lack instruction in Nebraska

2019The plaintiff does not challenge the statute directly, but argues that the lack of a hearing was - 389 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports SMITH v. WEDEKIND Cite as 302 Neb. 387 unconstitutional.

2019The plaintiff does not challenge the statute directly, but argues that the lack of a hearing was - 389 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports SMITH v. WEDEKIND Cite as 302 Neb. 387 unconstitutional.

2026We said “such a definition necessarily presumes that before there can be a ‘continuance’ of a proceeding, there must have been an initial setting,” 44 i.e., “the circumstance where a court proceeding set for one date is postponed to a future date.” 45 We accordingly held in State v. Space that the lack of a defense objection to the court’s pronouncement at the final plea hearing of the initial setting of the trial date did not entail continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b), because there had been no postpone- ment of something previously scheduled for a certain date. [14] In contrast to the facts of

2026We said “such a definition necessarily presumes that before there can be a ‘continuance’ of a proceeding, there must have been an initial setting,” 44 i.e., “the circumstance where a court proceeding set for one date is postponed to a future date.” 45 We accordingly held in State v. Space that the lack of a defense objection to the court’s pronouncement at the final plea hearing of the initial setting of the trial date did not entail continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b), because there had been no postpone- ment of something previously scheduled for a certain date. [14] In contrast to the facts of

2026We said “such a definition necessarily presumes that before there can be a ‘continuance’ of a proceeding, there must have been an initial setting,” 44 i.e., “the circumstance where a court proceeding set for one date is postponed to a future date.” 45 We accordingly held in State v. Space that the lack of a defense objection to the court’s pronouncement at the final plea hearing of the initial setting of the trial date did not entail continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b), because there had been no postpone- ment of something previously scheduled for a certain date. [14] In contrast to the facts of

2007Remembering the admonition from the majority opinion in Pinkard that “[ejach case must be evaluated based upon the facts indicating the parties’ intent,” 264 Neb. at 318 , 647 N.W.2d at 89 , the key collateral fact here is that Maxson did not in the 11 years after the divorce became final change the named beneficiary on his policy — even though, as the policy owner, he had the right to do so — to effect such a change if that was his intent.

2007Remembering the admonition from the majority opinion in Pinkard that “[ejach case must be evaluated based upon the facts indicating the parties’ intent,” 264 Neb. at 318 , 647 N.W.2d at 89 , the key collateral fact here is that Maxson did not in the 11 years after the divorce became final change the named beneficiary on his policy — even though, as the policy owner, he had the right to do so — to effect such a change if that was his intent.

2000Relying on Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995), Barnes contends that the instruction on failing to secure or tie down the ladder encompasses any additional instruction on the placement of the ladder.

2000Relying on Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995), Barnes contends that the instruction on failing to secure or tie down the ladder encompasses any additional instruction on the placement of the ladder.

1988State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986); State v. Lingle, 209 Neb. 492 , 308 N.W.2d 531 (1981). *78 Farm Bureau alleges that the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction, as set forth earlier in this opinion, was prejudicial because a lack of such instruction “[told] the jury that when they considered the ‘knowingly with intent to deceive’ element . . . they had to find direct, affirmative evidence on the scienter issue, particularly on the ‘intent to deceive’ portion of the element.” Brief for Appellant at 24.

1988State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986); State v. Lingle, 209 Neb. 492 , 308 N.W.2d 531 (1981). *78 Farm Bureau alleges that the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction, as set forth earlier in this opinion, was prejudicial because a lack of such instruction “[told] the jury that when they considered the ‘knowingly with intent to deceive’ element . . . they had to find direct, affirmative evidence on the scienter issue, particularly on the ‘intent to deceive’ portion of the element.” Brief for Appellant at 24.

1988State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986); State v. Lingle, 209 Neb. 492 , 308 N.W.2d 531 (1981). *78 Farm Bureau alleges that the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction, as set forth earlier in this opinion, was prejudicial because a lack of such instruction “[told] the jury that when they considered the ‘knowingly with intent to deceive’ element . . . they had to find direct, affirmative evidence on the scienter issue, particularly on the ‘intent to deceive’ portion of the element.” Brief for Appellant at 24.

1988State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986); State v. Lingle, 209 Neb. 492 , 308 N.W.2d 531 (1981). *78 Farm Bureau alleges that the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction, as set forth earlier in this opinion, was prejudicial because a lack of such instruction “[told] the jury that when they considered the ‘knowingly with intent to deceive’ element . . . they had to find direct, affirmative evidence on the scienter issue, particularly on the ‘intent to deceive’ portion of the element.” Brief for Appellant at 24.

1981Although there are substantive due process questions concerning the lack of this requirement, (see Doremus, supra; Statmus v. Leonhardt , 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.Ia. 1976); Lessard v. Schmit , 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.Wis. 1972), we dispose of the issue on equal protection grounds.

1981Although there are substantive due process questions concerning the lack of this requirement, (see Doremus, supra; Statmus v. Leonhardt , 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.Ia. 1976); Lessard v. Schmit , 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.Wis. 1972), we dispose of the issue on equal protection grounds.

1981Although there are substantive due process questions concerning the lack of this requirement, (see Doremus, supra; Statmus v. Leonhardt , 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.Ia. 1976); Lessard v. Schmit , 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.Wis. 1972), we dispose of the issue on equal protection grounds.