning in sufficient time and in such a manner as to adequately warn the driver of appellant’s car of the danger.” There, we found that there was sufficient evidence that the lack of warning to the appellant was the proximate cause of the accident, to justify submission of the case to the jury.

1951In that case, this Court found, 189 Md. at page 691 , 57 A. 2d at page 828 : “The appellee not having safety gates, in the absence of all other safety devices for' crossing warnings at night, reasonable minds might differ as to whether the watchman gave the warning in sufficient time and in such a manner as to adequately warn the driver of appellant’s car of the danger.” There, we found that there was sufficient evidence that the lack of warning to the appellant was the proximate cause of the accident, to justify submission of the case to the jury.