lack instruction in Georgia

2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2015Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 74 (3) ( 586 SE2d 645 ) (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2015Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 74 (3) ( 586 SE2d 645 ) (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2019See Key Safety Systems , 334 Ga. App. at 720 (1), 780 S.E.2d 389 ("Questions of adequacy of a warning and proximate cause resulting from a complete lack of warning or an inadequate warning are peculiarly questions for the jury.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See Key Safety Systems , 334 Ga. App. at 720 (1), 780 S.E.2d 389 ("Questions of adequacy of a warning and proximate cause resulting from a complete lack of warning or an inadequate warning are peculiarly questions for the jury.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2018See Lyman v. State , 301 Ga. 312 , 319, 800 S.E.2d 333 (2017).

2018See Lyman v. State , 301 Ga. 312 , 319, 800 S.E.2d 333 (2017).

2018See Saffold v. State , 298 Ga. 643 , 648 (3) (b), 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016) (an erroneous limiting instruction does not warrant reversal where the underlying evidence was harmless).

2018See Saffold v. State , 298 Ga. 643 , 648 (3) (b), 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016) (an erroneous limiting instruction does not warrant reversal where the underlying evidence was harmless).

2015Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 74 (3) ( 586 SE2d 645 ) (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2015Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 74 (3) ( 586 SE2d 645 ) (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2014Notwithstanding the lack of error, we further conclude that Chavez has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel’s alleged error. 5 Chavez’s reliance upon Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 766 ( 512 SE2d 892 ) (1999), is misplaced because the passing mention of the inapplicable crimes did not rise to the level of a due process violation.

2014Notwithstanding the lack of error, we further conclude that Chavez has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel’s alleged error. 5 Chavez’s reliance upon Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 766 ( 512 SE2d 892 ) (1999), is misplaced because the passing mention of the inapplicable crimes did not rise to the level of a due process violation.

2014See Bryant v. BMC of Georgia, 188 Ga. App. 124, 125 ( 372 SE2d 280 ) (1988) (“[tjhis court has no jurisdiction to consider grounds which are not enumerated as error according to OCGA § 5-6-40”) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2014See Bryant v. BMC of Georgia, 188 Ga. App. 124, 125 ( 372 SE2d 280 ) (1988) (“[tjhis court has no jurisdiction to consider grounds which are not enumerated as error according to OCGA § 5-6-40”) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2012Id. at 477 a).

2012Id. at 477 (1).

2024Analysis “The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to 17 The Review Board did not address the Special Master’s lack of analysis on duty, mental state, and potential or actual injury. 18 The Review Board then discussed several aspects of Breault’s unprofessional conduct in the proceedings before it, but because much evidence of that alleged conduct is not in the disciplinary record and because the Board did not clearly tie its professionalism discussion to its recommendation of discipline, we do not consider i

2024Analysis “The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to 17 The Review Board did not address the Special Master’s lack of analysis on duty, mental state, and potential or actual injury. 18 The Review Board then discussed several aspects of Breault’s unprofessional conduct in the proceedings before it, but because much evidence of that alleged conduct is not in the disciplinary record and because the Board did not clearly tie its professionalism discussion to its recommendation of discipline, we do not consider i

2024“Since [Ford’s attorneys] were afforded a full opportunity, with adequate notice, to present their opposition to the imposition of sanctions, the initial lack of a hearing does not require reversal.” Carder, 261 Ga. at 142 (1).

2023See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out- of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de- fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is “testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po- lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de- fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802 (2). 31 But Henderson has not

2023See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out- of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de- fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is “testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po- lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de- fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802 (2). 31 But Henderson has not

2023See Osprey Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 439 (1), n. 2 ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017) (noting that “it would have been improper for the trial court to consider . . . evidence when evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6)”).7 Ultimately, it would be inappropriate to attempt to reconcile these disparate procedures here due to the lack of analysis in the trial court’s order and the poor state 7 It is true that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are prese

2023See Osprey Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 439 (1), n. 2 ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017) (noting that “it would have been improper for the trial court to consider . . . evidence when evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6)”).7 Ultimately, it would be inappropriate to attempt to reconcile these disparate procedures here due to the lack of analysis in the trial court’s order and the poor state 7 It is true that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are prese

2023See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out- of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de- fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is “testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po- lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de- fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802 (2). 31 But Henderson has not

2023See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out- of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de- fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is “testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po- lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de- fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802 (2). 31 But Henderson has not

2023See King, 316 Ga. at 625 (“[F]ailing to make a meritless objection is not constitutionally deficient.”). (b) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Chief Gorman’s testimony that—according to Priester—violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by commenting on Priester’s “post-Miranda silence.” At trial, before Priester’s interview was played for the jury, Chief Gorman explained that 25 Priester was read his rights under Miranda,18 agreed to answer questions without an attorney, and never invoked hi

2023See King, 316 Ga. at 625 (“[F]ailing to make a meritless objection is not constitutionally deficient.”). (b) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Chief Gorman’s testimony that—according to 25 Priester—violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by commenting on Prieter’s “post-Miranda silence.” At trial, before Priester’s interview was played for the jury, Chief Gorman explained that Priester was read his rights under Miranda,18 agreed to answer questions without an attorney, and never invoked his

2023See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out- of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de- fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is “testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po- lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de- fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802 (2). 31 But Henderson has not

2022See Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 50 (644 SE2d 853) (2007) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel performed deficiently by failing to make inquiry into whether the juror’s behavior (clutching her stomach and leaving the courtroom with the bailiff) had any impact on the rest of the panel, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of inquiry.”). (b) Albury also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter and failing to object when the trial court, while working from the jury charge given at S

2022See Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 50 (644 SE2d 853) (2007) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel performed deficiently by failing to make inquiry into whether the juror’s behavior (clutching her stomach and leaving the courtroom with the bailiff) had any impact on the rest of the panel, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of inquiry.”). (b) Albury also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter and failing to object when the trial court, while working from the jury charge given at S

2021Campbell argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the remaining highlighted comment because, “[w]ithout clarification, this argument says that the jury could consider any actions of the defendant during the course of the trial, and even the lack of defense presented to them.” But he offers no citation to authority supporting his argument that the closing argument was improper for such a reason, and we know of none. “[T]rial counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection to the [s]tate’s closing argument is not evidence of ineffective assistance.” Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573, 577

2021Campbell argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the remaining highlighted comment because, “[w]ithout clarification, this argument says that the jury could consider any actions of the defendant during the course of the trial, and even the lack of defense presented to them.” But he offers no citation to authority supporting his argument that the closing argument was improper for such a reason, and we know of none. “[T]rial counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection to the [s]tate’s closing argument is not evidence of ineffective assistance.” Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573, 577

2021Thus, even if Appellant had not raised as plain error on appeal the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction, this Court could still consider the effect of the lack of that instruction when evaluating the harm caused by the erroneously admitted accomplice hearsay. 30 above, the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction is subject to plain error review, under which convictions will be reversed only if the (unwaived and clear) error “‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights,’” meaning that it likely affected the outcome of the tri

2021As explained above, the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction is subject to plain error review, under which if Appellant had not raised as plain error on appeal the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction, this Court could still consider the effect of the lack of that instruction when evaluating the harm caused by the erroneously admitted accomplice hearsay. 30 convictions will be reversed only if the (unwaived and clear) error “‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights,’” meaning that it likely affected the outcome of the t

2020Although in this case Guillermo was present and represented by counsel at the hearing, he immediately and repeatedly objected to a final hearing on the merits of the contempt petition in light of the lack of a rule nisi informing him of the issues to be resolved. “[W]here the notice of the hearing is unreasonable, the fact that the contemnor voluntarily appears and defends at the hearing does not excuse the failure to comport with due process.”4 Accordingly, based on the events in this case, the trial court erred 4 Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 316 ( 509 SE2d 612 ) (1998).

2020Although in this case Guillermo was present and represented by counsel at the hearing, he immediately and repeatedly objected to a final hearing on the merits of the contempt petition in light of the lack of a rule nisi informing him of the issues to be resolved. “[W]here the notice of the hearing is unreasonable, the fact that the contemnor voluntarily appears and defends at the hearing does not excuse the failure to comport with due process.”4 Accordingly, based on the events in this case, the trial court erred 4 Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 316 ( 509 SE2d 612 ) (1998).

2020See also Hedquist v. Hedquist, 275 Ga. 188, 189 ( 563 SE2d 854 ) (2002). 7 by holding a final hearing on the merits of Nancy’s contempt petition, and we vacate the final judgment. 2.

2020See also Hedquist v. Hedquist, 275 Ga. 188, 189 ( 563 SE2d 854 ) (2002). 7 by holding a final hearing on the merits of Nancy’s contempt petition, and we vacate the final judgment. 2.

2019This error, affecting the fair cross-section of the jury array, required a new trial.). 18 See, e.g., Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-105 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (The court vacated the judgment, in part, with regard to the issue of whether the wrong person served on the grand jury and remanded the case to the trial court for a ruling on that issue.). 19 See, e.g., Joyner v. State, 251 Ga. 84, 85-86 (3) ( 303 SE2d 106 ) (1983) (The court found that the excusal of jurors by the sheriff was not authorized by statute.

2019This error, affecting the fair cross-section of the jury array, required a new trial.). 18 See, e.g., Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-105 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (The court vacated the judgment, in part, with regard to the issue of whether the wrong person served on the grand jury and remanded the case to the trial court for a ruling on that issue.). 19 See, e.g., Joyner v. State, 251 Ga. 84, 85-86 (3) ( 303 SE2d 106 ) (1983) (The court found that the excusal of jurors by the sheriff was not authorized by statute.

2019Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section. 17 Gaines v. State, 339 Ga. App. 527, 529 (2) ( 792 SE2d 466 ) (2016) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 18 See id. at 529 (2); see also Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 825 (2) ( 783 SE2d 344 ) (2016). 10 To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must show that “the failure to give the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the lack of the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected

2019Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section. 17 Gaines v. State, 339 Ga. App. 527, 529 (2) ( 792 SE2d 466 ) (2016) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 18 See id. at 529 (2); see also Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 825 (2) ( 783 SE2d 344 ) (2016). 10 To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must show that “the failure to give the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the lack of the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected

2019Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section. 17 Gaines v. State, 339 Ga. App. 527, 529 (2) ( 792 SE2d 466 ) (2016) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 18 See id. at 529 (2); see also Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 825 (2) ( 783 SE2d 344 ) (2016). 10 To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must show that “the failure to give the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the lack of the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected

2019Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section. 17 Gaines v. State, 339 Ga. App. 527, 529 (2) ( 792 SE2d 466 ) (2016) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 18 See id. at 529 (2); see also Samuels v. State, 335 Ga. App. 819, 825 (2) ( 783 SE2d 344 ) (2016). 10 To demonstrate plain error, the Appellant must show that “the failure to give the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the lack of the instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected

2019W. were chosen had been created as required by law, and the trial jurors had already been summoned to appear on the 17 See, e.g., Yates v. State, 274 Ga. 312, 315-316 (2) ( 553 SE2d 563 ) (2001) (The trial court was authorized to excuse potential jurors based on a determination that jury service would pose an undue hardship, but the lack of inquiry into proffered medical excuses meant there was no determination of undue hardship, resulting in an abuse of discretion.

2019W. were chosen had been created as required by law, and the trial jurors had already been summoned to appear on the 17 See, e.g., Yates v. State, 274 Ga. 312, 315-316 (2) ( 553 SE2d 563 ) (2001) (The trial court was authorized to excuse potential jurors based on a determination that jury service would pose an undue hardship, but the lack of inquiry into proffered medical excuses meant there was no determination of undue hardship, resulting in an abuse of discretion.

2019This error, affecting the fair cross-section of the jury array, required a new trial.). 18 See, e.g., Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-105 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (The court vacated the judgment, in part, with regard to the issue of whether the wrong person served on the grand jury and remanded the case to the trial court for a ruling on that issue.). 19 See, e.g., Joyner v. State, 251 Ga. 84, 85-86 (3) ( 303 SE2d 106 ) (1983) (The court found that the excusal of jurors by the sheriff was not authorized by statute.

2019This error, affecting the fair cross-section of the jury array, required a new trial.). 18 See, e.g., Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-105 (1) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (The court vacated the judgment, in part, with regard to the issue of whether the wrong person served on the grand jury and remanded the case to the trial court for a ruling on that issue.). 19 See, e.g., Joyner v. State, 251 Ga. 84, 85-86 (3) ( 303 SE2d 106 ) (1983) (The court found that the excusal of jurors by the sheriff was not authorized by statute.

2014See Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 397 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008) (statements in an opinion “concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand” are nonbinding dicta) (citation and punctuation omitted). 7 In its motion for reconsideration, Post, Buckley also argues that we exceeded our jurisdiction in addressing the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the sanctions motion, as NDD did not specifically enumerate as error the lack of a hearing.

2014See Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 397 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008) (statements in an opinion “concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand” are nonbinding dicta) (citation and punctuation omitted). 7 In its motion for reconsideration, Post, Buckley also argues that we exceeded our jurisdiction in addressing the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the sanctions motion, as NDD did not specifically enumerate as error the lack of a hearing.

2014Butler, supra, 310 Ga. App. at 24, 25-28 (1).

2014Butler, supra, 310 Ga. App. at 24, 25-28 (1).

2013See Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131, 134 ( 702 SE2d 161 ) (2010); Wilcox v. State, 297 Ga. App. 201 (3) ( 677 SE2d 142 ) (2009).

2013See Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131, 134 ( 702 SE2d 161 ) (2010); Wilcox v. State, 297 Ga. App. 201 (3) ( 677 SE2d 142 ) (2009).