13 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1932–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hagens v. Hilstongreen2 sentences2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court's denial of a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties' lifestyle was caused by the husband's disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence *8 2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties’ lifestyle was caused by the husband’s disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evi dence f | 1 | 1 |
Tieche v. Panlenergreen2 sentences2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court's denial of a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties' lifestyle was caused by the husband's disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence *8 2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties’ lifestyle was caused by the husband’s disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evi dence f | 1 | 1 |
Keyes v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Keyes v. State, 804 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("As a general rule, a defendant's contention that his injury of another was an accident bars an instruction on self[-]defense or defense of another.”); Roberts v. State, 753 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of instruction where defendant failed to present any evidence to support self-defense); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (affirming denial of justification jury instruction because it was inconsistent with alibi defense). | 1 | 1 |
Ballagas v. Scottgreen2 sentences2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court's denial of a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties' lifestyle was caused by the husband's disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife's claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence *8 2011See Ballagas v. Scott, 589 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Tieche v. Panlener, 504 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deterioration in the parties’ lifestyle was caused by the husband’s disease rather than by the accident for which the claim was made); Hagens v. Hilston, 388 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversing an order granting a new trial on the wife’s claim for loss of consortium when there was evi dence f | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Keyes v. State, 804 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("As a general rule, a defendant's contention that his injury of another was an accident bars an instruction on self[-]defense or defense of another.”); Roberts v. State, 753 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of instruction where defendant failed to present any evidence to support self-defense); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (affirming denial of justification jury instruction because it was inconsistent with alibi defense). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2006We recognize that in State v. Johnson, 695 So.2d 771, 774 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 705 So.2d 9 (Fla.1997), a panel of this court ''questioned] whether the accident privilege or immunity for statements applies to probable cause hearings as opposed to criminal trials, since it appears to be limited solely to trials by the statute’s express language.” We have now addressed the issue, and find that the privilege does extend to probable cause hearings and other phases of prosecution. . | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Williams v. State, 588 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence1992See State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1988), and Stewart v. State, 571 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1988), and Stewart v. State, 571 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Dinsmore v. Watfordgreen1 sentence1963See Hudson v. Smith, Fla.App. 1961, 135 So.2d 450 ; Johnson v. Mills, Fla. 1948, 37 So.2d 906 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Suzanne Harvey, etc. v. Geico General Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2021Co., 259 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018) (insurer’s tender of policy limits within days of an accident did not bar a bad faith claim). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ferguson
green
1 sentence2016For the reasons discussed in State v. Ferguson, 405 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Cummings v. State, 780 So.2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which we acknowledge treated earlier versions of the same statutory scheme, we hold that the accident privilege in section 316.066(4) does not confer any benefit or privilege on a person who abandons her duty to remain at the scene of any automobile accident which results in death, and who chooses instead to leave the scene of an accident, contrary to section 316.027(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cummings v. State
green
1 sentence2016For the reasons discussed in State v. Ferguson, 405 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Cummings v. State, 780 So.2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which we acknowledge treated earlier versions of the same statutory scheme, we hold that the accident privilege in section 316.066(4) does not confer any benefit or privilege on a person who abandons her duty to remain at the scene of any automobile accident which results in death, and who chooses instead to leave the scene of an accident, contrary to section 316.027(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Moyer v. State
green
1 sentence2011See Keyes v. State, 804 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("As a general rule, a defendant's contention that his injury of another was an accident bars an instruction on self[-]defense or defense of another.”); Roberts v. State, 753 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming denial of instruction where defendant failed to present any evidence to support self-defense); Moyer v. State, 558 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (affirming denial of justification jury instruction because it was inconsistent with alibi defense). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Incorporated of Florida
green
1 sentence1993After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court considered the motion and determined that appellant's questioning of appellees concerning the settlement of a prior accident claim required a mistrial, relying on Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Inc. of Fla., 227 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) and Colvin v. Williams, 564 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Colvin v. Williams
green
1 sentence1993After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court considered the motion and determined that appellant's questioning of appellees concerning the settlement of a prior accident claim required a mistrial, relying on Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Inc. of Fla., 227 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) and Colvin v. Williams, 564 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Espinoza v. State
green
1 sentence1989II We likewise hold that the additional facts alleged in the traverse establish a prima facie case that Appellee was guilty (at least as an aider and abettor) of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of § 316.061, Fla. Stat. See Espinoza v State, 183 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Farley v. Gateway Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1980As stated in Farley, supra, section 627.733(4) does not make the uninsured owner an insurer, so there is no basis upon which State Farm can invoke the statute requiring two or more insurers to share the payment pro-rata. 4 (4) An owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required by this section who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an accident shall have no immunity from tort liability, but shall be personally liable for the payment of benefits under s. 627.736. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Johnson v. Mills
green
1 sentence1963See Hudson v. Smith, Fla.App. 1961, 135 So.2d 450 ; Johnson v. Mills, Fla. 1948, 37 So.2d 906 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Rosen, Et Vir. v. City of Miami
green
2 sentences1943The appellant cites the case of Rosen v. City of Miami, 141 Fla. 664 , 193 So. 749 , involving an automobile collision at the intersection of Southwest 16th Avenue with Southwest Eleventh Street in the City of Miami, in which this Court considered stop signs placed at street intersections to be observed by motorists for their safety when operating automobiles on the streets of a city. 1943The appellant cites the case of Rosen v. City of Miami, 141 Fla. 664 , 193 So. 749 , involving an automobile collision at the intersection of Southwest 16th Avenue with Southwest Eleventh Street in the City of Miami, in which this Court considered stop signs placed at street intersections to be observed by motorists for their safety when operating automobiles on the streets of a city. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Hurley v. City of Spokane
neutral
1 sentence1932In Hurley v. City of Spokane, et al., Supreme Court of Washington, reported in 217 Pac. 1004 , the question involved was to all intents the same as is involved here and there the Court said: “But it is said that to the appellant Gertrude Hurley cannot be attributed the contributory negligence, of the driver, her brother. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.