lack defense in Minnesota

2016State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 1984) (“[I]n a criminal trespass case the state must present evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that the defendant has no legal claim of right to be on the premises where the trespass is alleged to have occurred.”).

2001Once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense.” Hage, 595 N.W.2d at 205 (citing Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817 ) (other citation omitted); see also State v. Brechan, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn.1984) (distinguishing “affirmative defense,” for which defendant must raise the defense and bears the persuasion burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence, from “ordinary defense,” for which, once defendant makes prima facie showing that the defense is an issue in the case, bur

1995But, if the mitigating circumstance or issue is the converse of an enumerated element of the crime charged and negates that element, the defendant is required only to adduce sufficient evidence on the proffered defense to make the defense one of the issues of the case; the burden then shifts back to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense, or its converse. 8 State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (1983) (holding that defendant has initial burden of production with respect to issue of duress for specific intent crime; the burden then shifts back to the state to sho

1995But, if the mitigating circumstance or issue is the converse of an enumerated element of the crime charged and negates that element, the defendant is required only to adduce sufficient evidence on the proffered defense to make the defense one of the issues of the case; the burden then shifts back to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense, or its converse. [8] State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (1983) (holding that defendant has initial burden of production with respect to issue of duress for specific intent crime; the burden then shifts back to the state to s

2016If a defendant presents sufficient evidence, “the burden then shifts back to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense, or its converse.” Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817 .

2001Once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense.” Hage, 595 N.W.2d at 205 (citing Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817 ) (other citation omitted); see also State v. Brechan, 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn.1984) (distinguishing “affirmative defense,” for which defendant must raise the defense and bears the persuasion burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence, from “ordinary defense,” for which, once defendant makes prima facie showing that the defense is an issue in the case, bur

2024No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962); see generally Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Minn. 1988) (detailing history of sovereign immunity in Minnesota). 7 actions of its workers where the lack of immunity “would not deter” the workers’ performance but would encourage compliance with “governmental permits, operating requirements, and facility design limitations”).

2024No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962); see generally Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Minn. 1988) (detailing history of sovereign immunity in Minnesota). 7 actions of its workers where the lack of immunity “would not deter” the workers’ performance but would encourage compliance with “governmental permits, operating requirements, and facility design limitations”).

2019See State v. Barnslater , 786 N.W.2d 646 , 654 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that "[i]n light of [its] decisions in Word and Meldrum , the district court's error in failing to instruct the jury regarding the proper use of [634.20] evidence was plain" but concluding that this error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010); State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d 776 , 785 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that "[i]n light of our decision in Meldrum , the district court should have issued cautionary instructions related to the proper use of [634.20] evidence, and the failur

2015See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 236 (Minn.2005) (“In order to show that the [plain] error has affected his substantial rights, the defendant must show that the error was prejudicial and that it affected the outcome of the case.”).

2015See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005) (“In order to show that the [plain] error has affected his substantial rights, the defendant must show that the error was prejudicial and that it affected the outcome of the case.”).

2015See State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Minn. 2011). 11 Here, the jury was required to answer two questions regarding misrepresentation: (1) Did 1563 University Ave, LLC make a material misrepresentation to Seneca Specialty Insurance Company in the application process? and (2) Did RKL Landholdings, LLC make a material misrepresentation to Seneca Specialty Insurance Company in the application process?

2011The Alsides court based its decision on a number of policy reasons: (1) the lack of a standard for evaluation of a program; (2) inherent uncertainty about causation that could not be determined without intervening factors related to the student’s willingness or ability to learn; (3) a potential flood of litigation; and (4) a desire not to “embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools.” Id. at 472 (quotation omitted).

2011But although we agreed in Alsides that claims challenging the general quality of instructors or effectiveness of education received are barred, we also recognized that the doctrine does not apply to claims involving “specific aspects” of a promise to educate that “would not involve an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories.” Id. at 474 .

2010See Black, 291 N.W.2d at 212 . 9 Additionally, the State may have wanted to call Vega-Lara so that it could introduce Vega-Lara’s prior testimony.

2010See Black, 291 N.W.2d at 212 . [9] Additionally, the State may have wanted to call Vega-Lara so that it could introduce Vega-Lara's prior testimony.

2005See Gratta, 555 A.2d at 273 (“Until the Congress chooses to amend this section, this court must reluctantly follow the statute.”).

1999See Estate of Hartz, 437 N.W.2d at 752 (stating party who fails to object to special verdict form before submission to jury, waives right to later object to special verdict form): Despite Cascade’s failure to make a timely objection to the lack of a direct cause instruction, the district court may have properly reviewed the issue pursuant to the new trial motion if the lack of such an instruction was an error of “fundamental law or controlling principle.” Minn. R.

1999For example, in State v. Niska, 514 N.W.2d 260 (Minn.1994), we cited Charlton as authority for the proposition that, when raising the "justification defenses" of self-defense, entrapment, and duress, a defendant is required to make a prima facie showing of the defense, with the burden of persuasion then shifting to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense.

1999See id. at 264.

1997Although proximate cause generally is a question of fact for the jury, it is a question of law “where reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn.1995).

1997“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993); see Elias v. City of St.

1995But, if the mitigating circumstance or issue is the converse of an enumerated element of the crime charged and negates that element, the defendant is required only to adduce sufficient evidence on the proffered defense to make the defense one of the issues of the case; the burden then shifts back to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense, or its converse. 8 State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (1983) (holding that defendant has initial burden of production with respect to issue of duress for specific intent crime; the burden then shifts back to the state to sho

1995But, if the mitigating circumstance or issue is the converse of an enumerated element of the crime charged and negates that element, the defendant is required only to adduce sufficient evidence on the proffered defense to make the defense one of the issues of the case; the burden then shifts back to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the lack of the defense, or its converse. [8] State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (1983) (holding that defendant has initial burden of production with respect to issue of duress for specific intent crime; the burden then shifts back to the state to s

1988Id. at 497 .

1988Id. at 497, 498 .

1986State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 420 (Minn. 1980).

1986In any event, as we made clear in State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983), we have the primary responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine for the regulation of evidentia-ry matters and we believe that statutory rules of evidence enforced as a matter of comity should be interpreted consistently with the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, including Minn.R.Evid. 103, which codifies long-standing rules dealing with the need for objection, the conduct of admissibility hearings, the plain error doctrine, and harmless error analysis.

1984The court noted, however, that this lack of inquiry reflected the confusion created by the uninformative nature of the notice and the “resulting inability of the food stamp recipient to appreciate its meaning.” Id. at 759 (emphasis added).